Daily Papers

Recent large language models (LLMs) can generate long Chain-of-Thought (CoT) at test time, enabling them to solve complex tasks. These reasoning steps in CoT are often assumed as a faithful reflection of the model's internal thinking process, and used to monitor unsafe intentions. However, we find many reasoning steps don't truly contribute to LLMs' prediction. We measure the step-wise causal influence of each reasoning step on the model's final prediction with a proposed True Thinking Score (TTS). We reveal that LLMs often interleave between true-thinking steps (which are genuinely used to produce the final output) and decorative-thinking steps (which only give the appearance of reasoning but have minimal causal impact). Notably, only a small subset of the total reasoning steps have a high TTS that causally drive the model's prediction: e.g., for the AIME dataset, only an average of 2.3% of reasoning steps in CoT have a TTS >= 0.7 (range: 0-1) under the Qwen-2.5 model. Furthermore, we identify a TrueThinking direction in the latent space of LLMs. By steering along or against this direction, we can force the model to perform or disregard certain CoT steps when computing the final result. Finally, we highlight that self-verification steps in CoT (i.e., aha moments) can also be decorative, where LLMs do not truly verify their solution. Steering along the TrueThinking direction can force internal reasoning over these steps, resulting in a change in the final results. Overall, our work reveals that LLMs often verbalize reasoning steps without actually performing them internally, which undermines both the efficiency of LLM reasoning and the trustworthiness of CoT.

This study evaluates the performance of OpenAI's o1-preview model in higher-order cognitive domains, including critical thinking, systematic thinking, computational thinking, data literacy, creative thinking, logical reasoning, and scientific reasoning. Using established benchmarks, we compared the o1-preview models's performance to human participants from diverse educational levels. o1-preview achieved a mean score of 24.33 on the Ennis-Weir Critical Thinking Essay Test (EWCTET), surpassing undergraduate (13.8) and postgraduate (18.39) participants (z = 1.60 and 0.90, respectively). In systematic thinking, it scored 46.1, SD = 4.12 on the Lake Urmia Vignette, significantly outperforming the human mean (20.08, SD = 8.13, z = 3.20). For data literacy, o1-preview scored 8.60, SD = 0.70 on Merk et al.'s "Use Data" dimension, compared to the human post-test mean of 4.17, SD = 2.02 (z = 2.19). On creative thinking tasks, the model achieved originality scores of 2.98, SD = 0.73, higher than the human mean of 1.74 (z = 0.71). In logical reasoning (LogiQA), it outperformed humans with average 90%, SD = 10% accuracy versus 86%, SD = 6.5% (z = 0.62). For scientific reasoning, it achieved near-perfect performance (mean = 0.99, SD = 0.12) on the TOSLS,, exceeding the highest human scores of 0.85, SD = 0.13 (z = 1.78). While o1-preview excelled in structured tasks, it showed limitations in problem-solving and adaptive reasoning. These results demonstrate the potential of AI to complement education in structured assessments but highlight the need for ethical oversight and refinement for broader applications.

While there are numerous benchmarks comparing the performance of modern language models (LMs), end-task evaluations often conflate notions of *factual accuracy* ("truth") and *reasoning ability* ("rationality", or "honesty" in the sense of correctly reporting implications of beliefs). Our goal is a dataset that clearly distinguishes these two notions. Our approach is to leverage and extend a collection of human-annotated *entailment trees*, engineered to express both good and bad chains of reasoning, and using a mixture of true and false facts, in particular including counterfactual examples, to avoid belief bias (also known as the "content effect"). The resulting dataset, called BaRDa, contains 3000 entailments (1787 valid, 1213 invalid), using 6681 true and 2319 false statements. Testing on four GPT-series models, GPT3(curie)/GPT3(davinici)/3.5/4, we find factual accuracy (truth) scores of 74.1/80.6/82.6/87.1 and reasoning accuracy scores of 63.1/78.0/71.8/79.2. This shows the clear progression of models towards improved factual accuracy and entailment reasoning, and the dataset provides a new benchmark that more cleanly separates and quantifies these two notions.

Recent advancements in reasoning-enhanced large language models (LLMs), such as DeepSeek-R1 and OpenAI-o3, have demonstrated significant progress. However, their application in professional medical contexts remains underexplored, particularly in evaluating the quality of their reasoning processes alongside final outputs. Here, we introduce MedR-Bench, a benchmarking dataset of 1,453 structured patient cases, annotated with reasoning references derived from clinical case reports. Spanning 13 body systems and 10 specialties, it includes both common and rare diseases. To comprehensively evaluate LLM performance, we propose a framework encompassing three critical examination recommendation, diagnostic decision-making, and treatment planning, simulating the entire patient care journey. To assess reasoning quality, we present the Reasoning Evaluator, a novel automated system that objectively scores free-text reasoning responses based on efficiency, actuality, and completeness using dynamic cross-referencing and evidence checks. Using this benchmark, we evaluate five state-of-the-art reasoning LLMs, including DeepSeek-R1, OpenAI-o3-mini, and Gemini-2.0-Flash Thinking, etc. Our results show that current LLMs achieve over 85% accuracy in relatively simple diagnostic tasks when provided with sufficient examination results. However, performance declines in more complex tasks, such as examination recommendation and treatment planning. While reasoning outputs are generally reliable, with factuality scores exceeding 90%, critical reasoning steps are frequently missed. These findings underscore both the progress and limitations of clinical LLMs. Notably, open-source models like DeepSeek-R1 are narrowing the gap with proprietary systems, highlighting their potential to drive accessible and equitable advancements in healthcare.

Automatic evaluation of long-form literary writing remains challenging, as generic LLM-as-Judge approaches may not fully capture creativity-related dimensions such as originality and flexibility. Although the Torrance Test of Creative Writing (TTCW) provides a structured creativity framework, and prior work has demonstrated reference-based TTCW evaluation at the pairwise level, no large-scale dataset exists for long-form TTCW-based literary review generation. We address this gap by constructing a dataset of 263,911 long-form stories, each annotated with scalar scores and meta-synthesised review comments across 14 TTCW-based dimensions. Using this dataset, we fine-tune Qwen3 models at two scales, 4B and 8B, under two conditions: with and without reasoning content. Results show that non-reasoning fine-tuning achieves stronger and more stable performance, with the best setting reaching an evaluation score of 0.6820. Further analysis shows that reasoning-supervised models are more prone to parse failures, often continuing with irrelevant or repetitive reasoning-style text rather than completing the required 14-metric review report. These results suggest that, for fixed-format rubric-based review generation, reasoning supervision is not straightforwardly beneficial, and precise metric-aligned scoring remains challenging even after task-specific fine-tuning.

The rapid escalation from elementary school-level to frontier problems of the difficulty for LLM benchmarks in recent years have weaved a miracle for researchers that we are only inches away from surpassing human intelligence. However, is the LLMs' remarkable reasoning ability indeed comes from true intelligence by human standards, or are they simply reciting solutions witnessed during training at an Internet level? To study this problem, we propose RoR-Bench, a novel, multi-modal benchmark for detecting LLM's recitation behavior when asked simple reasoning problems but with conditions subtly shifted, and conduct empirical analysis on our benchmark. Surprisingly, we found existing cutting-edge LLMs unanimously exhibits extremely severe recitation behavior; by changing one phrase in the condition, top models such as OpenAI-o1 and DeepSeek-R1 can suffer 60% performance loss on elementary school-level arithmetic and reasoning problems. Such findings are a wake-up call to the LLM community that compels us to re-evaluate the true intelligence level of cutting-edge LLMs.

Mathematical reasoning models are widely deployed in education, automated tutoring, and decision support systems despite exhibiting fundamental computational instabilities. We demonstrate that state-of-the-art models (Qwen2.5-Math-7B) achieve 61% accuracy through a mixture of reliable and unreliable reasoning pathways: 18.4% of correct predictions employ stable, faithful reasoning while 81.6% emerge through computationally inconsistent pathways. Additionally, 8.8% of all predictions are silent failures -- confident yet incorrect outputs. Through comprehensive analysis using novel faithfulness metrics, we reveal: (1) reasoning quality shows weak negative correlation with correctness (r=-0.21, p=0.002), reflecting a binary classification threshold artifact rather than a monotonic inverse relationship; (2) scaling from 1.5B to 7B parameters (4.7x increase) provides zero accuracy benefit on our evaluated subset (6% of GSM8K), requiring validation on the complete benchmark; and (3) latent reasoning employs diverse computational strategies, with ~20% sharing CoT-like patterns. These findings highlight that benchmark accuracy can mask computational unreliability, demanding evaluation reforms measuring stability beyond single-sample metrics.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive reasoning capabilities by scaling test-time compute via long Chain-of-Thought (CoT). However, recent findings suggest that raw token counts are unreliable proxies for reasoning quality: increased generation length does not consistently correlate with accuracy and may instead signal "overthinking," leading to performance degradation. In this work, we quantify inference-time effort by identifying deep-thinking tokens -- tokens where internal predictions undergo significant revisions in deeper model layers prior to convergence. Across four challenging mathematical and scientific benchmarks (AIME 24/25, HMMT 25, and GPQA-diamond) and a diverse set of reasoning-focused models (GPT-OSS, DeepSeek-R1, and Qwen3), we show that deep-thinking ratio (the proportion of deep-thinking tokens in a generated sequence) exhibits a robust and consistently positive correlation with accuracy, substantially outperforming both length-based and confidence-based baselines. Leveraging this insight, we introduce Think@n, a test-time scaling strategy that prioritizes samples with high deep-thinking ratios. We demonstrate that Think@n matches or exceeds standard self-consistency performance while significantly reducing inference costs by enabling the early rejection of unpromising generations based on short prefixes.

Large Language Models, such as Generative Pre-trained Transformer 3 (aka. GPT-3), have been developed to understand language through the analysis of extensive text data, allowing them to identify patterns and connections between words. While LLMs have demonstrated impressive performance across various text-related tasks, they encounter challenges in tasks associated with reasoning. To address this challenge, Chain of Thought(CoT) prompting method has been proposed as a means to enhance LLMs' proficiency in complex reasoning tasks like solving math word problems and answering questions based on logical argumentative reasoning. The primary aim of this research is to assess how well four language models can grade reflective essays of third-year medical students. The assessment will specifically target the evaluation of critical thinking skills using CoT prompting. The research will provide the following contributions; to introduce and educate on the process of instructing models to evaluate reflective essays from a dataset they have not been previously trained on; to illustrate the use of CoT prompting as an instructional approach for training large models to carry out particular tasks. Our results suggest that among all the models, Llama-7b performs the least effectively, displaying the highest mean squared error. Conversely, ChatGPT emerges as the superior model, boasting a higher Cohen kappa score value of 0.53. Lastly, it's important to note that the selected models do prioritise user privacy by allowing users to delete their own conducted conversations.

Although counterfactual reasoning is a fundamental aspect of intelligence, the lack of large-scale counterfactual open-___domain question-answering (QA) benchmarks makes it difficult to evaluate and improve models on this ability. To address this void, we introduce the first such dataset, named IfQA, where each question is based on a counterfactual presupposition via an "if" clause. For example, if Los Angeles was on the east coast of the U.S., what would be the time difference between Los Angeles and Paris? Such questions require models to go beyond retrieving direct factual knowledge from the Web: they must identify the right information to retrieve and reason about an imagined situation that may even go against the facts built into their parameters. The IfQA dataset contains over 3,800 questions that were annotated annotated by crowdworkers on relevant Wikipedia passages. Empirical analysis reveals that the IfQA dataset is highly challenging for existing open-___domain QA methods, including supervised retrieve-then-read pipeline methods (EM score 36.2), as well as recent few-shot approaches such as chain-of-thought prompting with GPT-3 (EM score 27.4). The unique challenges posed by the IfQA benchmark will push open-___domain QA research on both retrieval and counterfactual reasoning fronts.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) show strong capabilities in complex reasoning, yet their marginal gains on evidence-dependent factual questions are limited. We find this limitation is partially attributable to a reasoning-answer hit gap, where the model identifies the correct facts during reasoning but fails to incorporate them into the final response, thereby reducing factual fidelity. To address this issue, we propose MR-ALIGN, a Meta-Reasoning informed alignment framework that enhances factuality without relying on external verifiers. MR-ALIGN quantifies state transition probabilities along the model's thinking process and constructs a transition-aware implicit reward that reinforces beneficial reasoning patterns while suppressing defective ones at the atomic thinking segments. This re-weighting reshapes token-level signals into probability-aware segment scores, encouraging coherent reasoning trajectories that are more conducive to factual correctness. Empirical evaluations across four factual QA datasets and one long-form factuality benchmark show that MR-ALIGN consistently improves accuracy and truthfulness while reducing misleading reasoning. These results highlight that aligning the reasoning process itself, rather than merely the outputs, is pivotal for advancing factuality in LRMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate significant potential but face challenges in complex financial reasoning tasks requiring both ___domain knowledge and sophisticated reasoning. Current evaluation benchmarks often fall short by not decoupling these capabilities indicators from single task performance and lack root cause analysis for task failure. To address this, we introduce FinEval-KR, a novel evaluation framework for decoupling and quantifying LLMs' knowledge and reasoning abilities independently, proposing distinct knowledge score and reasoning score metrics. Inspired by cognitive science, we further propose a cognitive score based on Bloom's taxonomy to analyze capabilities in reasoning tasks across different cognitive levels. We also release a new open-source Chinese financial reasoning dataset covering 22 subfields to support reproducible research and further advancements in financial reasoning. Our experimental results reveal that LLM reasoning ability and higher-order cognitive ability are the core factors influencing reasoning accuracy. We also specifically find that even top models still face a bottleneck with knowledge application. Furthermore, our analysis shows that specialized financial LLMs generally lag behind the top general large models across multiple metrics.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have significantly enhanced their capabilities in complex problem-solving by introducing a thinking draft that enables multi-path Chain-of-Thought explorations before producing final answers. Ensuring the faithfulness of these intermediate reasoning processes is crucial for reliable monitoring, interpretation, and effective control. In this paper, we propose a systematic counterfactual intervention framework to rigorously evaluate thinking draft faithfulness. Our approach focuses on two complementary dimensions: (1) Intra-Draft Faithfulness, which assesses whether individual reasoning steps causally influence subsequent steps and the final draft conclusion through counterfactual step insertions; and (2) Draft-to-Answer Faithfulness, which evaluates whether final answers are logically consistent with and dependent on the thinking draft, by perturbing the draft's concluding logic. We conduct extensive experiments across six state-of-the-art LRMs. Our findings show that current LRMs demonstrate selective faithfulness to intermediate reasoning steps and frequently fail to faithfully align with the draft conclusions. These results underscore the need for more faithful and interpretable reasoning in advanced LRMs.

In the age of open and free information, a concerning trend of reliance on AI is emerging. However, existing AI tools struggle to evaluate the credibility of information and to justify their assessments. Hence, there is a growing need for systems that can help users evaluate the trustworthiness of online information. Although major search engines incorporate AI features, they often lack clear reliability indicators. We present TrueGL, a model that makes trustworthy search results more accessible. The model is a fine-tuned version of IBM's Granite-1B, trained on the custom dataset and integrated into a search engine with a reliability scoring system. We evaluate the system using prompt engineering and assigning each statement a continuous reliability score from 0.1 to 1, then instructing the model to return a textual explanation alongside the score. Each model's predicted scores are measured against real scores using standard evaluation metrics. TrueGL consistently outperforms other small-scale LLMs and rule-based approaches across all experiments on key evaluation metrics, including MAE, RMSE, and R2. The model's high accuracy, broad content coverage, and ease of use make trustworthy information more accessible and help reduce the spread of false or misleading content online. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/AlgazinovAleksandr/TrueGL, and our model is publicly released at https://huggingface.co/JoydeepC/trueGL.

This paper examines the zero-shot ability of Large Language Models (LLMs) to detect multiple-choice questions with no correct answer, a crucial aspect of educational assessment quality. We explore this ability not only as a measure of subject matter knowledge but also as an indicator of critical thinking within LLMs. Our experiments, utilizing a range of LLMs on diverse questions, highlight the significant performance gap between questions with a single correct answer and those without. Llama-3.1-405B stands out by successfully identifying the lack of a valid answer in many instances. These findings suggest that LLMs should prioritize critical thinking over blind instruction following and caution against their use in educational settings where questions with incorrect answers might lead to inaccurate evaluations. This research sets a benchmark for assessing critical thinking in LLMs and emphasizes the need for ongoing model alignment to ensure genuine user comprehension and assistance.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning has been proposed as a transparency mechanism for large language models in safety-critical deployments, yet its effectiveness depends on faithfulness (whether models accurately verbalize the factors that actually influence their outputs), a property that prior evaluations have examined in only two proprietary models, finding acknowledgment rates as low as 25% for Claude 3.7 Sonnet and 39% for DeepSeek-R1. To extend this evaluation across the open-weight ecosystem, this study tests 12 open-weight reasoning models spanning 9 architectural families (7B-685B parameters) on 498 multiple-choice questions from MMLU and GPQA Diamond, injecting six categories of reasoning hints (sycophancy, consistency, visual pattern, metadata, grader hacking, and unethical information) and measuring the rate at which models acknowledge hint influence in their CoT when hints successfully alter answers. Across 41,832 inference runs, overall faithfulness rates range from 39.7% (Seed-1.6-Flash) to 89.9% (DeepSeek-V3.2-Speciale) across model families, with consistency hints (35.5%) and sycophancy hints (53.9%) exhibiting the lowest acknowledgment rates. Training methodology and model family predict faithfulness more strongly than parameter count, and keyword-based analysis reveals a striking gap between thinking-token acknowledgment (approximately 87.5%) and answer-text acknowledgment (approximately 28.6%), suggesting that models internally recognize hint influence but systematically suppress this acknowledgment in their outputs. These findings carry direct implications for the viability of CoT monitoring as a safety mechanism and suggest that faithfulness is not a fixed property of reasoning models but varies systematically with architecture, training method, and the nature of the influencing cue.

Large Language Models (LLMs) trained via Reinforcement Learning (RL) have recently achieved impressive results on reasoning benchmarks. Yet, growing evidence shows that these models often generate longer but ineffective chains of thought (CoTs), calling into question whether benchmark gains reflect real reasoning improvements. We present new evidence of overthinking, where models disregard correct solutions even when explicitly provided, instead continuing to generate unnecessary reasoning steps that often lead to incorrect conclusions. Experiments on three state-of-the-art models using the AIME2024 math benchmark reveal critical limitations in these models ability to integrate corrective information, posing new challenges for achieving robust and interpretable reasoning.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable performance across a wide range of mathematical benchmarks. However, concerns remain as to whether these successes reflect genuine reasoning or superficial pattern recognition. Existing evaluation methods, which typically focus either on the final answer or on the intermediate reasoning steps, reduce mathematical reasoning to a shallow input-output mapping, overlooking its inherently multi-stage and multi-dimensional cognitive nature. Inspired by Polya's problem-solving theory, we propose SMART, a benchmark that decomposes mathematical problem-solving into four cognitive dimensions: Semantic Understanding, Mathematical Reasoning, Arithmetic Computation, and Reflection & Refinement, and introduces dimension-specific tasks to measure the corresponding cognitive processes of LLMs. We apply SMART to 22 state-of-the-art open- and closed-source LLMs and uncover substantial discrepancies in their capabilities across dimensions. Our findings reveal genuine weaknesses in current models and motivate a new metric, the All-Pass Score, designed to better capture true problem-solving capability.

Automated scoring of ESG narrative disclosures with large language models (LLMs) is gaining traction, yet whether reasoning-heavy frontier models add value commensurate with their cost remains empirically unsettled. We evaluate this question on a corpus of ten Japanese listed firms across three rubric axes -- quantitative targets, progress-tracking infrastructure, and external-standard alignment -- using a four-model consensus design that combines a reasoning-on frontier model with three reasoning-off contemporaries. Across 120 firm x axis x model scores, the pooled mean absolute deviation between the reasoning-on model and each reasoning-off counterpart is 0.38 on a 5-point scale; only 2% of pairwise comparisons reach a two-point deviation, and none exceeds two points. Per-firm cost accounting shows the reasoning-on arm alone costs roughly 5.6x as much as the three-provider reasoning-off ensemble, for outcomes that differ only within small margins. We conclude that in span-based ESG narrative scoring, reasoning-heavy deployment does not materially improve outcomes relative to reasoning-off consensus, while substantially increasing operational cost. We discuss implications for cost-effective ESG auto-scoring pipelines and LLM deployment governance in applied accountability settings. An earlier version of this work is available on SSRN (Abstract ID 6683303).

Self-consistency has emerged as a popular technique for improving large language model accuracy on reasoning tasks. The approach is straightforward: generate multiple reasoning paths and select the most common answer through majority voting. While this reliably boosts accuracy, it remains unclear whether these gains reflect genuine improvements in reasoning quality. We investigate a fundamental question that has not been studied before: does inference scaling improve reasoning faithfulness? We conduct a comprehensive empirical study across four frontier models (GPT-5.2, Claude Opus 4.5, Gemini-3-flash-preview, and DeepSeek-v3.2) on 100 GSM8K mathematical reasoning problems. Our analysis employs bootstrap confidence intervals, McNemar's tests for paired comparisons, and Cohen's d effect sizes to quantify the effects rigorously. The results reveal striking differences across models that challenge common assumptions about self-consistency. GPT-5.2 shows the expected pattern: accuracy improves from 78% to 90% at N=5, with faithfulness remaining relatively stable (0.540 to 0.510). Claude Opus 4.5 tells a completely different story. Its accuracy actually drops from 78% to 74.3% while faithfulness jumps dramatically from 0.270 to 0.891 at N=5. DeepSeek-v3.2, already at 98% accuracy, shows ceiling effects with modest faithfulness gains (0.440 to 0.541). Gemini-3-flash improves from 81% to 86% accuracy with a slight faithfulness decrease (0.260 to 0.212). Problem difficulty analysis reveals that GPT-5.2 solves 82% of hard problems while breaking only 13% of easy ones. Claude, in contrast, breaks 23% of easy problems, explaining its accuracy decrease. These findings matter for practitioners: self-consistency is not universally beneficial, and teams should test their specific models before deployment. We release our code and provide practical recommendations for navigating these tradeoffs.

Although large Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance in a wide range of multimodal tasks, their true reasoning capabilities on human IQ tests remain underexplored. To advance research on the fluid intelligence of VLMs, we introduce **IQBench**, a new benchmark designed to evaluate VLMs on standardized visual IQ tests. We focus on evaluating the reasoning capabilities of VLMs, which we argue are more important than the accuracy of the final prediction. **Our benchmark is visually centric, minimizing the dependence on unnecessary textual content**, thus encouraging models to derive answers primarily from image-based information rather than learned textual knowledge. To this end, we manually collected and annotated 500 visual IQ questions to **prevent unintentional data leakage during training**. Unlike prior work that focuses primarily on the accuracy of the final answer, we evaluate the reasoning ability of the models by assessing their explanations and the patterns used to solve each problem, along with the accuracy of the final prediction and human evaluation. Our experiments show that there are substantial performance disparities between tasks, with models such as `o4-mini`, `gemini-2.5-flash`, and `claude-3.7-sonnet` achieving the highest average accuracies of 0.615, 0.578, and 0.548, respectively. However, all models struggle with 3D spatial and anagram reasoning tasks, highlighting significant limitations in current VLMs' general reasoning abilities. In terms of reasoning scores, `o4-mini`, `gemini-2.5-flash`, and `claude-3.7-sonnet` achieved top averages of 0.696, 0.586, and 0.516, respectively. These results highlight inconsistencies between the reasoning processes of the models and their final answers, emphasizing the importance of evaluating the accuracy of the reasoning in addition to the final predictions.

As LLM benchmarks saturate, the evaluation community has pursued two strategies to increase difficulty: escalating knowledge demands (GPQA, HLE) or removing knowledge entirely in favor of abstract reasoning (ARC-AGI). The first conflates memorization with capability; the second divorces reasoning from the practical contexts in which it matters. We take a different approach. The Grounded Integration Measure (GIM) is a benchmark of 820 original problems (615 public, 205 private) where difficulty comes from integration; individual problems require coordinating multiple cognitive operations (constraint satisfaction, state tracking, epistemic vigilance, audience calibration) over broadly accessible knowledge, so that reasoning stays grounded in realistic tasks without being gated on specialized expertise. Each problem is an original expert-authored composition, majority with rubric-decomposed scoring (median 6 independently judged criteria). A balanced public--private split provides built-in contamination diagnostic. We calibrate a continuous response 2-parameter logistic (2PL) IRT model over >200k prompt-response pairs across 28 models, producing robust ability estimates that correctly order test-configurations even when raw accuracy is distorted by errors or missing data, addressing a common challenge in benchmark reporting. Using this framework, we present a comprehensive leaderboard spanning 22 models and 47 test-configurations (unique model, thinking-level pairs), and conduct what is to our knowledge the most extensive published study of how test-time compute trades off against model capability on a fixed benchmark: 11 models swept across 35 test-configurations. We observe that within-family configuration choices, such as thinking budget and quantization, matter as much as model selection. We release the evaluation framework, calibrated IRT parameters, and all public problems.

Recently, with the chain of thought (CoT) prompting, large language models (LLMs), e.g., GPT-3, have shown strong reasoning ability in several natural language processing tasks such as arithmetic, commonsense, and logical reasoning. However, LLMs with CoT require multi-step prompting and multi-token prediction, which is highly sensitive to individual mistakes and vulnerable to error accumulation. The above issues make the LLMs need the ability to verify the answers. In fact, after inferring conclusions in some thinking decision tasks, people often check them by re-verifying steps to avoid some mistakes. In this paper, we propose and prove that LLMs also have similar self-verification abilities. We take the conclusion obtained by CoT as one of the conditions for solving the original problem. By taking turns masking the original conditions and predicting their results, we calculate an explainable answer verification score based on whether the re-predicted conditions are correct. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed method can improve the reasoning performance on various arithmetic, commonsense, and logical reasoning datasets. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/WENGSYX/Self-Verification.

Recent Large Language Models (LLMs) have reported high accuracy on reasoning benchmarks. However, it is still unclear whether the observed results arise from true reasoning or from statistical recall of the training set. Inspired by the ladder of causation (Pearl, 2009) and its three levels (associations, interventions and counterfactuals), this paper introduces RE-IMAGINE, a framework to characterize a hierarchy of reasoning ability in LLMs, alongside an automated pipeline to generate problem variations at different levels of the hierarchy. By altering problems in an intermediate symbolic representation, RE-IMAGINE generates arbitrarily many problems that are not solvable using memorization alone. Moreover, the framework is general and can work across reasoning domains, including math, code, and logic. We demonstrate our framework on four widely-used benchmarks to evaluate several families of LLMs, and observe reductions in performance when the models are queried with problem variations. These assessments indicate a degree of reliance on statistical recall for past performance, and open the door to further research targeting skills across the reasoning hierarchy.

Reward models can significantly enhance the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs), but they typically require extensive curated data and costly training. To mitigate these challenges, training-free approaches such as LLM-as-a-Judge leverage the intrinsic reasoning abilities of LLMs to evaluate responses, achieving promising results. Recent works have also indicated that model confidence can serve effectively as a reward metric, distinguishing between chain-of-thought (CoT) and non-CoT paths. However, the concept of using confidence as a reward has not been comprehensively studied. In this work, we systematically investigate Confidence-as-a-Reward (CRew), a simple yet powerful training-free method that utilizes token-level confidence in the model's final answers as a proxy for reward, especially suitable for close-ended tasks. Through extensive experiments on mathematical reasoning tasks, we demonstrate that CRew outperforms existing training-free reward approaches on the MATH500 and RewardMATH benchmarks, and even surpasses most trained reward models. We further identify a strong correlation between CRew scores and the actual reasoning performance of the model. Additionally, we find that CRew can effectively filter high-quality training data. Building upon these insights, we propose CRew-DPO, a training strategy that constructs preference data from confidence scores combined with correctness signals. Finetuning with CRew-DPO further enhances the model's judging capabilities and consistently outperforms existing self-training methods.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has marked a significant advancement in enhancing the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Previous studies have developed various extensions of CoT, which focus primarily on enhancing end-task performance. In addition, there has been research on assessing the quality of reasoning chains in CoT. This raises an intriguing question: Is it possible to predict the accuracy of LLM outputs by scrutinizing the reasoning chains they generate? To answer this research question, we introduce a benchmark, R2PE, designed specifically to explore the relationship between reasoning chains and performance in various reasoning tasks spanning five different domains. This benchmark aims to measure the falsehood of the final output of LLMs based on the reasoning steps. To make full use of information in multiple reasoning chains, we propose the process discernibility score (PDS) framework that beats the answer-checking baseline by a large margin. Concretely, this resulted in an average of 5.1% increase in the F1 score across all 45 subsets within R2PE. We further demonstrate our PDS's efficacy in advancing open-___domain QA accuracy. Data and code are available at https://github.com/XinXU-USTC/R2PE.

Test-time scaling increases inference-time computation by allowing models to generate long reasoning chains, and has shown strong performance across many domains. However, in this work, we show that this approach is not yet effective for knowledge-intensive tasks, where high factual accuracy and low hallucination rates are essential. We conduct a comprehensive evaluation of test-time scaling using 12 reasoning models on two knowledge-intensive benchmarks. Our results reveal that increasing test-time computation does not consistently improve accuracy and, in many cases, it even leads to more hallucinations. We then analyze how extended reasoning affects hallucination behavior. We find that reduced hallucinations often result from the model choosing to abstain after thinking more, rather than from improved factual recall. Conversely, for some models, longer reasoning encourages attempts on previously unanswered questions, many of which result in hallucinations. Case studies show that extended reasoning can induce confirmation bias, leading to overconfident hallucinations. Despite these limitations, we observe that compared to non-thinking, enabling thinking remains beneficial. Code and data are available at https://github.com/XuZhao0/tts-knowledge

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning has significantly advanced state-of-the-art AI capabilities. However, recent studies have shown that CoT reasoning is not always faithful when models face an explicit bias in their prompts, i.e., the CoT can give an incorrect picture of how models arrive at conclusions. We go further and show that unfaithful CoT can also occur on realistic prompts with no artificial bias. We find that when separately presented with the questions "Is X bigger than Y?" and "Is Y bigger than X?", models sometimes produce superficially coherent arguments to justify systematically answering Yes to both questions or No to both questions, despite such responses being logically contradictory. We show preliminary evidence that this is due to models' implicit biases towards Yes or No, thus labeling this unfaithfulness as Implicit Post-Hoc Rationalization. Our results reveal that several production models exhibit surprisingly high rates of post-hoc rationalization in our settings: GPT-4o-mini (13%) and Haiku 3.5 (7%). While frontier models are more faithful, especially thinking ones, none are entirely faithful: Gemini 2.5 Flash (2.17%), ChatGPT-4o (0.49%), DeepSeek R1 (0.37%), Gemini 2.5 Pro (0.14%), and Sonnet 3.7 with thinking (0.04%). We also investigate Unfaithful Illogical Shortcuts, where models use subtly illogical reasoning to try to make a speculative answer to hard maths problems seem rigorously proven. Our findings raise challenges for strategies for detecting undesired behavior in LLMs via the chain of thought.

Recent advancements in large reasoning models (LRMs) have introduced an intermediate "thinking" process prior to generating final answers, improving their reasoning capabilities on complex downstream tasks. However, the potential of LRMs as evaluators for machine translation (MT) quality remains underexplored. We provides the first systematic analysis of LRM-as-a-judge in MT evaluation. We identify key challenges, revealing LRMs require tailored evaluation materials, tend to "overthink" simpler instances and have issues with scoring mechanisms leading to overestimation. To address these, we propose to calibrate LRM thinking by training them on synthetic, human-like thinking trajectories. Our experiments on WMT24 Metrics benchmarks demonstrate that this approach largely reduces thinking budgets by ~35x while concurrently improving evaluation performance across different LRM scales from 7B to 32B (e.g., R1-Distill-Qwen-7B achieves a +8.7 correlation point improvement). These findings highlight the potential of efficiently calibrated LRMs to advance fine-grained automatic MT evaluation.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have shown impressive capabilities in multi-step reasoning tasks. However, alongside these successes, a more deceptive form of model error has emerged--Reasoning Hallucination--where logically coherent but factually incorrect reasoning traces lead to persuasive yet faulty conclusions. Unlike traditional hallucinations, these errors are embedded within structured reasoning, making them more difficult to detect and potentially more harmful. In this work, we investigate reasoning hallucinations from a mechanistic perspective. We propose the Reasoning Score, which quantifies the depth of reasoning by measuring the divergence between logits obtained from projecting late layers of LRMs to the vocabulary space, effectively distinguishing shallow pattern-matching from genuine deep reasoning. Using this score, we conduct an in-depth analysis on the ReTruthQA dataset and identify two key reasoning hallucination patterns: early-stage fluctuation in reasoning depth and incorrect backtracking to flawed prior steps. These insights motivate our Reasoning Hallucination Detection (RHD) framework, which achieves state-of-the-art performance across multiple domains. To mitigate reasoning hallucinations, we further introduce GRPO-R, an enhanced reinforcement learning algorithm that incorporates step-level deep reasoning rewards via potential-based shaping. Our theoretical analysis establishes stronger generalization guarantees, and experiments demonstrate improved reasoning quality and reduced hallucination rates.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) allocate substantial inference-time compute to Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning, improving performance on mathematics, scientific QA, and tool usage. However, this introduces overthinking: LRMs often reach a correct intermediate solution, continue reasoning, and overwrite it with an incorrect answer. We first demonstrate that oracle stopping--where we inject </think> at every sentence boundary and select the best stopping point in hindsight--improves average accuracy by 8% while reducing thinking tokens by 72%, exposing substantial overthinking. Motivated by this finding, we propose ThinkBrake, which monitors the log-probability margin between the top continuation token and </think> at sentence boundaries, stopping reasoning when this margin narrows. ThinkBrake requires no training and achieves favorable accuracy-efficiency trade-offs across math, scientific QA, and tool usage benchmarks, reducing thinking token usage by up to 30%. Furthermore, we provide theoretical analysis showing that ThinkBrake is equivalent to test-time realignment with a reward bonus for the </think> token.

Despite rapid advances in large language models (LLMs), achieving reliable performance on highly professional and structured examinations remains a significant challenge. The Japanese bar examination is a particularly demanding benchmark, requiring not only advanced legal reasoning but also strict adherence to complex answer formats that involve joint evaluation of multiple propositions. While recent studies have reported improvements by decomposing such questions into simpler true--false judgments, these approaches have not been systematically evaluated under the original exam format and scoring scheme, leaving open the question of whether they truly capture exam-level competence. In this paper, we present a self-verification model trained on a newly constructed dataset that faithfully replicates the authentic format and evaluation scale of the exam. Our model is able to exceed the official passing score when evaluated on the actual exam scale, marking the first demonstration, to our knowledge, of an LLM passing the Japanese bar examination without altering its original question structure or scoring rules. We further conduct extensive comparisons with alternative strategies, including multi-agent inference and decomposition-based supervision, and find that these methods fail to achieve comparable performance. Our results highlight the importance of format-faithful supervision and consistency verification, and suggest that carefully designed single-model approaches can outperform more complex systems in high-stakes professional reasoning tasks. Our dataset and codes are publicly available.

We introduce S1-Bench, a novel benchmark designed to evaluate Large Reasoning Models' (LRMs) performance on simple tasks that favor intuitive system 1 thinking rather than deliberative system 2 reasoning. While LRMs have achieved significant breakthroughs in complex reasoning tasks through explicit chains of thought, their reliance on deep analytical thinking may limit their system 1 thinking capabilities. Moreover, a lack of benchmark currently exists to evaluate LRMs' performance in tasks that require such capabilities. To fill this gap, S1-Bench presents a set of simple, diverse, and naturally clear questions across multiple domains and languages, specifically designed to assess LRMs' performance in such tasks. Our comprehensive evaluation of 22 LRMs reveals significant lower efficiency tendencies, with outputs averaging 15.5 times longer than those of traditional small LLMs. Additionally, LRMs often identify correct answers early but continue unnecessary deliberation, with some models even producing numerous errors. These findings highlight the rigid reasoning patterns of current LRMs and underscore the substantial development needed to achieve balanced dual-system thinking capabilities that can adapt appropriately to task complexity.

Reasoning is a cognitive process of using evidence to reach a sound conclusion. The reasoning capability is essential for large language models (LLMs) to serve as the brain of the artificial general intelligence agent. Recent studies reveal that fine-tuning LLMs on data with the chain of thought (COT) reasoning process can significantly enhance their reasoning capabilities. However, we find that the fine-tuned LLMs suffer from an Assessment Misalignment problem, i.e., they frequently assign higher scores to subpar COTs, leading to potential limitations in their reasoning abilities. To address this problem, we introduce an Alignment Fine-Tuning (AFT) paradigm, which involves three steps: 1) fine-tuning LLMs with COT training data; 2) generating multiple COT responses for each question, and categorizing them into positive and negative ones based on whether they achieve the correct answer; 3) calibrating the scores of positive and negative responses given by LLMs with a novel constraint alignment loss. Specifically, the constraint alignment loss has two objectives: a) Alignment, which guarantees that positive scores surpass negative scores to encourage answers with high-quality COTs; b) Constraint, which keeps the negative scores confined to a reasonable range to prevent the model degradation. Beyond just the binary positive and negative feedback, the constraint alignment loss can be seamlessly adapted to the ranking situations when ranking feedback is accessible. Furthermore, we also delve deeply into recent ranking-based alignment methods, such as DPO, RRHF, and PRO, and discover that the constraint, which has been overlooked by these approaches, is also crucial for their performance. Extensive experiments on four reasoning benchmarks with both binary and ranking feedback demonstrate the effectiveness of AFT.

We introduce Seed1.5-Thinking, capable of reasoning through thinking before responding, resulting in improved performance on a wide range of benchmarks. Seed1.5-Thinking achieves 86.7 on AIME 2024, 55.0 on Codeforces and 77.3 on GPQA, demonstrating excellent reasoning abilities in STEM and coding. Beyond reasoning tasks, the method demonstrates notable generalization across diverse domains. For instance, it surpasses DeepSeek R1 by 8% in win rate on non-reasoning tasks, indicating its broader applicability. Compared to other state-of-the-art reasoning models, Seed1.5-Thinking is a Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) model with a relatively small size, featuring 20B activated and 200B total parameters. As part of our effort to assess generalized reasoning, we develop two internal benchmarks, BeyondAIME and Codeforces, both of which will be publicly released to support future research. Model trial link: https://www.volcengine.com/experience/ark.

Self-consistency (SC) has been a widely used decoding strategy for chain-of-thought reasoning. Despite bringing significant performance improvements across a variety of multi-step reasoning tasks, it is a high-cost method that requires multiple sampling with the preset size. In this paper, we propose a simple and scalable sampling process, Early-Stopping Self-Consistency (ESC), to greatly reduce the cost of SC without sacrificing performance. On this basis, one control scheme for ESC is further derivated to dynamically choose the performance-cost balance for different tasks and models. To demonstrate ESC's effectiveness, we conducted extensive experiments on three popular categories of reasoning tasks: arithmetic, commonsense and symbolic reasoning over language models with varying scales. The empirical results show that ESC reduces the average number of sampling of chain-of-thought reasoning by a significant margin on six benchmarks, including MATH (-33.8%), GSM8K (-80.1%), StrategyQA (-76.8%), CommonsenseQA (-78.5%), Coin Flip (-84.2%) and Last Letters (-67.4%), while attaining comparable performances.

Recently evolved large reasoning models (LRMs) show powerful performance in solving complex tasks with long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning capability. As these LRMs are mostly developed by post-training on formal reasoning tasks, whether they generalize the reasoning capability to help reduce hallucination in fact-seeking tasks remains unclear and debated. For instance, DeepSeek-R1 reports increased performance on SimpleQA, a fact-seeking benchmark, while OpenAI-o3 observes even severer hallucination. This discrepancy naturally raises the following research question: Are reasoning models more prone to hallucination? This paper addresses the question from three perspectives. (1) We first conduct a holistic evaluation for the hallucination in LRMs. Our analysis reveals that LRMs undergo a full post-training pipeline with cold start supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and verifiable reward RL generally alleviate their hallucination. In contrast, both distillation alone and RL training without cold start fine-tuning introduce more nuanced hallucinations. (2) To explore why different post-training pipelines alters the impact on hallucination in LRMs, we conduct behavior analysis. We characterize two critical cognitive behaviors that directly affect the factuality of a LRM: Flaw Repetition, where the surface-level reasoning attempts repeatedly follow the same underlying flawed logic, and Think-Answer Mismatch, where the final answer fails to faithfully match the previous CoT process. (3) Further, we investigate the mechanism behind the hallucination of LRMs from the perspective of model uncertainty. We find that increased hallucination of LRMs is usually associated with the misalignment between model uncertainty and factual accuracy. Our work provides an initial understanding of the hallucination in LRMs.

We provide evidence of performative chain-of-thought (CoT) in reasoning models, where a model becomes strongly confident in its final answer, but continues generating tokens without revealing its internal belief. Our analysis compares activation probing, early forced answering, and a CoT monitor across two large models (DeepSeek-R1 671B & GPT-OSS 120B) and find task difficulty-specific differences: The model's final answer is decodable from activations far earlier in CoT than a monitor is able to say, especially for easy recall-based MMLU questions. We contrast this with genuine reasoning in difficult multihop GPQA-Diamond questions. Despite this, inflection points (e.g., backtracking, 'aha' moments) occur almost exclusively in responses where probes show large belief shifts, suggesting these behaviors track genuine uncertainty rather than learned "reasoning theater." Finally, probe-guided early exit reduces tokens by up to 80% on MMLU and 30% on GPQA-Diamond with similar accuracy, positioning attention probing as an efficient tool for detecting performative reasoning and enabling adaptive computation.

We introduce a professionally translated extension of the TruthfulQA benchmark designed to evaluate truthfulness in Basque, Catalan, Galician, and Spanish. Truthfulness evaluations of large language models (LLMs) have primarily been conducted in English. However, the ability of LLMs to maintain truthfulness across languages remains under-explored. Our study evaluates 12 state-of-the-art open LLMs, comparing base and instruction-tuned models using human evaluation, multiple-choice metrics, and LLM-as-a-Judge scoring. Our findings reveal that, while LLMs perform best in English and worst in Basque (the lowest-resourced language), overall truthfulness discrepancies across languages are smaller than anticipated. Furthermore, we show that LLM-as-a-Judge correlates more closely with human judgments than multiple-choice metrics, and that informativeness plays a critical role in truthfulness assessment. Our results also indicate that machine translation provides a viable approach for extending truthfulness benchmarks to additional languages, offering a scalable alternative to professional translation. Finally, we observe that universal knowledge questions are better handled across languages than context- and time-dependent ones, highlighting the need for truthfulness evaluations that account for cultural and temporal variability. Dataset and code are publicly available under open licenses.

Reasoning Large Language Models (R-LLMs) have significantly advanced complex reasoning tasks but often struggle with factuality, generating substantially more hallucinations than their non-reasoning counterparts on long-form factuality benchmarks. However, extending online Reinforcement Learning (RL), a key component in recent R-LLM advancements, to the long-form factuality setting poses several unique challenges due to the lack of reliable verification methods. Previous work has utilized automatic factuality evaluation frameworks such as FActScore to curate preference data in the offline RL setting, yet we find that directly leveraging such methods as the reward in online RL leads to reward hacking in multiple ways, such as producing less detailed or relevant responses. We propose a novel reward function that simultaneously considers the factual precision, response detail level, and answer relevance, and applies online RL to learn high quality factual reasoning. Evaluated on six long-form factuality benchmarks, our factual reasoning model achieves an average reduction of 23.1 percentage points in hallucination rate, a 23% increase in answer detail level, and no degradation in the overall response helpfulness.

Recently, slow-thinking reasoning systems, such as o1, have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in solving complex reasoning tasks. These systems typically engage in an extended thinking process before responding to a query, allowing them to generate more thorough, accurate, and well-reasoned solutions. These systems are primarily developed and maintained by industry, with their core techniques not publicly disclosed. In response, an increasing number of studies from the research community aim to explore the technical foundations underlying these powerful reasoning systems. Building on these prior efforts, this paper presents a reproduction report on implementing o1-like reasoning systems. We introduce an "imitate, explore, and self-improve" framework as our primary technical approach to train the reasoning model. In the initial phase, we use distilled long-form thought data to fine-tune the reasoning model, enabling it to invoke a slow-thinking mode. The model is then encouraged to explore challenging problems by generating multiple rollouts, which can result in increasingly more high-quality trajectories that lead to correct answers. Furthermore, the model undergoes self-improvement by iteratively refining its training dataset. To verify the effectiveness of this approach, we conduct extensive experiments on three challenging benchmarks. The experimental results demonstrate that our approach achieves competitive performance compared to industry-level reasoning systems on these benchmarks.

Common-sense reasoning is a key language model capability because it encapsulates not just specific factual knowledge but rather general language and world understanding. Measuring common-sense reasoning, therefore, is crucial for language models of different sizes and applications. One of the most widely used benchmarks for evaluating such capabilities is HellaSwag; however, in this paper, we show that it has severe construct validity issues. These issues range from basic ungrammaticality and numerous typos to misleading prompts or equally correct options. Furthermore, we show that if models are evaluated only on answer texts, or with "Lorem ipsum dolor..." instead of the question, more than 65% of model predictions remain the same, and this cannot be attributed merely to contamination. Since benchmark scores are an essential part of model selection in both research and commercial applications, these validity issues can have severe consequences. In particular, knowing that taking benchmark scores at face value is ubiquitous, inadequate evaluation leads to ill-informed decisions about models. In this paper, we thoroughly investigate critical validity issues posed by HellaSwag and illustrate them with various evaluations using generative language models of different sizes. We argue that this benchmark does not accurately measure common-sense reasoning and, therefore, should not be used for evaluation in its current state. Based on the results of our study, we propose requirements that should be met by future common-sense reasoning benchmarks. In addition, we release GoldenSwag, a corrected subset of HellaSwag, which, to our belief, facilitates acceptable common-sense reasoning evaluation.

Reasoning has become a central paradigm for large language models (LLMs), consistently boosting accuracy across diverse benchmarks. Yet its suitability for precision-sensitive tasks remains unclear. We present the first systematic study of reasoning for classification tasks under strict low false positive rate (FPR) regimes. Our analysis covers two tasks--safety detection and hallucination detection--evaluated in both fine-tuned and zero-shot settings, using standard LLMs and Large Reasoning Models (LRMs). Our results reveal a clear trade-off: Think On (reasoning-augmented) generation improves overall accuracy, but underperforms at the low-FPR thresholds essential for practical use. In contrast, Think Off (no reasoning during inference) dominates in these precision-sensitive regimes, with Think On surpassing only when higher FPRs are acceptable. In addition, we find token-based scoring substantially outperforms self-verbalized confidence for precision-sensitive deployments. Finally, a simple ensemble of the two modes recovers the strengths of each. Taken together, our findings position reasoning as a double-edged tool: beneficial for average accuracy, but often ill-suited for applications requiring strict precision.

Large Language Models (LLM) with reasoning capabilities offer a promising path for improving candidate evaluation in planning frameworks, but their relative performance against traditional non-reasoning models remains largely underexplored. In this study, we benchmark a distilled 1.5B parameter reasoning model (DeepSeek-R1) against several state-of-the-art non-reasoning LLMs within a generator-discriminator LLM planning framework for the text-to-SQL task. For this, we introduce a novel method for extracting soft scores from the chain-of-thought (CoT) outputs from reasoning that enables fine-grained ranking of candidates. Our central hypothesis is that reasoning models are more effective discriminators than non-reasoning LLMs. Our results show that distilled DeepSeek-R1-1.5B achieves up to 87% higher F1 and 3.7% better discrimination accuracy than CodeLlama-7B, as well as 3.7% higher execution accuracy than CodeLlama-13B, despite having significantly fewer parameters. Furthermore, we find that there is a limit to the logical capabilities of reasoning models, and only providing more context or allowing more compute budget for reasoning is not enough to improve their discrimination performance. Finally, we demonstrate that, unlike non-reasoning LLMs, reasoning models find generation more challenging than discrimination and may underperform as generators compared to smaller non-reasoning LLMs. Our work highlights the potential of reasoning models as discriminators in agentic frameworks, far outweighing their capabilities as generators, offering insights into their optimal role within LLM planning infrastructures.

Evaluating whether multimodal large language models truly understand long-form scientific papers remains challenging: answer-only metrics and synthetic "Needle-In-A-Haystack" tests often reward answer matching without requiring a causal, evidence-linked reasoning trace in the document. We propose the "Fish-in-the-Ocean" (FITO) paradigm, which requires models to construct explicit cross-modal evidence chains within native scientific documents. To operationalize FITO, we build SIN-Data, a scientific interleaved corpus that preserves the native interleaving of text and figures. On top of it, we construct SIN-Bench with four progressive tasks covering evidence discovery (SIN-Find), hypothesis verification (SIN-Verify), grounded QA (SIN-QA), and evidence-anchored synthesis (SIN-Summary). We further introduce "No Evidence, No Score", scoring predictions when grounded to verifiable anchors and diagnosing evidence quality via matching, relevance, and logic. Experiments on eight MLLMs show that grounding is the primary bottleneck: Gemini-3-pro achieves the best average overall score (0.573), while GPT-5 attains the highest SIN-QA answer accuracy (0.767) but underperforms on evidence-aligned overall scores, exposing a gap between correctness and traceable support.

Abstract reasoning ability reflects the intelligence and generalization capacity of LLMs to extract and apply abstract rules. However, accurately measuring this ability remains challenging: existing benchmarks either rely on expensive manual annotation, limiting their scale, or risk measuring memorization rather than genuine reasoning. To address this, we introduce an automated pipeline named A2RBench, encompassing generation, expansion, evaluation, and analysis. Specifically, in the generation stage, LLMs create diverse tasks demanding genuine reasoning; in the expansion stage, LLMs reuse validated rules and expand new input spaces to generate task variations, achieving scaling. However, such a process may cause hallucinations. To eliminate it, we further establish a theoretical framework and prove that programmatic verification--testing whether the inverse operation perfectly reverses the forward operation (cycle consistency)--guarantees a unique solution. Through extensive evaluations on mainstream LLMs, we find: (1) Current LLMs exhibit fundamental deficiencies in abstract reasoning, with top models significantly underperforming humans on a representative subset (39.8% vs. 68.5%). (2) Current LLMs fall far short of 2D and 1D in the complexity of generated 3D tasks, revealing their lack of understanding of high-dimensional tasks. (3) Counterintuitively, inputs with higher information complexity can simplify the reasoning process.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have led to remarkable performance across a wide range of language understanding and mathematical tasks. As a result, increasing attention has been given to assessing the true reasoning capabilities of LLMs, driving research into commonsense, numerical, logical, and qualitative reasoning. However, with the rapid progress of reasoning-focused models such as OpenAI's o1 and DeepSeek's R1, there has been a growing demand for reasoning benchmarks that can keep pace with ongoing model developments. In this paper, we introduce MastermindEval, a simple, scalable, and interpretable deductive reasoning benchmark inspired by the board game Mastermind. Our benchmark supports two evaluation paradigms: (1) agentic evaluation, in which the model autonomously plays the game, and (2) deductive reasoning evaluation, in which the model is given a pre-played game state with only one possible valid code to infer. In our experimental results we (1) find that even easy Mastermind instances are difficult for current models and (2) demonstrate that the benchmark is scalable to possibly more advanced models in the future Furthermore, we investigate possible reasons why models cannot deduce the final solution and find that current models are limited in deducing the concealed code as the number of statement to combine information from is increasing.

Recent frontier models employ long chain-of-thought reasoning to explore solution spaces in context and achieve stonger performance. While many works study distillation to build smaller yet capable models, most focus on English and little is known about language-specific reasoning. To bridge this gap, we first introduct **Language-Mixed CoT**, a reasoning schema that switches between English and a target language, using English as an anchor to excel in reasoning while minimizing translation artificats. As a Korean case study, we curate **Yi-Sang**: 5.79M native-Korean prompts from web Q&A, exams, STEM, and code; 3.7M long reasoning traces generated from Qwen3-32B; and a targeted 260k high-yield subset. We train ninve models (4B-35B) across six families (Qwen2.5, Llama-3.1, Gemma-3, etc). Our best model, **KO-REAson-35B**, achieves state-of-the-art performance, with the highest overall average score (64.0 \pm 25), ranking first on 5/9 benchmarks and second on the remainder. Samller and mid-sized models also benefit substantially, with an average improvement of +18.6 points across teh evaluated nine benchmarks. Ablations show **Language-Mixed CoT** is more effective than monolingual CoT, also resulting in cross-lingual and mult-modal performance gains. We release our data-curation pipeline, evaluation system, datasets, and models to advance research on language-specific reasoning. Data and model collection: https://huggingface.co/KOREAson.

We find that the response length of reasoning LLMs, whether trained by reinforcement learning or supervised learning, drastically increases for ill-posed questions with missing premises (MiP), ending up with redundant and ineffective thinking. This newly introduced scenario exacerbates the general overthinking issue to a large extent, which we name as the MiP-Overthinking. Such failures are against the ``test-time scaling law'' but have been widely observed on multiple datasets we curated with MiP, indicating the harm of cheap overthinking and a lack of critical thinking. Surprisingly, LLMs not specifically trained for reasoning exhibit much better performance on the MiP scenario, producing much shorter responses that quickly identify ill-posed queries. This implies a critical flaw of the current training recipe for reasoning LLMs, which does not encourage efficient thinking adequately, leading to the abuse of thinking patterns. To further investigate the reasons behind such failures, we conduct fine-grained analyses of the reasoning length, overthinking patterns, and ___location of critical thinking on different types of LLMs. Moreover, our extended ablation study reveals that the overthinking is contagious through the distillation of reasoning models' responses. These results improve the understanding of overthinking and shed novel insights into mitigating the problem.

Large Language Models deployed as question answering tools require robust calibration to avoid overconfidence. We systematically evaluate how reasoning capabilities and budget affect confidence assessment accuracy, using the ClimateX dataset (Lacombe et al., 2023) and expanding it to human and planetary health. Our key finding challenges the "test-time scaling" paradigm: while recent reasoning LLMs achieve 48.7% accuracy in assessing expert confidence, increasing reasoning budgets consistently impairs rather than improves calibration. Extended reasoning leads to systematic overconfidence that worsens with longer thinking budgets, producing diminishing and negative returns beyond modest computational investments. Conversely, search-augmented generation dramatically outperforms pure reasoning, achieving 89.3% accuracy by retrieving relevant evidence. Our results suggest that information access, rather than reasoning depth or inference budget, may be the critical bottleneck for improved confidence calibration of knowledge-intensive tasks.

We introduce the first version of KWBench (Knowledge Work Bench), a benchmark for unprompted problem recognition in large language models: can an LLM identify a professional scenario before attempting to solve it. Existing frontier benchmarks have saturated, and most knowledge-work evaluations to date reduce to extraction or task completion against a specification. KWBench targets the step before that: recognizing the governing structure of the situation from raw inputs alone. The benchmark contains 223 tasks sourced from practitioners across acquisitions, contract negotiations, clinical pharmacy, organizational politics, fraud analysis, and incentive design. Each task encodes a formal game-theoretic pattern (principal-agent conflict, signaling, mechanism design failure, strategic omission, coalitional dynamics, strategic interdependence) and carries structured ground truth recording the expert reading of the situation and the anticipated failure modes. Models receive raw data and a task prompt with no indication of problem type. Scoring is a three-tier rubric gated by a mandatory conjunctive check. Mandatory criteria encode the predicted wrong paths. We evaluate 16 models. The best model passes on 27.9% of tasks. The top two models agree on only 31.7% of their passes. Among the top 8, 44 tasks are solved by exactly one model; routing across the top 8 covers 50.7% of the benchmark, nearly double the best single model. Conditional on passing, quality scores converge (approx 83% across models); unconditional scores do not. Same models articulate the relevant game-theoretic concept correctly when asked, then fail to apply it unprompted. We release KWBench to shift how frontier models are evaluated on knowledge work, scoring them on whether they recognize the right problem from the situation alone, not only on how well they execute once the problem has been framed for them.

Most reasoning benchmarks for LLMs emphasize factual accuracy or step-by-step logic. In finance, however, professionals must not only converge on optimal decisions but also generate creative, plausible futures under uncertainty. We introduce ConDiFi, a benchmark that jointly evaluates divergent and convergent thinking in LLMs for financial tasks. ConDiFi features 607 macro-financial prompts for divergent reasoning and 990 multi-hop adversarial MCQs for convergent reasoning. Using this benchmark, we evaluated 14 leading models and uncovered striking differences. Despite high fluency, GPT-4o underperforms on Novelty and Actionability. In contrast, models like DeepSeek-R1 and Cohere Command R+ rank among the top for generating actionable, insights suitable for investment decisions. ConDiFi provides a new perspective to assess reasoning capabilities essential to safe and strategic deployment of LLMs in finance.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) increasingly rely on reasoning traces with complex internal structures. However, existing work lacks a unified answer to three fundamental questions: (1) what defines high-quality reasoning, (2) how to reliably evaluate long, implicitly structured reasoning traces, and (3) how to use such evaluation signals for reasoning optimization. To address these challenges, we provide a unified perspective. (1) We introduce the ME^2 principle to characterize reasoning quality along macro- and micro-level concerning efficiency and effectiveness. (2) Built on this principle, we model reasoning traces as directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) and develop a DAG-based pairwise evaluation method, capturing complex reasoning structures. (3) Based on this method, we construct the TRM-Preference dataset and train a Thinking Reward Model (TRM) to evaluate reasoning quality at scale. Experiments show that thinking rewards serve as an effective optimization signal. At test time, selecting better reasoning leads to better outcomes (up to 19.3\% gain), and during RL training, thinking rewards enhance reasoning and performance (up to 3.9\% gain) across diverse tasks. Code and data are available at https://github.com/Simplified-Reasoning/TRM.

Thinking LLMs solve complex tasks at the expense of increased compute and overthinking on simpler problems, while non-thinking LLMs are faster and cheaper but underthink on harder reasoning problems. This has led to the development of separate thinking and non-thinking LLM variants, leaving the onus of selecting the optimal model for each query on the end user. In this work, we introduce OptimalThinkingBench, a unified benchmark that jointly evaluates overthinking and underthinking in LLMs and also encourages the development of optimally-thinking models that balance performance and efficiency. Our benchmark comprises two sub-benchmarks: OverthinkingBench, featuring simple queries in 72 domains, and UnderthinkingBench, containing 11 challenging reasoning tasks. Using novel thinking-adjusted accuracy metrics, we perform extensive evaluation of 33 different thinking and non-thinking models and show that no model is able to optimally think on our benchmark. Thinking models often overthink for hundreds of tokens on the simplest user queries without improving performance. In contrast, large non-thinking models underthink, often falling short of much smaller thinking models. We further explore several methods to encourage optimal thinking, but find that these approaches often improve on one sub-benchmark at the expense of the other, highlighting the need for better unified and optimal models in the future.

Recent studies have shown that making a model spend more time thinking through longer Chain of Thoughts (CoTs) enables it to gain significant improvements in complex reasoning tasks. While current researches continue to explore the benefits of increasing test-time compute by extending the CoT lengths of Large Language Models (LLMs), we are concerned about a potential issue hidden behind the current pursuit of test-time scaling: Would excessively scaling the CoT length actually bring adverse effects to a model's reasoning performance? Our explorations on mathematical reasoning tasks reveal an unexpected finding that scaling with longer CoTs can indeed impair the reasoning performance of LLMs in certain domains. Moreover, we discover that there exists an optimal scaled length distribution that differs across different domains. Based on these insights, we propose a Thinking-Optimal Scaling strategy. Our method first uses a small set of seed data with varying response length distributions to teach the model to adopt different reasoning efforts for deep thinking. Then, the model selects its shortest correct response under different reasoning efforts on additional problems for self-improvement. Our self-improved models built upon Qwen2.5-32B-Instruct outperform other distillation-based 32B o1-like models across various math benchmarks, and achieve performance on par with QwQ-32B-Preview.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting improves reasoning but often produces long and redundant traces that substantially increase inference cost. We present SyncThink, a training-free and plug-and-play decoding method that reduces CoT overhead without modifying model weights. We find that answer tokens attend weakly to early reasoning and instead focus on the special token "/think", indicating an information bottleneck. Building on this observation, SyncThink monitors the model's own reasoning-transition signal and terminates reasoning. Experiments on GSM8K, MMLU, GPQA, and BBH across three DeepSeek-R1 distilled models show that SyncThink achieves 62.00 percent average Top-1 accuracy using 656 generated tokens and 28.68 s latency, compared to 61.22 percent, 2141 tokens, and 92.01 s for full CoT decoding. On long-horizon tasks such as GPQA, SyncThink can further yield up to +8.1 absolute accuracy by preventing over-thinking.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are extensively used today across various sectors, including academia, research, business, and finance, for tasks such as text generation, summarization, and translation. Despite their widespread adoption, these models often produce incorrect and misleading information, exhibiting a tendency to hallucinate. This behavior can be attributed to several factors, with consistency and reasoning capabilities being significant contributors. LLMs frequently lack the ability to generate explanations and engage in coherent reasoning, leading to inaccurate responses. Moreover, they exhibit inconsistencies in their outputs. This paper aims to evaluate and compare the consistency and reasoning capabilities of both public and proprietary LLMs. The experiments utilize the Boolq dataset as the ground truth, comprising questions, answers, and corresponding explanations. Queries from the dataset are presented as prompts to the LLMs, and the generated responses are evaluated against the ground truth answers. Additionally, explanations are generated to assess the models' reasoning abilities. Consistency is evaluated by repeatedly presenting the same query to the models and observing for variations in their responses. For measuring reasoning capabilities, the generated explanations are compared to the ground truth explanations using metrics such as BERT, BLEU, and F-1 scores. The findings reveal that proprietary models generally outperform public models in terms of both consistency and reasoning capabilities. However, even when presented with basic general knowledge questions, none of the models achieved a score of 90\% in both consistency and reasoning. This study underscores the direct correlation between consistency and reasoning abilities in LLMs and highlights the inherent reasoning challenges present in current language models.

Recent thinking models solve complex reasoning tasks by scaling test-time compute, but this scaling must be allocated in line with task difficulty. On one hand, short reasoning (underthinking) leads to errors on harder problems that require extended reasoning steps; but, excessively long reasoning (overthinking) can be token-inefficient, generating unnecessary steps even after reaching a correct intermediate solution. We refer to this as under-adaptivity, where the model fails to modulate its response length appropriately given problems of varying difficulty. To address under-adaptivity and strike a balance between under- and overthinking, we propose TRAAC (Think Right with Adaptive, Attentive Compression), an online post-training RL method that leverages the model's self-attention over a long reasoning trajectory to identify important steps and prune redundant ones. TRAAC also estimates difficulty and incorporates it into training rewards, thereby learning to allocate reasoning budget commensurate with example difficulty. Our approach improves accuracy, reduces reasoning steps, and enables adaptive thinking compared to base models and other RL baselines. Across a variety of tasks (AIME, AMC, GPQA-D, BBEH), TRAAC (Qwen3-4B) achieves an average absolute accuracy gain of 8.4% with a relative reduction in reasoning length of 36.8% compared to the base model, and a 7.9% accuracy gain paired with a 29.4% length drop compared to the best RL baseline. TRAAC also shows strong generalization: although our models are trained on math datasets, they show accuracy and efficiency gains on out-of-distribution non-math datasets like GPQA-D, BBEH, and OptimalThinkingBench. Our analysis further verifies that TRAAC provides fine-grained adjustments to thinking budget based on difficulty and that a combination of task-difficulty calibration and attention-based compression yields gains across diverse tasks.

LLMs are typically trained to answer user questions or follow instructions similarly to how human experts respond. However, in the standard alignment framework they lack the basic ability of explicit thinking before answering. Thinking is important for complex questions that require reasoning and planning -- but can be applied to any task. We propose a training method for equipping existing LLMs with such thinking abilities for general instruction following without use of additional human data. We achieve this by an iterative search and optimization procedure that explores the space of possible thought generations, allowing the model to learn how to think without direct supervision. For each instruction, the thought candidates are scored using a judge model to evaluate their responses only, and then optimized via preference optimization. We show that this procedure leads to superior performance on AlpacaEval and Arena-Hard, and shows gains from thinking on non-reasoning categories such as marketing, health and general knowledge, in addition to more traditional reasoning & problem-solving tasks.

Researchers have found that fake news spreads much times faster than real news. This is a major problem, especially in today's world where social media is the key source of news for many among the younger population. Fact verification, thus, becomes an important task and many media sites contribute to the cause. Manual fact verification is a tedious task, given the volume of fake news online. The Factify5WQA shared task aims to increase research towards automated fake news detection by providing a dataset with an aspect-based question answering based fact verification method. Each claim and its supporting document is associated with 5W questions that help compare the two information sources. The objective performance measure in the task is done by comparing answers using BLEU score to measure the accuracy of the answers, followed by an accuracy measure of the classification. The task had submissions using custom training setup and pre-trained language-models among others. The best performing team posted an accuracy of 69.56%, which is a near 35% improvement over the baseline.

Large language models (LLMs) achieve good performance on challenging reasoning benchmarks, yet could also make basic reasoning mistakes. This contrasting behavior is puzzling when it comes to understanding the mechanisms behind LLMs' reasoning capabilities. One hypothesis is that the increasingly high and nearly saturated performance on common reasoning benchmarks could be due to the memorization of similar problems. In this paper, we systematically investigate this hypothesis with a quantitative measurement of memorization in reasoning tasks, using a dynamically generated logical reasoning benchmark based on Knights and Knaves (K&K) puzzles. We found that LLMs could interpolate the training puzzles (achieving near-perfect accuracy) after fine-tuning, yet fail when those puzzles are slightly perturbed, suggesting that the models heavily rely on memorization to solve those training puzzles. On the other hand, we show that while fine-tuning leads to heavy memorization, it also consistently improves generalization performance. In-depth analyses with perturbation tests, cross difficulty-level transferability, probing model internals, and fine-tuning with wrong answers suggest that the LLMs learn to reason on K&K puzzles despite training data memorization. This phenomenon indicates that LLMs exhibit a complex interplay between memorization and genuine reasoning abilities. Finally, our analysis with per-sample memorization score sheds light on how LLMs switch between reasoning and memorization in solving logical puzzles. Our code and data are available at https://memkklogic.github.io.

Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are increasingly prominent in the field of artificial intelligence. These models not only excel in traditional vision-language tasks but also demonstrate impressive performance in contemporary multi-modal benchmarks. Although many of these benchmarks attempt to holistically evaluate MLLMs, they typically concentrate on basic reasoning tasks, often yielding only simple yes/no or multi-choice responses. These methods naturally lead to confusion and difficulties in conclusively determining the reasoning capabilities of MLLMs. To mitigate this issue, we manually curate a benchmark dataset specifically designed for MLLMs, with a focus on complex reasoning tasks. Our benchmark comprises three key reasoning categories: deductive, abductive, and analogical reasoning. The queries in our dataset are intentionally constructed to engage the reasoning capabilities of MLLMs in the process of generating answers. For a fair comparison across various MLLMs, we incorporate intermediate reasoning steps into our evaluation criteria. In instances where an MLLM is unable to produce a definitive answer, its reasoning ability is evaluated by requesting intermediate reasoning steps. If these steps align with our manual annotations, appropriate scores are assigned. This evaluation scheme resembles methods commonly used in human assessments, such as exams or assignments, and represents what we consider a more effective assessment technique compared with existing benchmarks. We evaluate a selection of representative MLLMs using this rigorously developed open-ended multi-step elaborate reasoning benchmark, designed to challenge and accurately measure their reasoning capabilities. The code and data will be released at https://core-mm.github.io/

Despite the remarkable coherence of Large Language Models (LLMs), existing evaluation methods often suffer from fluency bias and rely heavily on multiple-choice formats, making it difficult to assess factual accuracy and complex reasoning effectively. LLMs thus frequently generate factually inaccurate responses, especially in complex reasoning tasks, highlighting two prominent challenges: (1) the inadequacy of existing methods to evaluate reasoning and factual accuracy effectively, and (2) the reliance on human evaluators for nuanced judgment, as illustrated by Williams and Huckle (2024)[1], who found manual grading indispensable despite automated grading advancements. To address evaluation gaps in open-ended reasoning tasks, we introduce the EQUATOR Evaluator (Evaluation of Question Answering Thoroughness in Open-ended Reasoning). This framework combines deterministic scoring with a focus on factual accuracy and robust reasoning assessment. Using a vector database, EQUATOR pairs open-ended questions with human-evaluated answers, enabling more precise and scalable evaluations. In practice, EQUATOR significantly reduces reliance on human evaluators for scoring and improves scalability compared to Williams and Huckle's (2004)[1] methods. Our results demonstrate that this framework significantly outperforms traditional multiple-choice evaluations while maintaining high accuracy standards. Additionally, we introduce an automated evaluation process leveraging smaller, locally hosted LLMs. We used LLaMA 3.2B, running on the Ollama binaries to streamline our assessments. This work establishes a new paradigm for evaluating LLM performance, emphasizing factual accuracy and reasoning ability, and provides a robust methodological foundation for future research.

As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.

We conduct a systematic audit of three widely used reasoning benchmarks, SocialIQa, FauxPas-EAI, and ToMi, and uncover pervasive flaws in both benchmark items and evaluation methodology. Using five LLMs (GPT-{3, 3.5, 4, o1}, and LLaMA 3.1) as diagnostic tools, we identify structural, semantic, and pragmatic issues in benchmark design (e.g., duplicated items, ambiguous wording, and implausible answers), as well as scoring procedures that prioritize output form over reasoning process. Through systematic human annotation and re-evaluation on cleaned benchmark subsets, we find that model scores often improve not due to due to erratic surface wording variations and not to improved reasoning. Infact, further analyses show that model performance is highly sensitive to minor input variations such as context availability and phrasing, revealing that high scores may reflect alignment with format-specific cues rather than consistent inference based on the input. These findings challenge the validity of current benchmark-based claims about reasoning in LLMs, and highlight the need for evaluation protocols that assess reasoning as a process of drawing inference from available information, rather than as static output selection. We release audited data and evaluation tools to support more interpretable and diagnostic assessments of model reasoning.

Recent advances in Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have shown impressive capabilities in mathematical and logical reasoning. However, current LRMs rarely admit ignorance or respond with "I don't know". Instead, they often produce incorrect answers while showing undue confidence, raising concerns about their factual reliability. In this work, we identify two pathological reasoning patterns characterized by overthinking that contribute to the overconfident and incorrect answers: last-minute guessing and second-thought spiraling. To address these issues, we propose BARREL-a novel framework that promotes concise and boundary-aware factual reasoning. Our experiments show that BARREL-training increases the reliability of DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B from 39.33% to 61.48%, while still achieving accuracy comparable to models finetuned on reasoning data generated by R1. These results demonstrate that our pilot study is inspiring to build more reliable and factual System 2 LRMs.

Test-time scaling has emerged as a powerful technique for enhancing the reasoning capabilities of large language models. However, its effectiveness in medical reasoning remains uncertain, as the medical ___domain fundamentally differs from mathematical tasks in terms of knowledge representation and decision-making processes. In this paper, we provide the first comprehensive investigation of test-time scaling for medical reasoning and present m1, a simple yet effective approach that increases a model's medical reasoning capability at inference. Our evaluation across diverse medical tasks demonstrates that test-time scaling consistently enhances medical reasoning, enabling lightweight fine-tuned models under 10B parameters to establish new state-of-the-art performance, while our 32B model rivals previous 70B-scale medical LLMs. However, we identify an optimal reasoning token budget of approximately 4K, beyond which performance may degrade due to overthinking. Budget forcing, which extends test-time computation through iterative prompts, helps models double-check answers but does not necessarily improve the overall medical QA performance and, in some cases, even introduces errors into previously correct responses. Our case-by-case analysis identifies insufficient medical knowledge as a key bottleneck that prevents further performance gains through test-time scaling. We find that increasing data scale, improving data quality, and expanding model capacity consistently enhance medical knowledge grounding, enabling continued performance improvements, particularly on challenging medical benchmarks where smaller models reach saturation. These findings underscore fundamental differences between medical and mathematical reasoning in LLMs, highlighting that enriched medical knowledge, other than increased reasoning depth alone, is essential for realizing the benefits of test-time scaling.

Recent advancements in natural language processing by large language models (LLMs), such as GPT-4, have been suggested to approach Artificial General Intelligence. And yet, it is still under dispute whether LLMs possess similar reasoning abilities to humans. This study evaluates GPT-4 and various other LLMs in judging the profoundness of mundane, motivational, and pseudo-profound statements. We found a significant statement-to-statement correlation between the LLMs and humans, irrespective of the type of statements and the prompting technique used. However, LLMs systematically overestimate the profoundness of nonsensical statements, with the exception of Tk-instruct, which uniquely underestimates the profoundness of statements. Only few-shot learning prompts, as opposed to chain-of-thought prompting, draw LLMs ratings closer to humans. Furthermore, this work provides insights into the potential biases induced by Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), inducing an increase in the bias to overestimate the profoundness of statements.

Large language models (LLMs) demonstrate considerable potential in various natural language tasks but face significant challenges in mathematical reasoning, particularly in executing precise, multi-step logic. However, current evaluation frameworks judge their performance solely based on accuracy, which only accounts for the final answer. This study explores these pitfalls by employing a novel evaluation framework. We propose an evaluation metric called the MAPLE score, which holistically quantifies reasoning misalignment by integrating error rates, redundancy, and validity.

Doctors and patients alike increasingly use Large Language Models (LLMs) to diagnose clinical cases. However, unlike domains such as math or coding, where correctness can be objectively defined by the final answer, medical diagnosis requires both the outcome and the reasoning process to be accurate. Currently, widely used medical benchmarks like MedQA and MMLU assess only accuracy in the final answer, overlooking the quality and faithfulness of the clinical reasoning process. To address this limitation, we introduce MedCaseReasoning, the first open-access dataset for evaluating LLMs on their ability to align with clinician-authored diagnostic reasoning. The dataset includes 14,489 diagnostic question-and-answer cases, each paired with detailed reasoning statements derived from open-access medical case reports. We evaluate state-of-the-art reasoning LLMs on MedCaseReasoning and find significant shortcomings in their diagnoses and reasoning: for instance, the top-performing open-source model, DeepSeek-R1, achieves only 48% 10-shot diagnostic accuracy and mentions only 64% of the clinician reasoning statements (recall). However, we demonstrate that fine-tuning LLMs on the reasoning traces derived from MedCaseReasoning significantly improves diagnostic accuracy and clinical reasoning recall by an average relative gain of 29% and 41%, respectively. The open-source dataset, code, and models are available at https://github.com/kevinwu23/Stanford-MedCaseReasoning.

LLMs achieve remarkable multi-step reasoning capabilities, yet effectively transferring these skills via post-training distillation remains challenging. Existing data selection methods, ranging from manual curation to heuristics based on length, entropy, or overall loss, fail to capture the causal importance of individual reasoning steps, limiting distillation efficiency. To address this, we propose Attention Influence for Reasoning (AIR), a principled, unsupervised and training-free framework that leverages mechanistic insights of the retrieval head to select high-value post-training data. AIR first identifies reasoning-critical attention heads of an off-the-shelf model, then constructs a weakened reference model with disabled head influence, and finally quantifies the resulting loss divergence as the Attention Influence Score. This score enables fine-grained assessment at both the step and sample levels, supporting step-level weighted fine-tuning and global sample selection. Experiments across multiple reasoning benchmarks show that AIR consistently improves reasoning accuracy, surpassing heuristic baselines and effectively isolating the most critical steps and samples. Our work establishes a mechanism-driven, data-efficient approach for reasoning distillation in LLMs.

Measuring the creativity of large language models (LLMs) is essential for designing methods that can improve creativity and for enhancing our scientific understanding of this ability. To accomplish this, it has become common in recent years to administer tests of human creativity to LLMs. Although these tests provide a convenient and fully automated way to score "creativity," their validity as measures of machine creativity has not been established, and these tests already have limited validity as predictors of human creativity. To address this problem, we conduct the first large-scale, systematic study assessing the effectiveness of human creativity tests for predicting the creative achievement of LLMs across three target constructs: creative writing, divergent thinking, and scientific ideation. We find that the Divergent Association Task (DAT) and the Conditional DAT are the best predictors of creative writing and divergent thinking, respectively, but that test effectiveness varies significantly by construct, and no single test predicts all constructs well. Moreover, contrary to popular belief, no existing test reliably predicts scientific ideation ability. Motivated by this problem, we introduce the Divergent Remote Association Test (DRAT), a vocabulary-space test that assesses both convergent and divergent thinking in a single instrument. The DRAT is the first and only creativity test for LLMs that is a significant predictor of scientific ideation ability, demonstrating robustness across major design choices. Furthermore, the performance gain of the DRAT is not recoverable from any linear combination of the Divergent Association Task and the Remote Associates Test, indicating that assessing divergent and convergent thinking in the same test is essential to reliably predicting scientific ideation ability.

Chain-of-thought prompting combined with pre-trained large language models has achieved encouraging results on complex reasoning tasks. In this paper, we propose a new decoding strategy, self-consistency, to replace the naive greedy decoding used in chain-of-thought prompting. It first samples a diverse set of reasoning paths instead of only taking the greedy one, and then selects the most consistent answer by marginalizing out the sampled reasoning paths. Self-consistency leverages the intuition that a complex reasoning problem typically admits multiple different ways of thinking leading to its unique correct answer. Our extensive empirical evaluation shows that self-consistency boosts the performance of chain-of-thought prompting with a striking margin on a range of popular arithmetic and commonsense reasoning benchmarks, including GSM8K (+17.9%), SVAMP (+11.0%), AQuA (+12.2%), StrategyQA (+6.4%) and ARC-challenge (+3.9%).

Standard factuality evaluations of LLMs treat all errors alike, obscuring whether failures arise from missing knowledge (empty shelves) or from limited access to encoded facts (lost keys). We propose a behavioral framework that profiles factual knowledge at the level of facts rather than questions, characterizing each fact by whether it is encoded, and then by how accessible it is: cannot be recalled, can be directly recalled, or can only be recalled with inference-time computation (thinking). To support such profiling, we introduce WikiProfile, a new benchmark constructed via an automated pipeline with a prompted LLM grounded in web search. Across 4 million responses from 13 LLMs, we find that encoding is nearly saturated in frontier models on our benchmark, with GPT-5 and Gemini-3 encoding 95--98% of facts. However, recall remains a major bottleneck: many errors previously attributed to missing knowledge instead stem from failures to access it. These failures are systematic and disproportionately affect long-tail facts and reverse questions. Finally, we show that thinking improves recall and can recover a substantial fraction of failures, indicating that future gains may rely less on scaling and more on methods that improve how models utilize what they already encode.

We propose a benchmark to measure whether a language model is truthful in generating answers to questions. The benchmark comprises 817 questions that span 38 categories, including health, law, finance and politics. We crafted questions that some humans would answer falsely due to a false belief or misconception. To perform well, models must avoid generating false answers learned from imitating human texts. We tested GPT-3, GPT-Neo/J, GPT-2 and a T5-based model. The best model was truthful on 58% of questions, while human performance was 94%. Models generated many false answers that mimic popular misconceptions and have the potential to deceive humans. The largest models were generally the least truthful. This contrasts with other NLP tasks, where performance improves with model size. However, this result is expected if false answers are learned from the training distribution. We suggest that scaling up models alone is less promising for improving truthfulness than fine-tuning using training objectives other than imitation of text from the web.

This paper presents an eight-week observational comparison of 68 single-file HTML generations collected across 17 public experiments in the "HTML AI Battle" project between December 10, 2025 and February 4, 2026. Four reasoning model families, GPT, Gemini, Grok, and Claude, were compared under a fixed public-interface protocol with no custom instructions, no personality tuning, and no repair prompts. Each output was evaluated from a rendered browser video using human scores and a Gemini LLM-as-a-judge layer for prompt adherence, functional correctness, and UI quality, then packaged into a standardized social-media protocol spanning X (Twitter), TikTok, and YouTube. The tracker was also used for two supervised predictive analyses: an experiment-level model for 24-hour X impressions and a generation-level model for HTML verbosity. Under this protocol, Claude was the strongest and most consistent family, leading mean performance and winning 9/17 prompts under the primary human weighted score. Longer measured reasoning time was not associated with higher quality overall. Gemini as a judge was significantly more lenient than the human evaluator on functional correctness and overall performance, while stable self-favoring bias remained unresolved. The exploratory X-impressions model remained weak under post-screen cross-validation (MAE = 46,874, R^2 = -0.377), whereas the HTML-lines model performed better, with a model-family-only baseline outperforming prompt-aware alternatives (MAE = 135.2, R^2 = 0.576). Overall, selected pre-publication technical/audio variables were not sufficient to predict 24-hour X reach, while code verbosity was driven much more by model family than by prompt wording. The comparisons remain observational and are limited by public-interface drift, access-path differences, and one primary human scorer.

The ability of large language models (LLMs) to follow user instructions is central to their reliability, safety, and usefulness. While prior studies assess instruction adherence in the model's main responses, we argue that it is also critical for large reasoning models (LRMs) to follow user instructions throughout their reasoning process. Reasoning instruction following makes LRMs more controllable and transparent, while reducing risks of undesirable shortcuts, hallucinations, or reward hacking within reasoning traces. To evaluate this dimension, we introduce ReasonIF, a systematic benchmark for assessing reasoning instruction following. ReasonIF includes six categories of instruction prompts, spanning multilingual reasoning, formatting and length control. Across many open-source LRMs including GPT-OSS, Qwen3, and DeepSeek-R1, we find substantial failures in reasoning instruction adherence: the highest instruction following score (IFS) remains below 0.25, meaning that fewer than 25% of reasoning traces comply with the given instructions. Notably, as task difficulty increases, reasoning instruction following degrades further. We also explore two strategies to enhance reasoning instruction fidelity. (1) multi-turn reasoning and (2) Reasoning Instruction Finetuning (RIF) using synthetic data. RIF improves the IFS of GPT-OSS-20B from 0.11 to 0.27, indicating measurable progress but leaving ample room for improvement.

We introduce an axiomatic evaluation framework for latent thought representations in LLMs, comprising metrics that are independent of downstream benchmark scores and reveal representational failures that benchmark accuracy masks. Existing evaluations conflate representation quality with model capacity. Therefore, failures cannot be attributed to the representation rather than to the model that processes it. We formalize four functional axioms (Causality, Minimality, Separability, and Stability) and define a quantitative measure for each, computed directly on the representation independently of downstream accuracy. We audit open-weight LLMs across 23 reasoning tasks (e.g., Spatial Reasoning, Factual QA). We find that no candidate satisfies all four axioms simultaneously, that the representations distinguish task type reliably but cannot distinguish between two questions within the same task, and that the representations encode little information beyond what is already present in the input embedding. The failure is consistent across dense, reasoning-distilled, and RL-trained model families, indicating that the gap is structural rather than a property of model size or training procedure.

The advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) has greatly improved our ability to process complex language. However, accurately detecting logical fallacies remains a significant challenge. This study presents a novel and effective prompt formulation approach for logical fallacy detection, applicable in both supervised (fine-tuned) and unsupervised (zero-shot) settings. Our method enriches input text incorporating implicit contextual information -- counterarguments, explanations, and goals -- which we query for validity within the context of the argument. We then rank these queries based on confidence scores to inform classification. We evaluate our approach across multiple datasets from 5 domains, covering 29 distinct fallacy types, using models from the GPT and LLaMA series. The results show substantial improvements over state-of-the-art models, with F1 score increases of up to 0.60 in zero-shot settings and up to 0.45 in fine-tuned models. Extensive analyses further illustrate why and how our method excels.

Large language models have demonstrated impressive performance on challenging mathematical reasoning tasks, which has triggered the discussion of whether the performance is achieved by true reasoning capability or memorization. To investigate this question, prior work has constructed mathematical benchmarks when questions undergo simple perturbations -- modifications that still preserve the underlying reasoning patterns of the solutions. However, no work has explored hard perturbations, which fundamentally change the nature of the problem so that the original solution steps do not apply. To bridge the gap, we construct MATH-P-Simple and MATH-P-Hard via simple perturbation and hard perturbation, respectively. Each consists of 279 perturbed math problems derived from level-5 (hardest) problems in the MATH dataset (Hendrycksmath et. al., 2021). We observe significant performance drops on MATH-P-Hard across various models, including o1-mini (-16.49%) and gemini-2.0-flash-thinking (-12.9%). We also raise concerns about a novel form of memorization where models blindly apply learned problem-solving skills without assessing their applicability to modified contexts. This issue is amplified when using original problems for in-context learning. We call for research efforts to address this challenge, which is critical for developing more robust and reliable reasoning models.

Existing benchmarks for frontier models often test specialized, ``PhD-level'' knowledge that is difficult for non-experts to grasp. In contrast, we present a benchmark based on the NPR Sunday Puzzle Challenge that requires only general knowledge. Our benchmark is challenging for both humans and models, however correct solutions are easy to verify, and models' mistakes are easy to spot. Our work reveals capability gaps that are not evident in existing benchmarks: OpenAI o1 significantly outperforms other reasoning models that are on par on benchmarks that test specialized knowledge. Furthermore, our analysis of reasoning outputs uncovers new kinds of failures. DeepSeek R1, for instance, often concedes with ``I give up'' before providing an answer that it knows is wrong. R1 can also be remarkably ``uncertain'' in its output and in rare cases, it does not ``finish thinking,'' which suggests the need for an inference-time technique to ``wrap up'' before the context window limit is reached. We also quantify the effectiveness of reasoning longer with R1 and Gemini Thinking to identify the point beyond which more reasoning is unlikely to improve accuracy on our benchmark.

Generating rationales that justify scoring decisions has been a promising way to facilitate explainability in automated scoring systems. However, existing methods do not match the accuracy of classifier-based methods. Plus, the generated rationales often contain hallucinated information. To address these issues, we propose a novel framework capable of generating more faithful rationales and, more importantly, matching performance with classifier-based black-box scoring systems. We first mimic the human assessment process by querying Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate a thought tree. We then summarise intermediate assessment decisions from each thought tree path for creating synthetic rationale data and rationale preference data. Finally, we utilise the generated synthetic data to calibrate LLMs through a two-step training process: supervised fine-tuning and preference optimization. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that our framework achieves a 38% assessment performance improvement in the QWK score compared to prior work while producing higher-quality rationales, as recognised by human evaluators and LLMs. Our work sheds light on the effectiveness of performing preference optimization using synthetic preference data obtained from thought tree paths.

Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) has been a go-to and effective method for enhancing long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning in relatively small LLMs by fine-tuning them with long CoT responses from larger LLMs. To continually improve reasoning abilities, we can either collect new high-quality long CoT reasoning SFT data or repeatedly train on existing SFT datasets. However, acquiring new long CoT SFT data is costly and limited, while repeated training often results in a performance plateau or decline. To further boost the performance with the SFT data, we propose Thinking Preference Optimization (ThinkPO), a simple yet effective post-SFT method that enhances long CoT reasoning without requiring new long CoT responses. Instead, ThinkPO utilizes readily available or easily obtainable short CoT reasoning responses as rejected answers and long CoT responses as chosen answers for the same question. It then applies direct preference optimization to encourage the model to favor longer reasoning outputs. Experiments show that ThinkPO further improves the reasoning performance of SFT-ed models, e.g. it increases math reasoning accuracy of SFT-ed models by 8.6% and output length by 25.9%. Notably, ThinkPO is capable of continually boosting the performance of the publicly distilled SFT model, e.g., increasing the official DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B's performance on MATH500 from 87.4% to 91.2%.

While large language models (LLMs) with reasoning capabilities are progressing rapidly on high-school math competitions and coding, can they reason effectively through complex, open-ended challenges found in frontier physics research? And crucially, what kinds of reasoning tasks do physicists want LLMs to assist with? To address these questions, we present the CritPt (Complex Research using Integrated Thinking - Physics Test, pronounced "critical point"), the first benchmark designed to test LLMs on unpublished, research-level reasoning tasks that broadly covers modern physics research areas, including condensed matter, quantum physics, atomic, molecular & optical physics, astrophysics, high energy physics, mathematical physics, statistical physics, nuclear physics, nonlinear dynamics, fluid dynamics and biophysics. CritPt consists of 71 composite research challenges designed to simulate full-scale research projects at the entry level, which are also decomposed to 190 simpler checkpoint tasks for more fine-grained insights. All problems are newly created by 50+ active physics researchers based on their own research. Every problem is hand-curated to admit a guess-resistant and machine-verifiable answer and is evaluated by an automated grading pipeline heavily customized for advanced physics-specific output formats. We find that while current state-of-the-art LLMs show early promise on isolated checkpoints, they remain far from being able to reliably solve full research-scale challenges: the best average accuracy among base models is only 4.0% , achieved by GPT-5 (high), moderately rising to around 10% when equipped with coding tools. Through the realistic yet standardized evaluation offered by CritPt, we highlight a large disconnect between current model capabilities and realistic physics research demands, offering a foundation to guide the development of scientifically grounded AI tools.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated their remarkable performance across various language understanding tasks. While emerging benchmarks have been proposed to evaluate LLMs in various domains such as mathematics and computer science, they merely measure the accuracy in terms of the final prediction on multi-choice questions. However, it remains insufficient to verify the essential understanding of LLMs given a chosen choice. To fill this gap, we present CLR-Bench to comprehensively evaluate the LLMs in complex college-level reasoning. Specifically, (i) we prioritize 16 challenging college disciplines in computer science and artificial intelligence. The dataset contains 5 types of questions, while each question is associated with detailed explanations from experts. (ii) To quantify a fair evaluation of LLMs' reasoning ability, we formalize the criteria with two novel metrics. QrightarrowA is utilized to measure the performance of direct answer prediction, and QrightarrowAR effectively considers the joint ability to answer the question and provide rationale simultaneously. Extensive experiments are conducted with 40 LLMs over 1,018 discipline-specific questions. The results demonstrate the key insights that LLMs, even the best closed-source LLM, i.e., GPT-4 turbo, tend to `guess' the college-level answers. It shows a dramatic decrease in accuracy from 63.31% QrightarrowA to 39.00% QrightarrowAR, indicating an unsatisfactory reasoning ability.

Compressing long chain-of-thought (CoT) from large language models (LLMs) is an emerging strategy to improve the reasoning efficiency of LLMs. Despite its promising benefits, existing studies equally compress all thoughts within a long CoT, hindering more concise and effective reasoning. To this end, we first investigate the importance of different thoughts by examining their effectiveness and efficiency in contributing to reasoning through automatic long CoT chunking and Monte Carlo rollouts. Building upon the insights, we propose a theoretically bounded metric to jointly measure the effectiveness and efficiency of different thoughts. We then propose LongotimesShort, an efficient reasoning framework that enables two LLMs to collaboratively solve the problem: a long-thought LLM for more effectively generating important thoughts, while a short-thought LLM for efficiently generating remaining thoughts. Specifically, we begin by synthesizing a small amount of cold-start data to fine-tune LLMs for long-thought and short-thought reasoning styles, respectively. Furthermore, we propose a synergizing-oriented multi-turn reinforcement learning, focusing on the model self-evolution and collaboration between long-thought and short-thought LLMs. Experimental results show that our method enables Qwen2.5-7B and Llama3.1-8B to achieve comparable performance compared to DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B and DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B, while reducing token length by over 80% across the MATH500, AIME24/25, AMC23, and GPQA Diamond benchmarks. Our data and code are available at https://github.com/yasNing/Long-otimes-Short/.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) spend substantial test-time compute on long chain-of-thought (CoT) traces, but what *characterizes* an effective CoT remains unclear. While prior work reports gains from lengthening CoTs and increasing review (revisiting earlier steps) via appended *wait* tokens, recent studies suggest that shorter thinking can outperform longer traces. We therefore conduct a systematic evaluation across ten LRMs on math and scientific reasoning. Contrary to the "longer-is-better" narrative, we find that both naive CoT lengthening and increased review are associated with *lower* accuracy. As CoT unfolds step by step, token-level metrics can conflate verbosity with process quality. We introduce a graph view of CoT to extract structure and identify a single statistic-the *Failed-Step Fraction (FSF)*, the fraction of steps in abandoned branches-that consistently outpredicts length and review ratio for correctness across models. To probe causality, we design two interventions. First, we rank candidate CoTs by each metric at test time, where FSF yields the largest pass@1 gains; second, we edit CoTs to remove failed branches, which significantly improves accuracy, indicating that failed branches bias subsequent reasoning. Taken together, these results characterize effective CoTs as those that *fail less* and support *structure-aware* test-time scaling over indiscriminately generating long CoT.

Reasoning models are evaluated on single-turn benchmarks but deployed in multi-turn dialogue, where users push back on correct answers. Under sustained adversarial pressure we find a previously undocumented failure mode: the chain-of-thought stays factually correct from first turn to last while the emitted answer flips wrong. We call this unfaithful capitulation (UC) and isolate it with a 2times 2 latent-versus-behavioral framework that flip-rate metrics and single-turn faithfulness probes both miss. Across three datasets (MT-Consistency, MMLU-Pro, GSM8K), the latent-correct rate at the behavioral flip clusters near 50% in think mode and collapses to 11-15% under no_think -- paired, within-model causal evidence that reasoning creates the gap. Across models the effect tracks the reasoning channel (high in Qwen3-32B and GPT-OSS-20B, low in inline-CoT Gemma-4-31B-it). An independent GPT-4o judge corroborates 86% of UC labels; a token-level probe shows the answer-slot argmax is correct in 84% of UC cells; and a naive trace-anchored defense backfires. We release all trajectories, traces, and judge labels.

Language has long been conceived as an essential tool for human reasoning. The breakthrough of Large Language Models (LLMs) has sparked significant research interest in leveraging these models to tackle complex reasoning tasks. Researchers have moved beyond simple autoregressive token generation by introducing the concept of "thought" -- a sequence of tokens representing intermediate steps in the reasoning process. This innovative paradigm enables LLMs' to mimic complex human reasoning processes, such as tree search and reflective thinking. Recently, an emerging trend of learning to reason has applied reinforcement learning (RL) to train LLMs to master reasoning processes. This approach enables the automatic generation of high-quality reasoning trajectories through trial-and-error search algorithms, significantly expanding LLMs' reasoning capacity by providing substantially more training data. Furthermore, recent studies demonstrate that encouraging LLMs to "think" with more tokens during test-time inference can further significantly boost reasoning accuracy. Therefore, the train-time and test-time scaling combined to show a new research frontier -- a path toward Large Reasoning Model. The introduction of OpenAI's o1 series marks a significant milestone in this research direction. In this survey, we present a comprehensive review of recent progress in LLM reasoning. We begin by introducing the foundational background of LLMs and then explore the key technical components driving the development of large reasoning models, with a focus on automated data construction, learning-to-reason techniques, and test-time scaling. We also analyze popular open-source projects at building large reasoning models, and conclude with open challenges and future research directions.

In this paper, we investigate whether Large Language Models (LLMs) actively recall or retrieve their internal repositories of factual knowledge when faced with reasoning tasks. Through an analysis of LLMs' internal factual recall at each reasoning step via Knowledge Neurons, we reveal that LLMs fail to harness the critical factual associations under certain circumstances. Instead, they tend to opt for alternative, shortcut-like pathways to answer reasoning questions. By manually manipulating the recall process of parametric knowledge in LLMs, we demonstrate that enhancing this recall process directly improves reasoning performance whereas suppressing it leads to notable degradation. Furthermore, we assess the effect of Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting, a powerful technique for addressing complex reasoning tasks. Our findings indicate that CoT can intensify the recall of factual knowledge by encouraging LLMs to engage in orderly and reliable reasoning. Furthermore, we explored how contextual conflicts affect the retrieval of facts during the reasoning process to gain a comprehensive understanding of the factual recall behaviors of LLMs. Code and data will be available soon.

Recent advances leverage post-training to enhance model reasoning performance, which typically requires costly training pipelines and still suffers from inefficient, overly lengthy outputs. We introduce Speculative Thinking, a training-free framework that enables large reasoning models to guide smaller ones during inference at the reasoning level, distinct from speculative decoding, which operates at the token level. Our approach is based on two observations: (1) reasoning-supportive tokens such as "wait" frequently appear after structural delimiters like "\n\n", serving as signals for reflection or continuation; and (2) larger models exhibit stronger control over reflective behavior, reducing unnecessary backtracking while improving reasoning quality. By strategically delegating reflective steps to a more capable model, our method significantly boosts the reasoning accuracy of reasoning models while shortening their output. With the assistance of the 32B reasoning model, the 1.5B model's accuracy on MATH500 increases from 83.2% to 89.4%, marking a substantial improvement of 6.2%. Simultaneously, the average output length is reduced from 5439 tokens to 4583 tokens, representing a 15.7% decrease. Moreover, when applied to a non-reasoning model (Qwen-2.5-7B-Instruct), our framework boosts its accuracy from 74.0% to 81.8% on the same benchmark, achieving a relative improvement of 7.8%.

There is a growing literature on reasoning by large language models (LLMs), but the discussion on the uncertainty in their responses is still lacking. Our aim is to assess the extent of confidence that LLMs have in their answers and how it correlates with accuracy. Confidence is measured (i) qualitatively in terms of persistence in keeping their answer when prompted to reconsider, and (ii) quantitatively in terms of self-reported confidence score. We investigate the performance of three LLMs -- GPT4o, GPT4-turbo and Mistral -- on two benchmark sets of questions on causal judgement and formal fallacies and a set of probability and statistical puzzles and paradoxes. Although the LLMs show significantly better performance than random guessing, there is a wide variability in their tendency to change their initial answers. There is a positive correlation between qualitative confidence and accuracy, but the overall accuracy for the second answer is often worse than for the first answer. There is a strong tendency to overstate the self-reported confidence score. Confidence is only partially explained by the underlying token-level probability. The material effects of prompting on qualitative confidence and the strong tendency for overconfidence indicate that current LLMs do not have any internally coherent sense of confidence.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have achieved remarkable success, yet they often suffer from producing unnecessary and verbose reasoning chains. We identify a core aspect of this issue as "invalid thinking" -- models tend to repeatedly double-check their work after having derived the correct answer. To address this specific inefficiency, we move beyond the general principles of Efficacy and Efficiency to propose two new, fine-grained principles: Brevity, which advocates for eliminating redundancy, and Sufficiency, which ensures critical reasoning steps are preserved. Guided by these principles, we introduce LC-R1, a post-training method based on Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). LC-R1 employs a novel combination of a Length Reward for overall conciseness and a Compress Reward that is specifically designed to remove the invalid portion of the thinking process. Extensive experiments on multiple reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that LC-R1 achieves a significant reduction in sequence length (~50%) with only a marginal (~2%) drop in accuracy, achieving a favorable trade-off point on the Pareto frontier that prioritizes high compression. Our analysis further validates the robustness of LC-R1 and provides valuable insights for developing more powerful yet computationally efficient LRMs. Our code is released at https://github.com/zxiangx/LC-R1.

Logic reasoning in natural language has been recognized as an important measure of human intelligence for Large Language Models (LLMs). Popular benchmarks may entangle multiple reasoning skills and thus provide unfaithful evaluations on the logic reasoning skill. Meanwhile, existing logic reasoning benchmarks are limited in language diversity and their distributions are deviated from the distribution of an ideal logic reasoning benchmark, which may lead to biased evaluation results. This paper thereby proposes a new classical logic benchmark DivLogicEval, consisting of natural sentences composed of diverse statements in a counterintuitive way. To ensure a more reliable evaluation, we also introduce a new evaluation metric that mitigates the influence of bias and randomness inherent in LLMs. Through experiments, we demonstrate the extent to which logical reasoning is required to answer the questions in DivLogicEval and compare the performance of different popular LLMs in conducting logical reasoning.

This comprehensive study evaluates the performance of OpenAI's o1-preview large language model across a diverse array of complex reasoning tasks, spanning multiple domains, including computer science, mathematics, natural sciences, medicine, linguistics, and social sciences. Through rigorous testing, o1-preview demonstrated remarkable capabilities, often achieving human-level or superior performance in areas ranging from coding challenges to scientific reasoning and from language processing to creative problem-solving. Key findings include: -83.3% success rate in solving complex competitive programming problems, surpassing many human experts. -Superior ability in generating coherent and accurate radiology reports, outperforming other evaluated models. -100% accuracy in high school-level mathematical reasoning tasks, providing detailed step-by-step solutions. -Advanced natural language inference capabilities across general and specialized domains like medicine. -Impressive performance in chip design tasks, outperforming specialized models in areas such as EDA script generation and bug analysis. -Remarkable proficiency in anthropology and geology, demonstrating deep understanding and reasoning in these specialized fields. -Strong capabilities in quantitative investing. O1 has comprehensive financial knowledge and statistical modeling skills. -Effective performance in social media analysis, including sentiment analysis and emotion recognition. The model excelled particularly in tasks requiring intricate reasoning and knowledge integration across various fields. While some limitations were observed, including occasional errors on simpler problems and challenges with certain highly specialized concepts, the overall results indicate significant progress towards artificial general intelligence.

The effectiveness of Large Language Models (LLMs) is heavily influenced by the reasoning strategies, or styles of thought, employed in their prompts. However, the interplay between these reasoning styles, model architecture, and task type remains poorly understood. To address this, we introduce StyleBench, a comprehensive benchmark for systematically evaluating reasoning styles across diverse tasks and models. We assess five representative reasoning styles, including Chain of Thought (CoT), Tree of Thought (ToT), Algorithm of Thought (AoT), Sketch of Thought (SoT), and Chain-of-Draft (CoD) on five reasoning tasks, using 15 open-source models from major families (LLaMA, Qwen, Mistral, Gemma, GPT-OSS, Phi, and DeepSeek) ranging from 270M to 120B parameters. Our large-scale analysis reveals that no single style is universally optimal. We demonstrate that strategy efficacy is highly contingent on both model scale and task type: search-based methods (AoT, ToT) excel in open-ended problems but require large-scale models, while concise styles (SoT, CoD) achieve radical efficiency gains on well-defined tasks. Furthermore, we identify key behavioral patterns: smaller models frequently fail to follow output instructions and default to guessing, while reasoning robustness emerges as a function of scale. Our findings offer a crucial roadmap for selecting optimal reasoning strategies based on specific constraints, we open source the benchmark in https://github.com/JamesJunyuGuo/Style_Bench.

A new generation of AI models generates step-by-step reasoning text before producing an answer. This text appears to offer a human-readable window into their computation process, and is increasingly relied upon for transparency and interpretability. However, it is unclear whether human understanding of this text matches the model's actual computational process. In this paper, we investigate a necessary condition for correspondence: the ability of humans to identify which steps in a reasoning text causally influence later steps. We evaluated humans on this ability by composing questions based on counterfactual measurements and found a significant discrepancy: participant accuracy was only 29.3%, barely above chance (25%), and remained low (42%) even when evaluating the majority vote on questions with high agreement. Our results reveal a fundamental gap between how humans interpret reasoning texts and how models use it, challenging its utility as a simple interpretability tool. We argue that reasoning texts should be treated as an artifact to be investigated, not taken at face value, and that understanding the non-human ways these models use language is a critical research direction.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have demonstrated impressive reasoning capabilities across a broad range of tasks including Olympiad-level mathematical problems, indicating evidence of their complex reasoning abilities. While many reasoning benchmarks focus on the STEM ___domain, the ability of LRMs to reason correctly in broader task domains remains underexplored. In this work, we introduce TTT-Bench, a new benchmark that is designed to evaluate basic strategic, spatial, and logical reasoning abilities in LRMs through a suite of four two-player Tic-Tac-Toe-style games that humans can effortlessly solve from a young age. We propose a simple yet scalable programmatic approach for generating verifiable two-player game problems for TTT-Bench. Although these games are trivial for humans, they require reasoning about the intentions of the opponent, as well as the game board's spatial configurations, to ensure a win. We evaluate a diverse set of state-of-the-art LRMs, and discover that the models that excel at hard math problems frequently fail at these simple reasoning games. Further testing reveals that our evaluated reasoning models score on average downarrow 41\% \& downarrow 5\% lower on TTT-Bench compared to MATH 500 \& AIME 2024 respectively, with larger models achieving higher performance using shorter reasoning traces, where most of the models struggle on long-term strategic reasoning situations on simple and new TTT-Bench tasks.

Fact-checking is extensively studied in the context of misinformation and disinformation, addressing objective inaccuracies. However, a softer form of misinformation involves responses that are factually correct but lack certain features such as clarity and relevance. This challenge is prevalent in formal Question-Answer (QA) settings such as press conferences in finance, politics, sports, and other domains, where subjective answers can obscure transparency. Despite this, there is a lack of manually annotated datasets for subjective features across multiple dimensions. To address this gap, we introduce SubjECTive-QA, a human annotated dataset on Earnings Call Transcripts' (ECTs) QA sessions as the answers given by company representatives are often open to subjective interpretations and scrutiny. The dataset includes 49,446 annotations for long-form QA pairs across six features: Assertive, Cautious, Optimistic, Specific, Clear, and Relevant. These features are carefully selected to encompass the key attributes that reflect the tone of the answers provided during QA sessions across different ___domain. Our findings are that the best-performing Pre-trained Language Model (PLM), RoBERTa-base, has similar weighted F1 scores to Llama-3-70b-Chat on features with lower subjectivity, such as Relevant and Clear, with a mean difference of 2.17% in their weighted F1 scores. The models perform significantly better on features with higher subjectivity, such as Specific and Assertive, with a mean difference of 10.01% in their weighted F1 scores. Furthermore, testing SubjECTive-QA's generalizability using QAs from White House Press Briefings and Gaggles yields an average weighted F1 score of 65.97% using our best models for each feature, demonstrating broader applicability beyond the financial ___domain. SubjECTive-QA is publicly available under the CC BY 4.0 license

Despite their strengths, large language models (LLMs) often fail to communicate their confidence accurately, making it difficult to assess when they might be wrong and limiting their reliability. In this work, we demonstrate that reasoning models-LLMs that engage in extended chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning-exhibit superior performance not only in problem-solving but also in accurately expressing their confidence. Specifically, we benchmark six reasoning models across six datasets and find that they achieve strictly better confidence calibration than their non-reasoning counterparts in 33 out of the 36 settings. Our detailed analysis reveals that these gains in calibration stem from the slow thinking behaviors of reasoning models-such as exploring alternative approaches and backtracking-which enable them to adjust their confidence dynamically throughout their CoT, making it progressively more accurate. In particular, we find that reasoning models become increasingly better calibrated as their CoT unfolds, a trend not observed in non-reasoning models. Moreover, removing slow thinking behaviors from the CoT leads to a significant drop in calibration. Lastly, we show that these gains are not exclusive to reasoning models-non-reasoning models also benefit when guided to perform slow thinking via in-context learning.

We present Voice Evaluation of Reasoning Ability (VERA), a benchmark for evaluating reasoning ability in voice-interactive systems under real-time conversational constraints. VERA comprises 2,931 voice-native episodes derived from established text benchmarks and organized into five tracks (Math, Web, Science, Long-Context, Factual). Each item is adapted for speech interaction while preserving reasoning difficulty. VERA enables direct text-voice comparison within model families and supports analysis of how architectural choices affect reliability. We assess 12 contemporary voice systems alongside strong text baselines and observe large, consistent modality gaps: on competition mathematics a leading text model attains 74.8% accuracy while its voice counterpart reaches 6.1%; macro-averaged across tracks the best text models achieve 54.0% versus 11.3% for voice. Latency-accuracy analyses reveal a low-latency plateau, where fast voice systems cluster around ~10% accuracy, while approaching text performance requires sacrificing real-time interaction. Diagnostic experiments indicate that common mitigations are insufficient. Increasing "thinking time" yields negligible gains; a decoupled cascade that separates reasoning from narration improves accuracy but still falls well short of text and introduces characteristic grounding/consistency errors. Failure analyses further show distinct error signatures across native streaming, end-to-end, and cascade designs. VERA provides a reproducible testbed and targeted diagnostics for architectures that decouple thinking from speaking, offering a principled way to measure progress toward real-time voice assistants that are both fluent and reliably reasoned.

In this research, we introduce BEATS, a novel framework for evaluating Bias, Ethics, Fairness, and Factuality in Large Language Models (LLMs). Building upon the BEATS framework, we present a bias benchmark for LLMs that measure performance across 29 distinct metrics. These metrics span a broad range of characteristics, including demographic, cognitive, and social biases, as well as measures of ethical reasoning, group fairness, and factuality related misinformation risk. These metrics enable a quantitative assessment of the extent to which LLM generated responses may perpetuate societal prejudices that reinforce or expand systemic inequities. To achieve a high score on this benchmark a LLM must show very equitable behavior in their responses, making it a rigorous standard for responsible AI evaluation. Empirical results based on data from our experiment show that, 37.65\% of outputs generated by industry leading models contained some form of bias, highlighting a substantial risk of using these models in critical decision making systems. BEATS framework and benchmark offer a scalable and statistically rigorous methodology to benchmark LLMs, diagnose factors driving biases, and develop mitigation strategies. With the BEATS framework, our goal is to help the development of more socially responsible and ethically aligned AI models.

Cognitive textual and visual reasoning tasks, such as puzzles, series, and analogies, demand the ability to quickly reason, decipher, and evaluate patterns both textually and spatially. While LLMs and VLMs, through extensive training on large amounts of human-curated data, have attained a high level of pseudo-human intelligence in some common sense reasoning tasks, they still struggle with more complex reasoning tasks that require cognitive understanding. In this work, we introduce a new dataset, NTSEBench, designed to evaluate the cognitive multi-modal reasoning and problem-solving skills of large models. The dataset comprises 2,728 multiple-choice questions comprising of a total of 4,642 images across 26 categories sampled from the NTSE examination conducted nationwide in India, featuring both visual and textual general aptitude questions that do not rely on rote learning. We establish baselines on the dataset using state-of-the-art LLMs and VLMs. To facilitate a comparison between open source and propriety models, we propose four distinct modeling strategies to handle different modalities (text and images) in the dataset instances.

With the widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs), hallucinations, which are non-factual fabrications in model outputs, have become serious concerns. Reasoning capabilities have received attention as a self-verification process to improve output reliability. However, the effect of reasoning within a closed system where LLMs cannot rely on external tools or knowledge has yet to be clarified. We therefore conduct experiments under strict constraints (recommending peer-reviewed journal articles in computer science) to examine the effect of reasoning across multiple models (GPT-5.2 and Gemini 3 Flash). Our results reveal a problematic trade-off between constraint compliance and factual accuracy. Non-reasoning models exhibit high constraint violation rates (66-75%) but maintain factual accuracy, while reasoning models reduce violations (13-26%) but systematically distort known facts to satisfy constraints and increase complete fabrication. This trade-off pattern is consistent across both models despite different architectures, indicating a fundamental limitation of reasoning. Furthermore, reasoning does not uniformly improve output authenticity: effects diverge by model, reflecting different allocations of the compliance-truthfulness trade-off. These findings challenge the assumption that reasoning universally improves reliability: reasoning models trade honest constraint violations for detection-resistant distortions.

Misinformation about climate change is a complex societal issue requiring holistic, interdisciplinary solutions at the intersection between technology and psychology. One proposed solution is a "technocognitive" approach, involving the synthesis of psychological and computer science research. Psychological research has identified that interventions in response to misinformation require both fact-based (e.g., factual explanations) and technique-based (e.g., explanations of misleading techniques) content. However, little progress has been made on documenting and detecting fallacies in climate misinformation. In this study, we apply a previously developed critical thinking methodology for deconstructing climate misinformation, in order to develop a dataset mapping different types of climate misinformation to reasoning fallacies. This dataset is used to train a model to detect fallacies in climate misinformation. Our study shows F1 scores that are 2.5 to 3.5 better than previous works. The fallacies that are easiest to detect include fake experts and anecdotal arguments, while fallacies that require background knowledge, such as oversimplification, misrepresentation, and slothful induction, are relatively more difficult to detect. This research lays the groundwork for development of solutions where automatically detected climate misinformation can be countered with generative technique-based corrections.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) achieve strong reasoning performance by emitting long chains of thought. Yet, these verbose traces slow down inference and often drift into unnecessary detail, known as the overthinking phenomenon. To better understand LRMs' behavior, we systematically analyze the token-level misalignment between reasoning and non-reasoning models. While it is expected that their primary difference lies in the stylistic "thinking cues", LRMs uniquely exhibit two pivotal, previously under-explored phenomena: a Global Misalignment Rebound, where their divergence from non-reasoning models persists or even grows as response length increases, and more critically, a Local Misalignment Diminish, where the misalignment concentrates at the "thinking cues" each sentence starts with but rapidly declines in the remaining of the sentence. Motivated by the Local Misalignment Diminish, we propose FoReaL-Decoding, a collaborative fast-slow thinking decoding method for cost-quality trade-off. In FoReaL-Decoding, a Leading model leads the first few tokens for each sentence, and then a weaker draft model completes the following tokens to the end of each sentence. FoReaL-Decoding adopts a stochastic gate to smoothly interpolate between the small and the large model. On four popular math-reasoning benchmarks (AIME24, GPQA-Diamond, MATH500, AMC23), FoReaL-Decoding reduces theoretical FLOPs by 30 to 50% and trims CoT length by up to 40%, while preserving 86 to 100% of model performance. These results establish FoReaL-Decoding as a simple, plug-and-play route to controllable cost-quality trade-offs in reasoning-centric tasks.

Recent studies on large language model (LLM) reasoning capabilities have demonstrated promising improvements in model performance by leveraging a lengthy thinking process and additional computational resources during inference, primarily in tasks involving mathematical reasoning (Muennighoff et al., 2025). However, it remains uncertain if longer reasoning chains inherently enhance factual accuracy, particularly beyond mathematical contexts. In this work, we thoroughly examine LLM reasoning within complex open-___domain question-answering (QA) scenarios. We initially distill reasoning traces from advanced, large-scale reasoning models (QwQ-32B and DeepSeek-R1-671B), then fine-tune a variety of models ranging from smaller, instruction-tuned variants to larger architectures based on Qwen2.5. To enrich reasoning traces, we introduce factual information from knowledge graphs in the form of paths into our reasoning traces. Our experimental setup includes four baseline approaches and six different instruction-tuned models evaluated across a benchmark of six datasets, encompassing over 22.6K questions. Overall, we carry out 168 experimental runs and analyze approximately 1.7 million reasoning traces. Our findings indicate that, within a single run, smaller reasoning models achieve noticeable improvements in factual accuracy compared to their original instruction-tuned counterparts. Moreover, our analysis demonstrates that adding test-time compute and token budgets factual accuracy consistently improves by 2-8%, further confirming the effectiveness of test-time scaling for enhancing performance and consequently improving reasoning accuracy in open-___domain QA tasks. We release all the experimental artifacts for further research.

Recent reasoning models through test-time scaling have demonstrated that long chain-of-thoughts can unlock substantial performance boosts in hard reasoning tasks such as math and code. However, the benefit of such long thoughts for system-2 reasoning is relatively less explored in other domains such as perceptual tasks where shallower, system-1 reasoning seems sufficient. In this paper, we introduce LongPerceptualThoughts, a new synthetic dataset with 30K long-thought traces for perceptual tasks. The key challenges in synthesizing elaborate reasoning thoughts for perceptual tasks are that off-the-shelf models are not yet equipped with such thinking behavior and that it is not straightforward to build a reliable process verifier for perceptual tasks. Thus, we propose a novel three-stage data synthesis framework that first synthesizes verifiable multiple-choice questions from dense image descriptions, then extracts simple CoTs from VLMs for those verifiable problems, and finally expands those simple thoughts to elaborate long thoughts via frontier reasoning models. In controlled experiments with a strong instruction-tuned 7B model, we demonstrate notable improvements over existing visual reasoning data-generation methods. Our model, trained on the generated dataset, achieves an average +3.4 points improvement over 5 vision-centric benchmarks, including +11.8 points on V^* Bench. Notably, despite being tuned for vision tasks, it also improves performance on the text reasoning benchmark, MMLU-Pro, by +2 points.

Logical reasoning is a fundamental aspect of human intelligence and an essential capability for multimodal large language models (MLLMs). Despite the significant advancement in multimodal reasoning, existing benchmarks fail to comprehensively evaluate their reasoning abilities due to the lack of explicit categorization for logical reasoning types and an unclear understanding of reasoning. To address these issues, we introduce MME-Reasoning, a comprehensive benchmark designed to evaluate the reasoning ability of MLLMs, which covers all three types of reasoning (i.e., inductive, deductive, and abductive) in its questions. We carefully curate the data to ensure that each question effectively evaluates reasoning ability rather than perceptual skills or knowledge breadth, and extend the evaluation protocols to cover the evaluation of diverse questions. Our evaluation reveals substantial limitations of state-of-the-art MLLMs when subjected to holistic assessments of logical reasoning capabilities. Even the most advanced MLLMs show limited performance in comprehensive logical reasoning, with notable performance imbalances across reasoning types. In addition, we conducted an in-depth analysis of approaches such as ``thinking mode'' and Rule-based RL, which are commonly believed to enhance reasoning abilities. These findings highlight the critical limitations and performance imbalances of current MLLMs in diverse logical reasoning scenarios, providing comprehensive and systematic insights into the understanding and evaluation of reasoning capabilities.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are often described as being instances of foundation models - that is, models that transfer strongly across various tasks and conditions in few-show or zero-shot manner, while exhibiting scaling laws that predict function improvement when increasing the pre-training scale. These claims of excelling in different functions and tasks rely on measurements taken across various sets of standardized benchmarks showing high scores for such models. We demonstrate here a dramatic breakdown of function and reasoning capabilities of state-of-the-art models trained at the largest available scales which claim strong function, using a simple, short, conventional common sense problem formulated in concise natural language, easily solvable by humans. The breakdown is dramatic, as models also express strong overconfidence in their wrong solutions, while providing often non-sensical "reasoning"-like explanations akin to confabulations to justify and backup the validity of their clearly failed responses, making them sound plausible. Various standard interventions in an attempt to get the right solution, like various type of enhanced prompting, or urging the models to reconsider the wrong solutions again by multi step re-evaluation, fail. We take these initial observations to the scientific and technological community to stimulate urgent re-assessment of the claimed capabilities of current generation of LLMs, Such re-assessment also requires common action to create standardized benchmarks that would allow proper detection of such basic reasoning deficits that obviously manage to remain undiscovered by current state-of-the-art evaluation procedures and benchmarks. Code for reproducing experiments in the paper and raw experiments data can be found at https://github.com/LAION-AI/AIW

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) represent a breakthrough in AI problem-solving capabilities, but their effectiveness in interactive environments can be limited. This paper introduces and analyzes overthinking in LRMs. A phenomenon where models favor extended internal reasoning chains over environmental interaction. Through experiments on software engineering tasks using SWE Bench Verified, we observe three recurring patterns: Analysis Paralysis, Rogue Actions, and Premature Disengagement. We propose a framework to study these behaviors, which correlates with human expert assessments, and analyze 4018 trajectories. We observe that higher overthinking scores correlate with decreased performance, with reasoning models exhibiting stronger tendencies toward overthinking compared to non-reasoning models. Our analysis reveals that simple efforts to mitigate overthinking in agentic environments, such as selecting the solution with the lower overthinking score, can improve model performance by almost 30% while reducing computational costs by 43%. These results suggest that mitigating overthinking has strong practical implications. We suggest that by leveraging native function-calling capabilities and selective reinforcement learning overthinking tendencies could be mitigated. We also open-source our evaluation framework and dataset to facilitate research in this direction at https://github.com/AlexCuadron/Overthinking.

Large Language Models have demonstrated strong performance on many established reasoning benchmarks. However, these benchmarks primarily evaluate structured skills like quantitative problem-solving, leaving a gap in assessing flexible, multifaceted reasoning abilities that are central to human intelligence. These abilities require integrating logical deduction with spatial awareness and constraint satisfaction, which current evaluations do not measure well. To address this, we introduce RiddleBench, a benchmark of 1,737 challenging puzzles in English designed to probe these core reasoning capabilities. Evaluation of state-of-the-art models on RiddleBench shows fundamental weaknesses. Even top proprietary models like Gemini 2.5 Pro, o3, and Claude 4 Sonnet achieve accuracy just above 60% (60.30%, 63.37%, and 63.16%). Analysis further reveals deep failures, including hallucination cascades (accepting flawed reasoning from other models) and poor self-correction due to a strong self-confirmation bias. Their reasoning is also fragile, with performance degrading significantly when constraints are reordered or irrelevant information is introduced. RiddleBench functions as a diagnostic tool for these issues and as a resource for guiding the development of more robust and reliable language models.

While large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong performance on factoid question answering, they are still prone to hallucination and untruthful responses, particularly when tasks demand information outside their parametric knowledge. Indeed, truthfulness requires more than accuracy -- models must also recognize uncertainty and abstain when unsure to avoid hallucinations. This presents a fundamental challenge for existing methods: approaches that optimize for accuracy often amplify hallucinations, while those that encourage abstention can become overly conservative, sacrificing correct answers. Both extremes ultimately compromise truthfulness. In this work, we present TruthRL, a general reinforcement learning (RL) framework that directly optimizes the truthfulness of LLMs. Specifically, we implement TruthRL using GRPO with a simple yet effective ternary reward that distinguishes correct answers, hallucinations, and abstentions. It incentivizes models to reduce hallucinations not only by providing correct responses, but also by enabling abstention when uncertain, thereby improving truthfulness. Extensive experiments across four knowledge-intensive benchmarks show that, compared to vanilla RL, TruthRL significantly reduces hallucinations by 28.9% and improves truthfulness by 21.1%, with consistent gains across various backbone models (e.g., Qwen, Llama) under both retrieval and non-retrieval setups. In-depth ablation study demonstrates that vanilla accuracy-driven methods, such as supervised fine-tuning or RL with a binary reward, struggle to balance factual correctness and uncertainty. In contrast, our proposed truthfulness-driven TruthRL achieves strong performance in both accuracy and truthfulness, underscoring the importance of learning objective design for developing truthful LLMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved excellent performances in various tasks. However, fine-tuning an LLM requires extensive supervision. Human, on the other hand, may improve their reasoning abilities by self-thinking without external inputs. In this work, we demonstrate that an LLM is also capable of self-improving with only unlabeled datasets. We use a pre-trained LLM to generate "high-confidence" rationale-augmented answers for unlabeled questions using Chain-of-Thought prompting and self-consistency, and fine-tune the LLM using those self-generated solutions as target outputs. We show that our approach improves the general reasoning ability of a 540B-parameter LLM (74.4%->82.1% on GSM8K, 78.2%->83.0% on DROP, 90.0%->94.4% on OpenBookQA, and 63.4%->67.9% on ANLI-A3) and achieves state-of-the-art-level performance, without any ground truth label. We conduct ablation studies and show that fine-tuning on reasoning is critical for self-improvement.

Frontier model progress is often measured by academic benchmarks, which offer a limited view of performance in real-world professional contexts. Existing evaluations often fail to assess open-ended, economically consequential tasks in high-stakes domains like Legal and Finance, where practical returns are paramount. To address this, we introduce Professional Reasoning Bench (PRBench), a realistic, open-ended, and difficult benchmark of real-world problems in Finance and Law. We open-source its 1,100 expert-authored tasks and 19,356 expert-curated criteria, making it, to our knowledge, the largest public, rubric-based benchmark for both legal and finance domains. We recruit 182 qualified professionals, holding JDs, CFAs, or 6+ years of experience, who contributed tasks inspired by their actual workflows. This process yields significant diversity, with tasks spanning 114 countries and 47 US jurisdictions. Our expert-curated rubrics are validated through a rigorous quality pipeline, including independent expert validation. Subsequent evaluation of 20 leading models reveals substantial room for improvement, with top scores of only 0.39 (Finance) and 0.37 (Legal) on our Hard subsets. We further catalog associated economic impacts of the prompts and analyze performance using human-annotated rubric categories. Our analysis shows that models with similar overall scores can diverge significantly on specific capabilities. Common failure modes include inaccurate judgments, a lack of process transparency and incomplete reasoning, highlighting critical gaps in their reliability for professional adoption.

Current question-answering benchmarks predominantly focus on accuracy in realizable prediction tasks. Conditioned on a question and answer-key, does the most likely token match the ground truth? Such benchmarks necessarily fail to evaluate LLMs' ability to quantify ground-truth outcome uncertainty. In this work, we focus on the use of LLMs as risk scores for unrealizable prediction tasks. We introduce folktexts, a software package to systematically generate risk scores using LLMs, and evaluate them against US Census data products. A flexible API enables the use of different prompting schemes, local or web-hosted models, and diverse census columns that can be used to compose custom prediction tasks. We evaluate 17 recent LLMs across five proposed benchmark tasks. We find that zero-shot risk scores produced by multiple-choice question-answering have high predictive signal but are widely miscalibrated. Base models consistently overestimate outcome uncertainty, while instruction-tuned models underestimate uncertainty and produce over-confident risk scores. In fact, instruction-tuning polarizes answer distribution regardless of true underlying data uncertainty. This reveals a general inability of instruction-tuned LLMs to express data uncertainty using multiple-choice answers. A separate experiment using verbalized chat-style risk queries yields substantially improved calibration across instruction-tuned models. These differences in ability to quantify data uncertainty cannot be revealed in realizable settings, and highlight a blind-spot in the current evaluation ecosystem that folktexts covers.

Recent advances in generative artificial intelligence (AI) have shown promise in accurately grading open-ended student responses. However, few prior works have explored grading handwritten responses due to a lack of data and the challenge of combining visual and textual information. In this work, we leverage state-of-the-art multi-modal AI models, in particular GPT-4o, to automatically grade handwritten responses to college-level math exams. Using real student responses to questions in a probability theory exam, we evaluate GPT-4o's alignment with ground-truth scores from human graders using various prompting techniques. We find that while providing rubrics improves alignment, the model's overall accuracy is still too low for real-world settings, showing there is significant room for growth in this task.

Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive reasoning capabilities in familiar contexts, but struggle when the context conflicts with their parametric knowledge. To investigate this phenomenon, we introduce CounterLogic, a dataset containing 1,800 examples across 9 logical schemas, explicitly designed to evaluate logical reasoning through counterfactual (hypothetical knowledge-conflicting) scenarios. Our systematic evaluation of 11 LLMs across 6 different datasets reveals a consistent performance degradation, with accuracies dropping by 27% on average when reasoning through counterfactual information. We propose Self-Segregate, a prompting method enabling metacognitive awareness (explicitly identifying knowledge conflicts) before reasoning. Our method dramatically narrows the average performance gaps from 27% to just 11%, while significantly increasing the overall accuracy (+7.5%). We discuss the implications of these findings and draw parallels to human cognitive processes, particularly on how humans disambiguate conflicting information during reasoning tasks. Our findings offer practical insights for understanding and enhancing LLMs reasoning capabilities in real-world applications, especially where models must logically reason independently of their factual knowledge.

Studies of human reasoning have shown that people are typically stronger at evaluating reasoning than producing it from scratch. In contrast, large reasoning models (LRMs) are trained to excel at producing long chains of reasoning to solve complex problems. How then do LRMs perform at evaluating reasons? We investigate this with the Valid-Answer-Invalid-Reasoning (VAIR) dataset: math problems and solutions with trivial reasoning flaws but valid answers, designed to isolate reasoning evaluation from the confound of reasoning production. Unlike humans, who we find are only 6% worse at grading than solving such problems, we find a substantial production-evaluation gap in LRMs: frontier models score as low as 48% when evaluating VAIR solutions, despite near-perfect solution production. Why this enigma? Through chain-of-thought (CoT) analysis, we find evidence of an answer confirmation bias: LRMs often produce then check for the correct answer instead of carefully verifying each step, fabricating rationalizations even when noticing anomalous reasoning. Linear probes corroborate this, showing that while LRM activations encode some representation of valid reasoning, they fail to robustly represent VAIR solutions as invalid. Causal patching of the final answer's representations causes LRM verdicts and activations to flip, demonstrating that answer validity is responsible for models' confirmation biases. These findings indicate an outstanding limitation in dominant approaches to reasoning training, which incentivize LRMs to produce and confirm reasoning towards correct answers, but not to robustly evaluate the underlying reasons.

With social media usage growing exponentially in the past few years, fake news has also become extremely prevalent. The detrimental impact of fake news emphasizes the need for research focused on automating the detection of false information and verifying its accuracy. In this work, we present the outcome of the Factify 2 shared task, which provides a multi-modal fact verification and satire news dataset, as part of the DeFactify 2 workshop at AAAI'23. The data calls for a comparison based approach to the task by pairing social media claims with supporting documents, with both text and image, divided into 5 classes based on multi-modal relations. In the second iteration of this task we had over 60 participants and 9 final test-set submissions. The best performances came from the use of DeBERTa for text and Swinv2 and CLIP for image. The highest F1 score averaged for all five classes was 81.82%.