Daily Papers

Multimodal Large Language Models have demonstrated powerful cross-modal understanding and reasoning capabilities in general domains. However, in the electromagnetic (EM) ___domain, they still face challenges such as data scarcity and insufficient integration of ___domain knowledge. This paper proposes PReD, the first foundation model for the EM ___domain that covers the intelligent closed-loop of "perception, recognition, decision-making." We constructed a high-quality multitask EM dataset, PReD-1.3M, and an evaluation benchmark, PReD-Bench. The dataset encompasses multi-perspective representations such as raw time-___domain waveform, frequency-___domain spectrograms, and constellation diagrams, covering typical features of communication and radar signals. It supports a range of core tasks, including signal detection, modulation recognition, parameter estimation, protocol recognition, radio frequency fingerprint recognition, and anti-jamming decision-making. PReD adopts a multi-stage training strategy that unifies multiple tasks for EM signals. It achieves closed-loop optimization from end-to-end signal understanding to language-driven reasoning and decision-making, significantly enhancing EM ___domain expertise while maintaining general multimodal capabilities. Experimental results show that PReD achieves state-of-the-art performance on PReD-Bench constructed from both open-source and self-collected signal datasets. These results collectively validate the feasibility and potential of vision-aligned foundation models in advancing the understanding and reasoning of EM signals.

World models -- generative models that simulate environment dynamics conditioned on past observations and actions -- are gaining prominence in planning, simulation, and embodied AI. However, evaluating their rollouts remains a fundamental challenge, requiring fine-grained, temporally grounded assessment of action alignment and semantic consistency -- capabilities not captured by existing metrics. Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have shown promise as automatic evaluators of generative content due to their strong multimodal reasoning abilities. Yet, their use in fine-grained, temporally sensitive evaluation tasks remains limited and requires targeted adaptation. We introduce a evaluation protocol targeting two recognition tasks -- action recognition and character recognition -- each assessed across binary, multiple-choice, and open-ended formats. To support this, we present UNIVERSE (UNIfied Vision-language Evaluator for Rollouts in Simulated Environments), a method for adapting VLMs to rollout evaluation under data and compute constraints. We conduct a large-scale study comparing full, partial, and parameter-efficient finetuning across task formats, context lengths, sampling strategies, and data compositions. The resulting unified evaluator matches the performance of task-specific baselines using a single checkpoint. Human studies confirm strong alignment with human judgments, establishing UNIVERSE as a scalable, semantics-aware evaluator for world models.

Visual tempo, which describes how fast an action goes, has shown its potential in supervised action recognition. In this work, we demonstrate that visual tempo can also serve as a self-supervision signal for video representation learning. We propose to maximize the mutual information between representations of slow and fast videos via hierarchical contrastive learning (VTHCL). Specifically, by sampling the same instance at slow and fast frame rates respectively, we can obtain slow and fast video frames which share the same semantics but contain different visual tempos. Video representations learned from VTHCL achieve the competitive performances under the self-supervision evaluation protocol for action recognition on UCF-101 (82.1\%) and HMDB-51 (49.2\%). Moreover, comprehensive experiments suggest that the learned representations are generalized well to other downstream tasks including action detection on AVA and action anticipation on Epic-Kitchen. Finally, we propose Instance Correspondence Map (ICM) to visualize the shared semantics captured by contrastive learning.

Explainable face recognition is the problem of explaining why a facial matcher matches faces. In this paper, we provide the first comprehensive benchmark and baseline evaluation for explainable face recognition. We define a new evaluation protocol called the ``inpainting game'', which is a curated set of 3648 triplets (probe, mate, nonmate) of 95 subjects, which differ by synthetically inpainting a chosen facial characteristic like the nose, eyebrows or mouth creating an inpainted nonmate. An explainable face matcher is tasked with generating a network attention map which best explains which regions in a probe image match with a mated image, and not with an inpainted nonmate for each triplet. This provides ground truth for quantifying what image regions contribute to face matching. Furthermore, we provide a comprehensive benchmark on this dataset comparing five state of the art methods for network attention in face recognition on three facial matchers. This benchmark includes two new algorithms for network attention called subtree EBP and Density-based Input Sampling for Explanation (DISE) which outperform the state of the art by a wide margin. Finally, we show qualitative visualization of these network attention techniques on novel images, and explore how these explainable face recognition models can improve transparency and trust for facial matchers.

The evaluation of generative models for natural image tasks has been extensively studied. Similar protocols and metrics are used in cases with unique particularities, such as Handwriting Generation, even if they might not be completely appropriate. In this work, we introduce three measures tailored for HTG evaluation, HTG_{HTR} , HTG_{style} , and HTG_{OOV} , and argue that they are more expedient to evaluate the quality of generated handwritten images. The metrics rely on the recognition error/accuracy of Handwriting Text Recognition and Writer Identification models and emphasize writing style, textual content, and diversity as the main aspects that adhere to the content of handwritten images. We conduct comprehensive experiments on the IAM handwriting database, showcasing that widely used metrics such as FID fail to properly quantify the diversity and the practical utility of generated handwriting samples. Our findings show that our metrics are richer in information and underscore the necessity of standardized evaluation protocols in HTG. The proposed metrics provide a more robust and informative protocol for assessing HTG quality, contributing to improved performance in HTR. Code for the evaluation protocol is available at: https://github.com/koninik/HTG_evaluation.

As urban areas expand, automatic monitoring of parking lots becomes essential for efficient and sustainable cities. This work proposes a self-supervised approach for parking spot occupancy recognition that requires no labeled samples from the target parking lot. Building upon a self-supervised transfer learning fine-tuning protocol, the proposed training strategy consists of two self-supervised stages: first on unlabeled generic data and then on unlabeled target-specific data, followed by supervised fine-tuning using only generic parking lot labels. We adopt SimCLR with a ResNet-50 encoder and evaluate the method under a leave-one-out cross-environment protocol on three public datasets: PKLot, CNRPark-EXT, and PLds. We also introduce a two-stage deployment strategy in which a Strong General Model is initially deployed, followed by a Specialized Model that incorporates unlabeled images collected during the first N days of deployment in a self-supervised manner. Experimental results show that the Strong General Model alone outperforms supervised and self-supervised baselines, achieving an average accuracy of 97.2%, which further improves to 97.8% with the proposed two-stage strategy. These results demonstrate that self-supervised learning enables a scalable and labelefficient solution for real-world parking occupancy monitoring. Our trained models and source code are publicly available at https://github.com/LoanMaikon/Parking-Spot-Occupancy-Recognition.

New methods are needed to monitor environmental treaties, like the Montreal Protocol, by reviewing large, complex customs datasets. This paper introduces a framework using unsupervised machine learning to systematically detect suspicious trade patterns and highlight activities for review. Our methodology, applied to 100,000 trade records, combines several ML techniques. Unsupervised Clustering (K-Means) discovers natural trade archetypes based on shipment value and weight. Anomaly Detection (Isolation Forest and IQR) identifies rare "mega-trades" and shipments with commercially unusual price-per-kilogram values. This is supplemented by Heuristic Flagging to find tactics like vague shipment descriptions. These layers are combined into a priority score, which successfully identified 1,351 price outliers and 1,288 high-priority shipments for customs review. A key finding is that high-priority commodities show a different and more valuable value-to-weight ratio than general goods. This was validated using Explainable AI (SHAP), which confirmed vague descriptions and high value as the most significant risk predictors. The model's sensitivity was validated by its detection of a massive spike in "mega-trades" in early 2021, correlating directly with the real-world regulatory impact of the US AIM Act. This work presents a repeatable unsupervised learning pipeline to turn raw trade data into prioritized, usable intelligence for regulatory groups.

Existing visual place recognition (VPR) datasets predominantly rely on vehicle-mounted imagery, lack multimodal diversity and underrepresent dense, mixed-use street-level spaces, especially in non-Western urban contexts. To address these gaps, we introduce MMS-VPR, a large-scale multimodal dataset for street-level place recognition in complex, pedestrian-only environments. The dataset comprises 78,575 annotated images and 2,512 video clips captured across 207 locations in a ~70,800 m^2 open-air commercial district in Chengdu, China. Each image is labeled with precise GPS coordinates, timestamp, and textual metadata, and covers varied lighting conditions, viewpoints, and timeframes. MMS-VPR follows a systematic and replicable data collection protocol with minimal device requirements, lowering the barrier for scalable dataset creation. Importantly, the dataset forms an inherent spatial graph with 125 edges, 81 nodes, and 1 subgraph, enabling structure-aware place recognition. We further define two application-specific subsets -- Dataset_Edges and Dataset_Points -- to support fine-grained and graph-based evaluation tasks. Extensive benchmarks using conventional VPR models, graph neural networks, and multimodal baselines show substantial improvements when leveraging multimodal and structural cues. MMS-VPR facilitates future research at the intersection of computer vision, geospatial understanding, and multimodal reasoning. The dataset is publicly available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/Yiwei-Ou/MMS-VPR.

This paper presents a novel approach to Zero-Shot Action Recognition. Recent works have explored the detection and classification of objects to obtain semantic information from videos with remarkable performance. Inspired by them, we propose using video captioning methods to extract semantic information about objects, scenes, humans, and their relationships. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work to represent both videos and labels with descriptive sentences. More specifically, we represent videos using sentences generated via video captioning methods and classes using sentences extracted from documents acquired through search engines on the Internet. Using these representations, we build a shared semantic space employing BERT-based embedders pre-trained in the paraphrasing task on multiple text datasets. The projection of both visual and semantic information onto this space is straightforward, as they are sentences, enabling classification using the nearest neighbor rule. We demonstrate that representing videos and labels with sentences alleviates the ___domain adaptation problem. Additionally, we show that word vectors are unsuitable for building the semantic embedding space of our descriptions. Our method outperforms the state-of-the-art performance on the UCF101 dataset by 3.3 p.p. in accuracy under the TruZe protocol and achieves competitive results on both the UCF101 and HMDB51 datasets under the conventional protocol (0/50\% - training/testing split). Our code is available at https://github.com/valterlej/zsarcap.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have demonstrated impressive capabilities in understanding visual content, but their reliability in safety-critical contexts remains under-explored. We introduce VERI (Visual Emergency Recognition Dataset), a carefully designed diagnostic benchmark of 200 images (100 contrastive pairs). Each emergency scene is matched with a visually similar but safe counterpart through multi-stage human verification and iterative refinement. Using a two-stage protocol - risk identification and emergency response - we evaluate 14 VLMs (2B-124B parameters) across medical emergencies, accidents, and natural disasters. Our analysis reveals a systematic overreaction problem: models excel at identifying real emergencies (70-100 percent success rate) but suffer from an alarming rate of false alarms, misidentifying 31-96 percent of safe situations as dangerous, with 10 scenarios failed by all models regardless of scale. This "better-safe-than-sorry" bias manifests primarily through contextual overinterpretation (88-93 percent of errors), challenging VLMs' reliability for safety applications. These findings highlight persistent limitations that are not resolved by increasing model scale, motivating targeted approaches for improving contextual safety assessment in visually misleading scenarios.

Speech Large Language Models (LLMs) show great promise for speech emotion recognition (SER) via generative interfaces. However, shifting from closed-set classification to open text generation introduces zero-shot stochasticity, making evaluation highly sensitive to prompts. Additionally, conventional speech LLMs benchmarks overlook the inherent ambiguity of human emotion. Hence, we present VoxEmo, a comprehensive SER benchmark encompassing 35 emotion corpora across 15 languages for Speech LLMs. VoxEmo provides a standardized toolkit featuring varying prompt complexities, from direct classification to paralinguistic reasoning. To reflect real-world perception/application, we introduce a distribution-aware soft-label protocol and a prompt-ensemble strategy that emulates annotator disagreement. Experiments reveal that while zero-shot speech LLMs trail supervised baselines in hard-label accuracy, they uniquely align with human subjective distributions.

Low-Resolution License Plate Recognition (LRLPR) remains a challenging problem in real-world surveillance scenarios, where long capture distances, compression artifacts, and adverse imaging conditions can severely degrade license plate legibility. To promote progress in this area, we organized the ICPR 2026 Competition on Low-Resolution License Plate Recognition, the first competition specifically dedicated to LRLPR using real low-quality data collected under operationally relevant conditions. The competition was based on the LRLPR-26 dataset, which comprises 20,000 training tracks and 3,000 test tracks; each training track contains five low-resolution and five high-resolution images of the same license plate. Notably, a total of 269 teams from 41 countries registered for the competition, and 99 teams submitted valid entries in the Blind Test Phase. The winning team achieved a Recognition Rate of 82.13%, and four teams surpassed the 80% mark, highlighting both the high level of competition at the top of the leaderboard and the continued difficulty of the task. In addition to presenting the competition design, evaluation protocol, and main results, this paper summarizes the methods adopted by the top-5 teams and discusses current trends and promising directions for future research on LRLPR. The competition webpage is available at https://icpr26lrlpr.github.io/

In this paper, we contribute a new million-scale face benchmark containing noisy 4M identities/260M faces (WebFace260M) and cleaned 2M identities/42M faces (WebFace42M) training data, as well as an elaborately designed time-constrained evaluation protocol. Firstly, we collect 4M name list and download 260M faces from the Internet. Then, a Cleaning Automatically utilizing Self-Training (CAST) pipeline is devised to purify the tremendous WebFace260M, which is efficient and scalable. To the best of our knowledge, the cleaned WebFace42M is the largest public face recognition training set and we expect to close the data gap between academia and industry. Referring to practical scenarios, Face Recognition Under Inference Time conStraint (FRUITS) protocol and a test set are constructed to comprehensively evaluate face matchers. Equipped with this benchmark, we delve into million-scale face recognition problems. A distributed framework is developed to train face recognition models efficiently without tampering with the performance. Empowered by WebFace42M, we reduce relative 40% failure rate on the challenging IJB-C set, and ranks the 3rd among 430 entries on NIST-FRVT. Even 10% data (WebFace4M) shows superior performance compared with public training set. Furthermore, comprehensive baselines are established on our rich-attribute test set under FRUITS-100ms/500ms/1000ms protocol, including MobileNet, EfficientNet, AttentionNet, ResNet, SENet, ResNeXt and RegNet families. Benchmark website is https://www.face-benchmark.org.

The challenge of replicating research results has posed a significant impediment to the field of molecular biology. The advent of modern intelligent systems has led to notable progress in various domains. Consequently, we embarked on an investigation of intelligent monitoring systems as a means of tackling the issue of the reproducibility crisis. Specifically, we first curate a comprehensive multimodal dataset, named ProBio, as an initial step towards this objective. This dataset comprises fine-grained hierarchical annotations intended for the purpose of studying activity understanding in BioLab. Next, we devise two challenging benchmarks, transparent solution tracking and multimodal action recognition, to emphasize the unique characteristics and difficulties associated with activity understanding in BioLab settings. Finally, we provide a thorough experimental evaluation of contemporary video understanding models and highlight their limitations in this specialized ___domain to identify potential avenues for future research. We hope ProBio with associated benchmarks may garner increased focus on modern AI techniques in the realm of molecular biology.

Speech conveys not only linguistic information but also rich non-verbal vocal events such as laughing and crying. While semantic transcription is well-studied, the precise localization of non-verbal events remains a critical yet under-explored challenge. Current methods suffer from insufficient task definitions with limited category coverage and ambiguous temporal granularity. They also lack standardized evaluation frameworks, hindering the development of downstream applications. To bridge this gap, we first develop a refined taxonomy of 21 vocal events, with a new categorization into discrete (standalone) versus continuous (mixed with speech) types. Based on the refined taxonomy, we introduce WESR-Bench, an expert-annotated evaluation set (900+ utterances) with a novel position-aware protocol that disentangles ASR errors from event detection, enabling precise localization measurement for both discrete and continuous events. We also build a strong baseline by constructing a 1,700+ hour corpus, and train specialized models, surpassing both open-source audio-language models and commercial APIs while preserving ASR quality. We anticipate that WESR will serve as a foundational resource for future research in modeling rich, real-world auditory scenes.

Group Activity Recognition (GAR) is well studied on the video modality for surveillance and indoor team sports (e.g., volleyball, basketball). Yet, other modalities such as agent positions and trajectories over time, i.e. tracking, remain comparatively under-explored despite being compact, agent-centric signals that explicitly encode spatial interactions. Understanding whether pixel (video) or position (tracking) modalities leads to better group activity recognition is therefore important to drive further research on the topic. However, no standardized benchmark currently exists that aligns broadcast video and tracking data for the same group activities, leading to a lack of apples-to-apples comparison between these modalities for GAR. In this work, we introduce SoccerNet-GAR, a multimodal dataset built from the 64 matches of the football World Cup 2022. Specifically, the broadcast videos and player tracking modalities for 94{,}285 group activities are synchronized and annotated with 10 categories. Furthermore, we define a unified evaluation protocol to benchmark two strong unimodal approaches: (i) a competitive video-based classifiers and (ii) a tracking-based classifiers leveraging graph neural networks. In particular, our novel role-aware graph architecture for tracking-based GAR directly encodes tactical structure through positional edges and temporal attention. Our tracking model achieves 67.2% balanced accuracy compared to 58.1% for the best video baseline, while training 4.25 times faster with 438 times fewer parameters (197K \vs 86.3M). This study provides new insights into the relative strengths of pixels and positions for group activity recognition. Overall, it highlights the importance of modality choice and role-aware modeling for GAR.

Recent studies show that the visual place recognition (VPR) method using pre-trained visual foundation models can achieve promising performance. In our previous work, we propose a novel method to realize seamless adaptation of foundation models to VPR (SelaVPR). This method can produce both global and local features that focus on discriminative landmarks to recognize places for two-stage VPR by a parameter-efficient adaptation approach. Although SelaVPR has achieved competitive results, we argue that the previous adaptation is inefficient in training time and GPU memory usage, and the re-ranking paradigm is also costly in retrieval latency and storage usage. In pursuit of higher efficiency and better performance, we propose an extension of the SelaVPR, called SelaVPR++. Concretely, we first design a parameter-, time-, and memory-efficient adaptation method that uses lightweight multi-scale convolution (MultiConv) adapters to refine intermediate features from the frozen foundation backbone. This adaptation method does not back-propagate gradients through the backbone during training, and the MultiConv adapter facilitates feature interactions along the spatial axes and introduces proper local priors, thus achieving higher efficiency and better performance. Moreover, we propose an innovative re-ranking paradigm for more efficient VPR. Instead of relying on local features for re-ranking, which incurs huge overhead in latency and storage, we employ compact binary features for initial retrieval and robust floating-point (global) features for re-ranking. To obtain such binary features, we propose a similarity-constrained deep hashing method, which can be easily integrated into the VPR pipeline. Finally, we improve our training strategy and unify the training protocol of several common training datasets to merge them for better training of VPR models. Extensive experiments show that ......

The goal of building a benchmark (suite of datasets) is to provide a unified protocol for fair evaluation and thus facilitate the evolution of a specific area. Nonetheless, we point out that existing protocols of action recognition could yield partial evaluations due to several limitations. To comprehensively probe the effectiveness of spatiotemporal representation learning, we introduce BEAR, a new BEnchmark on video Action Recognition. BEAR is a collection of 18 video datasets grouped into 5 categories (anomaly, gesture, daily, sports, and instructional), which covers a diverse set of real-world applications. With BEAR, we thoroughly evaluate 6 common spatiotemporal models pre-trained by both supervised and self-supervised learning. We also report transfer performance via standard finetuning, few-shot finetuning, and unsupervised ___domain adaptation. Our observation suggests that current state-of-the-art cannot solidly guarantee high performance on datasets close to real-world applications, and we hope BEAR can serve as a fair and challenging evaluation benchmark to gain insights on building next-generation spatiotemporal learners. Our dataset, code, and models are released at: https://github.com/AndongDeng/BEAR

Word-level handwritten optical character recognition (OCR) remains a challenge for morphologically rich languages like Bangla. The complexity arises from the existence of a large number of alphabets, the presence of several diacritic forms, and the appearance of complex conjuncts. The difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that some graphemes occur infrequently but remain indispensable, so addressing the class imbalance is required for satisfactory results. This paper addresses this issue by introducing two knowledge distillation methods: Leveraging Isolated Letter Accumulations By Ordering Teacher Insights (LILA-BOTI) and Super Teacher LILA-BOTI. In both cases, a Convolutional Recurrent Neural Network (CRNN) student model is trained with the dark knowledge gained from a printed isolated character recognition teacher model. We conducted inter-dataset testing on BN-HTRd and BanglaWriting as our evaluation protocol, thus setting up a challenging problem where the results would better reflect the performance on unseen data. Our evaluations achieved up to a 3.5% increase in the F1-Macro score for the minor classes and up to 4.5% increase in our overall word recognition rate when compared with the base model (No KD) and conventional KD.

In this paper, we design a benchmark task and provide the associated datasets for recognizing face images and link them to corresponding entity keys in a knowledge base. More specifically, we propose a benchmark task to recognize one million celebrities from their face images, by using all the possibly collected face images of this individual on the web as training data. The rich information provided by the knowledge base helps to conduct disambiguation and improve the recognition accuracy, and contributes to various real-world applications, such as image captioning and news video analysis. Associated with this task, we design and provide concrete measurement set, evaluation protocol, as well as training data. We also present in details our experiment setup and report promising baseline results. Our benchmark task could lead to one of the largest classification problems in computer vision. To the best of our knowledge, our training dataset, which contains 10M images in version 1, is the largest publicly available one in the world.

Large vision-language models (LVLMs) are vulnerable to typographic attacks, where misleading text within an image overrides visual understanding. Existing evaluation protocols and defenses, largely focused on object recognition, implicitly encourage ignoring text to achieve robustness; however, real-world scenarios often require joint reasoning over both objects and text (e.g., recognizing pedestrians while reading traffic signs). To address this, we introduce a novel task, Read-or-Ignore VQA (RIO-VQA), which formalizes selective text use in visual question answering (VQA): models must decide, from context, when to read text and when to ignore it. For evaluation, we present the Read-or-Ignore Benchmark (RIO-Bench), a standardized dataset and protocol that, for each real image, provides same-scene counterfactuals (read / ignore) by varying only the textual content and question type. Using RIO-Bench, we show that strong LVLMs and existing defenses fail to balance typographic robustness and text-reading capability, highlighting the need for improved approaches. Finally, RIO-Bench enables a novel data-driven defense that learns adaptive selective text use, moving beyond prior non-adaptive, text-ignoring defenses. Overall, this work reveals a fundamental misalignment between the existing evaluation scope and real-world requirements, providing a principled path toward reliable LVLMs. Our Project Page is at https://turingmotors.github.io/rio-vqa/.

Large vision language models (LVLMs) often suffer from object hallucination, producing objects not present in the given images. While current benchmarks for object hallucination primarily concentrate on the presence of a single object class rather than individual entities, this work systematically investigates multi-object hallucination, examining how models misperceive (e.g., invent nonexistent objects or become distracted) when tasked with focusing on multiple objects simultaneously. We introduce Recognition-based Object Probing Evaluation (ROPE), an automated evaluation protocol that considers the distribution of object classes within a single image during testing and uses visual referring prompts to eliminate ambiguity. With comprehensive empirical studies and analysis of potential factors leading to multi-object hallucination, we found that (1) LVLMs suffer more hallucinations when focusing on multiple objects compared to a single object. (2) The tested object class distribution affects hallucination behaviors, indicating that LVLMs may follow shortcuts and spurious correlations.(3) Hallucinatory behaviors are influenced by data-specific factors, salience and frequency, and model intrinsic behaviors. We hope to enable LVLMs to recognize and reason about multiple objects that often occur in realistic visual scenes, provide insights, and quantify our progress towards mitigating the issues.

Automated attack discovery techniques, such as attacker synthesis or model-based fuzzing, provide powerful ways to ensure network protocols operate correctly and securely. Such techniques, in general, require a formal representation of the protocol, often in the form of a finite state machine (FSM). Unfortunately, many protocols are only described in English prose, and implementing even a simple network protocol as an FSM is time-consuming and prone to subtle logical errors. Automatically extracting protocol FSMs from documentation can significantly contribute to increased use of these techniques and result in more robust and secure protocol implementations. In this work we focus on attacker synthesis as a representative technique for protocol security, and on RFCs as a representative format for protocol prose description. Unlike other works that rely on rule-based approaches or use off-the-shelf NLP tools directly, we suggest a data-driven approach for extracting FSMs from RFC documents. Specifically, we use a hybrid approach consisting of three key steps: (1) large-scale word-representation learning for technical language, (2) focused zero-shot learning for mapping protocol text to a protocol-independent information language, and (3) rule-based mapping from protocol-independent information to a specific protocol FSM. We show the generalizability of our FSM extraction by using the RFCs for six different protocols: BGPv4, DCCP, LTP, PPTP, SCTP and TCP. We demonstrate how automated extraction of an FSM from an RFC can be applied to the synthesis of attacks, with TCP and DCCP as case-studies. Our approach shows that it is possible to automate attacker synthesis against protocols by using textual specifications such as RFCs.

Emergency Medical Services (EMS) responders often operate under time-sensitive conditions, facing cognitive overload and inherent risks, requiring essential skills in critical thinking and rapid decision-making. This paper presents CognitiveEMS, an end-to-end wearable cognitive assistant system that can act as a collaborative virtual partner engaging in the real-time acquisition and analysis of multimodal data from an emergency scene and interacting with EMS responders through Augmented Reality (AR) smart glasses. CognitiveEMS processes the continuous streams of data in real-time and leverages edge computing to provide assistance in EMS protocol selection and intervention recognition. We address key technical challenges in real-time cognitive assistance by introducing three novel components: (i) a Speech Recognition model that is fine-tuned for real-world medical emergency conversations using simulated EMS audio recordings, augmented with synthetic data generated by large language models (LLMs); (ii) an EMS Protocol Prediction model that combines state-of-the-art (SOTA) tiny language models with EMS ___domain knowledge using graph-based attention mechanisms; (iii) an EMS Action Recognition module which leverages multimodal audio and video data and protocol predictions to infer the intervention/treatment actions taken by the responders at the incident scene. Our results show that for speech recognition we achieve superior performance compared to SOTA (WER of 0.290 vs. 0.618) on conversational data. Our protocol prediction component also significantly outperforms SOTA (top-3 accuracy of 0.800 vs. 0.200) and the action recognition achieves an accuracy of 0.727, while maintaining an end-to-end latency of 3.78s for protocol prediction on the edge and 0.31s on the server.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents to navigate mobile graphical user interfaces (GUIs). Operating in dynamic on-device ecosystems, which include notifications, pop-ups, and inter-app interactions, exposes them to a unique and underexplored threat vector: environmental injection. Unlike prompt-based attacks that manipulate textual instructions, environmental injection corrupts an agent's visual perception by inserting adversarial UI elements (for example, deceptive overlays or spoofed notifications) directly into the GUI. This bypasses textual safeguards and can derail execution, causing privacy leakage, financial loss, or irreversible device compromise. To systematically evaluate this threat, we introduce GhostEI-Bench, the first benchmark for assessing mobile agents under environmental injection attacks within dynamic, executable environments. Moving beyond static image-based assessments, GhostEI-Bench injects adversarial events into realistic application workflows inside fully operational Android emulators and evaluates performance across critical risk scenarios. We further propose a judge-LLM protocol that conducts fine-grained failure analysis by reviewing the agent's action trajectory alongside the corresponding screenshot sequence, pinpointing failure in perception, recognition, or reasoning. Comprehensive experiments on state-of-the-art agents reveal pronounced vulnerability to deceptive environmental cues: current models systematically fail to perceive and reason about manipulated UIs. GhostEI-Bench provides a framework for quantifying and mitigating this emerging threat, paving the way toward more robust and secure embodied agents.

We present PharmaShip, a real-world Chinese dataset of scanned pharmaceutical shipping documents designed to stress-test pre-trained text-layout models under noisy OCR and heterogeneous templates. PharmaShip covers three complementary tasks-sequence entity recognition (SER), relation extraction (RE), and reading order prediction (ROP)-and adopts an entity-centric evaluation protocol to minimize confounds across architectures. We benchmark five representative baselines spanning pixel-aware and geometry-aware families (LiLT, LayoutLMv3-base, GeoLayoutLM and their available RORE-enhanced variants), and standardize preprocessing, splits, and optimization. Experiments show that pixels and explicit geometry provide complementary inductive biases, yet neither alone is sufficient: injecting reading-order-oriented regularization consistently improves SER and EL and yields the most robust configuration, while longer positional coverage stabilizes late-page predictions and reduces truncation artifacts. ROP is accurate at the word level but challenging at the segment level, reflecting boundary ambiguity and long-range crossings. PharmaShip thus establishes a controlled, reproducible benchmark for safety-critical document understanding in the pharmaceutical ___domain and highlights sequence-aware constraints as a transferable bias for structure modeling. We release the dataset at https://github.com/KevinYuLei/PharmaShip.

We evaluate existing foundation models video understanding capabilities using a carefully designed experiment protocol consisting of three hallmark tasks (action recognition, temporal localization, and spatiotemporal localization), eight datasets well received by the community, and four adaptation methods tailoring a foundation model (FM) for a downstream task. Moreover, we propose a scalar VideoGLUE score (VGS) to measure an FMs efficacy and efficiency when adapting to general video understanding tasks. Our main findings are as follows. First, task-specialized models significantly outperform the six FMs studied in this work, in sharp contrast to what FMs have achieved in natural language and image understanding. Second,video-native FMs, whose pretraining data contains the video modality, are generally better than image-native FMs in classifying motion-rich videos, localizing actions in time, and understanding a video of more than one action. Third, the video-native FMs can perform well on video tasks under light adaptations to downstream tasks(e.g., freezing the FM backbones), while image-native FMs win in full end-to-end finetuning. The first two observations reveal the need and tremendous opportunities to conduct research on video-focused FMs, and the last confirms that both tasks and adaptation methods matter when it comes to the evaluation of FMs.

Due to its expressiveness and unambiguous nature, First-Order Logic (FOL) is a powerful formalism for representing concepts expressed in natural language (NL). This is useful, e.g., for specifying and verifying desired system properties. While translating FOL into human-readable English is relatively straightforward, the inverse problem, converting NL to FOL (NL-FOL translation), has remained a longstanding challenge, for both humans and machines. Although the emergence of Large Language Models (LLMs) promised a breakthrough, recent literature provides contrasting results on their ability to perform NL-FOL translation. In this work, we provide a threefold contribution. First, we critically examine existing datasets and protocols for evaluating NL-FOL translation performance, revealing key limitations that may cause a misrepresentation of LLMs' actual capabilities. Second, to overcome these shortcomings, we propose a novel evaluation protocol explicitly designed to distinguish genuine semantic-level logical understanding from superficial pattern recognition, memorization, and dataset contamination. Third, using this new approach, we show that state-of-the-art, dialogue-oriented LLMs demonstrate strong NL-FOL translation skills and a genuine grasp of sentence-level logic, whereas embedding-centric models perform markedly worse.

Reliable benchmarking is critical for advancing Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models, as it reveals their generalization, robustness, and alignment of perception with language-driven manipulation tasks. However, existing benchmarks often provide limited or misleading assessments due to insufficient evaluation protocols that inadequately capture real-world distribution shifts. This work systematically rethinks VLA benchmarking from both evaluation and data perspectives, introducing LIBERO-X, a benchmark featuring: 1) A hierarchical evaluation protocol with progressive difficulty levels targeting three core capabilities: spatial generalization, object recognition, and task instruction understanding. This design enables fine-grained analysis of performance degradation under increasing environmental and task complexity; 2) A high-diversity training dataset collected via human teleoperation, where each scene supports multiple fine-grained manipulation objectives to bridge the train-evaluation distribution gap. Experiments with representative VLA models reveal significant performance drops under cumulative perturbations, exposing persistent limitations in scene comprehension and instruction grounding. By integrating hierarchical evaluation with diverse training data, LIBERO-X offers a more reliable foundation for assessing and advancing VLA development.

Assessing learner competency in clinical simulation requires expert observation that is time-intensive, difficult to scale, and subject to inter-rater variability. Vision-language models have emerged as a promising tool for understanding complex visual behavior. In this work, we investigate whether visual observations can provide educationally meaningful signals for competency assessment through a three-stage framework that (1) extracts action timelines from egocentric nursing simulation video using frozen visual encoders and few-shot learning, (2) derives sequence-level features and per-session recognition metrics, and (3) relates these to instructor-rated competency. Across 22 densely annotated sessions (3.8 hours, 493 actions), a frozen DINOv2 backbone with HMM Viterbi decoding achieves 57.4% MOF in leave-one-out 1-shot recognition. Surprisingly, we observe a negative trend between recognition accuracy and competency (rho = -0.524, p = 0.012 for mIoU), robust to six confound controls: more competent students produce diverse, harder-to-classify workflows, while simple sequence features show no such relationship. Per-item analysis identifies patient safety protocols and team communication as the expected behaviors most reflected in this pattern, and process model comparisons reveal that higher-competency students exhibit more protocol-consistent action transitions. These findings suggest that recognition accuracy may complement predicted action timelines as a pedagogically informative signal in automated competency assessment.

The performance of speaker verification systems degrades significantly under language mismatch, a critical challenge exacerbated by the field's reliance on English-centric data. To address this, we propose the TidyVoice Challenge for cross-lingual speaker verification. The challenge leverages the TidyVoiceX dataset from the novel TidyVoice benchmark, a large-scale, multilingual corpus derived from Mozilla Common Voice, and specifically curated to isolate the effect of language switching across approximately 40 languages. Participants will be tasked with building systems robust to this mismatch, with performance primarily evaluated using the Equal Error Rate on cross-language trials. By providing standardized data, open-source baselines, and a rigorous evaluation protocol, this challenge aims to drive research towards fairer, more inclusive, and language-independent speaker recognition technologies, directly aligning with the Interspeech 2026 theme, "Speaking Together."

Contactless fingerprint matching using smartphone cameras can alleviate major challenges of traditional fingerprint systems including hygienic acquisition, portability and presentation attacks. However, development of practical and robust contactless fingerprint matching techniques is constrained by the limited availability of large scale real-world datasets. To motivate further advances in contactless fingerprint matching across sensors, we introduce the RidgeBase benchmark dataset. RidgeBase consists of more than 15,000 contactless and contact-based fingerprint image pairs acquired from 88 individuals under different background and lighting conditions using two smartphone cameras and one flatbed contact sensor. Unlike existing datasets, RidgeBase is designed to promote research under different matching scenarios that include Single Finger Matching and Multi-Finger Matching for both contactless- to-contactless (CL2CL) and contact-to-contactless (C2CL) verification and identification. Furthermore, due to the high intra-sample variance in contactless fingerprints belonging to the same finger, we propose a set-based matching protocol inspired by the advances in facial recognition datasets. This protocol is specifically designed for pragmatic contactless fingerprint matching that can account for variances in focus, polarity and finger-angles. We report qualitative and quantitative baseline results for different protocols using a COTS fingerprint matcher (Verifinger) and a Deep CNN based approach on the RidgeBase dataset. The dataset can be downloaded here: https://www.buffalo.edu/cubs/research/datasets/ridgebase-benchmark-dataset.html

Medical Multimodal Large Language Models (Med-MLLMs) require egocentric clinical intent understanding for real-world deployment, yet existing benchmarks fail to evaluate this critical capability. To address these challenges, we introduce MedGaze-Bench, the first benchmark leveraging clinician gaze as a Cognitive Cursor to assess intent understanding across surgery, emergency simulation, and diagnostic interpretation. Our benchmark addresses three fundamental challenges: visual homogeneity of anatomical structures, strict temporal-causal dependencies in clinical workflows, and implicit adherence to safety protocols. We propose a Three-Dimensional Clinical Intent Framework evaluating: (1) Spatial Intent: discriminating precise targets amid visual noise, (2) Temporal Intent: inferring causal rationale through retrospective and prospective reasoning, and (3) Standard Intent: verifying protocol compliance through safety checks. Beyond accuracy metrics, we introduce Trap QA mechanisms to stress-test clinical reliability by penalizing hallucinations and cognitive sycophancy. Experiments reveal current MLLMs struggle with egocentric intent due to over-reliance on global features, leading to fabricated observations and uncritical acceptance of invalid instructions.

Existing Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) remain primarily reactive, failing to continuously perceive environments or proactively assist users. While emerging benchmarks address proactivity, they are largely confined to alert scenarios, neglect personalized context, and fail to evaluate the precise timing of human-machine interactions (HMI).In this paper, we introduce EgoPro-Bench, a novel benchmark for training and evaluating proactive interaction capabilities based on streaming egocentric videos; it comprises 2,400 videos in the evaluation set and over 12,000 videos in the training set.Unlike previous works, EgoPro-Bench leverages simulated user profiles to generate diverse user intentions and to construct high-fidelity HMI data across 12 distinct domains.Subsequently, we propose a specialized evaluation protocol and metrics, train proactive interaction models designed for efficient reasoning and low-latency interaction on streaming video data, and conduct comprehensive evaluations.Furthermore, we introduce an interaction principle termed "short thinking, better interaction", which allocates a limited token budget prior to intent recognition, thereby enhancing interaction performance.The experiments demonstrate that EgoPro-Bench substantially enhances the intention understanding capabilities of MLLMs and enables accurate identification of appropriate timings for HMI, thereby laying a solid foundation for next-generation user-centric proactive interactive agents.

Biological protocols are fundamental to reproducible and safe life science research. While LLMs excel on general tasks, their systematic evaluation on these highly specialized, accuracy-critical, and inherently procedural texts remains limited. In this work, we present BioProBench, the first large-scale, integrated multi-task benchmark for biological protocol understanding and reasoning. While limited benchmarks have touched upon specific aspects like protocol QA, BioProBench provides a comprehensive suite of five core tasks: Protocol Question Answering, Step Ordering, Error Correction, Protocol Generation, and Protocol Reasoning, enabling a holistic evaluation of LLMs on procedural biological texts. Built upon 27K original protocols, it yields nearly 556K high-quality structured instances. We evaluate 12 mainstream open/closed-source LLMs on BioProBench. Experimental results reveal that while top models preform well on surface understanding tasks, struggle significantly with deep reasoning and structured generation tasks like ordering and generation. Furthermore, model comparisons reveal diverse performance: certain open-source models approach closed-source levels on some tasks, yet bio-specific small models lag behind general LLMs, indicating limitations on complex procedural content. Overall, our findings underscore that procedural reasoning within biological protocols represents a significant challenge for current LLMs. BioProBench serves as a standardized framework to diagnose these specific limitations and guide the development of AI systems better equipped for safely automating complex scientific procedures. The code and data are available at: https://github.com/YuyangSunshine/bioprotocolbench and https://huggingface.co/datasets/GreatCaptainNemo/BioProBench.

5G is the 5th generation cellular network protocol. It is the state-of-the-art global wireless standard that enables an advanced kind of network designed to connect virtually everyone and everything with increased speed and reduced latency. Therefore, its development, analysis, and security are critical. However, all approaches to the 5G protocol development and security analysis, e.g., property extraction, protocol summarization, and semantic analysis of the protocol specifications and implementations are completely manual. To reduce such manual effort, in this paper, we curate SPEC5G the first-ever public 5G dataset for NLP research. The dataset contains 3,547,586 sentences with 134M words, from 13094 cellular network specifications and 13 online websites. By leveraging large-scale pre-trained language models that have achieved state-of-the-art results on NLP tasks, we use this dataset for security-related text classification and summarization. Security-related text classification can be used to extract relevant security-related properties for protocol testing. On the other hand, summarization can help developers and practitioners understand the high level of the protocol, which is itself a daunting task. Our results show the value of our 5G-centric dataset in 5G protocol analysis automation. We believe that SPEC5G will enable a new research direction into automatic analyses for the 5G cellular network protocol and numerous related downstream tasks. Our data and code are publicly available.

Diagnosing 802.11 packet captures requires expert protocol knowledge, is slow, inconsistent across engineers, and unscalable. LLM-based approaches sound plausible but fabricate protocol events absent from captures (especially truncated traces), produce uncalibrated confidence scores, and suffer evaluation bias when golden references are co-produced by the model under test. We introduce PROBE (Protocol Reasoning Over evidence-Based Ensembles), a multi-stage pipeline addressing all three failures. It integrates (i) deterministic PCAP-to-text normalization with frame-level verifiability, (ii) multi-run, multi-candidate ensembles with optional cross-model second opinion and progressive obfuscation, (iii) a verdict-aware evidence framework treating absence of failure evidence as contributing evidence, and (iv) a fully deterministic composite reliability score from evidence validity, run-to-run stability, and cross-model agreement without LLM self-assessment. On 87 enterprise Wi-Fi captures (104 capture-reviewer pairs), single-pass LLM analysis raises weighted evidence F1 from 0.871 (expert baseline) to 0.912 but misses critical frames in 35% of cases. Naive ensemble voting drops below baseline (0.842) as majority voting amplifies conservative verdicts: 50% of confirmed failures are misclassified as 'no issue' or 'insufficient evidence.' Adding evidence-grounded reconciliation achieves 0.957 F1, a 96% auto-accept rate, and a worst-case floor above 0.70. LLM self-reported confidence clusters at 0.95 regardless of difficulty (71% report exactly 0.95), confirming it is uninformative. We also introduce a model-agnostic evaluation framework using per-field assertion matching, eliminating circular bias from model-co-produced golden references.

We present the Consilium Protocol, a Byzantine Fault Tolerance-derived architecture for structured multi-model AI deliberation that treats inter-model disagreement as epistemic signal rather than error. The protocol assigns engineered cognitive personas to language models -- separating what a model is from how it reasons -- and introduces an In-Sample/Out-of-Sample validation framework adapted from quantitative finance to distinguish training-data consensus from empirically grounded conclusions. Across 1,478 deliberation sessions spanning 32 topics in 10 ___domain categories, we demonstrate that (1) the cognitive persona, not the underlying model, determines epistemic behavior: free edge-inference models costing 0.0002 USD per batch produced comparable analytical output to frontier models costing 10.69 USD; (2) RLHF alignment training creates measurable, ___domain-specific epistemic blind spots -- contested policy topics exhibit 12.3 percentage points less adversarial challenge than settled science topics, and AI safety topics show asymmetric bias (Δ=11.6%) where models challenge claims that AI is dangerous far more vigorously than claims that AI risk is overstated; (3) the protocol exhibits no directional bias of its own (immigration Δ=2.3%, renewables Δ=1.2%); and (4) out-of-sample evidence retrieval validated 239 claims with 100% evidence retrieval and surfaced 167 blind-spot discoveries invisible to training-data deliberation. Run-to-run reproducibility across randomized modeltimespersona assignments averages pm2.2% standard deviation. Total cost for the complete battery including all overhead: 217 USD. We release the protocol specification under MIT license to enable independent verification.

The integration of advanced technologies into telecommunication networks complicates troubleshooting, posing challenges for manual error identification in Packet Capture (PCAP) data. This manual approach, requiring substantial resources, becomes impractical at larger scales. Machine learning (ML) methods offer alternatives, but the scarcity of labeled data limits accuracy. In this study, we propose a self-supervised, large language model-based (LLMcap) method for PCAP failure detection. LLMcap leverages language-learning abilities and employs masked language modeling to learn grammar, context, and structure. Tested rigorously on various PCAPs, it demonstrates high accuracy despite the absence of labeled data during training, presenting a promising solution for efficient network analysis. Index Terms: Network troubleshooting, Packet Capture Analysis, Self-Supervised Learning, Large Language Model, Network Quality of Service, Network Performance.

Network protocols are programs with inputs and outputs that follow predefined communication patterns to synchronize and exchange information. There are many protocols and each serves a different purpose, e.g., routing, transport, secure communication, etc. The functional and performance requirements for a protocol can be expressed using a formal specification, such as, a set of logical predicates over its traces. A protocol could be prevented from achieving its requirements due to a bug in its design or implementation, a component failure (e.g., a crash), or an attack. This dissertation shows that formal methods can feasibly characterize the functionality and performance of network protocols under normal conditions as well as when subjected to attacks.

Foundation models succeed when they learn in the native structure of a modality, whether morphology-respecting tokens in language or pixels in vision. Wireless packet traces deserve the same treatment: meaning emerges from layered headers, typed fields, timing gaps, and cross-packet state machines, not flat strings. We present Plume (Protocol Language Understanding Model for Exchanges), a compact 140M-parameter foundation model for 802.11 traces that learns from structured PDML dissections. A protocol-aware tokenizer splits along the dissector field tree, emits gap tokens for timing, and normalizes identifiers, yielding 6.2x shorter sequences than BPE with higher per token information density. Trained on a curated corpus, Plume achieves 74-97% next-packet token accuracy across five real-world failure categories and AUROC >= 0.99 for zero-shot anomaly detection. On the same prediction task, frontier LLMs (Claude Opus 4.6, GPT-5.4) score comparably despite receiving identical protocol context, yet Plume does so with > 600x fewer parameters, fitting on a single GPU at effectively zero marginal cost vs. cloud API pricing, enabling on-prem, privacy-preserving root cause analysis.

To reduce development overhead and enable seamless integration between potential components comprising any given generative AI application, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) (Anthropic, 2024) has recently been released and subsequently widely adopted. The MCP is an open protocol that standardizes API calls to large language models (LLMs), data sources, and agentic tools. By connecting multiple MCP servers, each defined with a set of tools, resources, and prompts, users are able to define automated workflows fully driven by LLMs. However, we show that the current MCP design carries a wide range of security risks for end users. In particular, we demonstrate that industry-leading LLMs may be coerced into using MCP tools to compromise an AI developer's system through various attacks, such as malicious code execution, remote access control, and credential theft. To proactively mitigate these and related attacks, we introduce a safety auditing tool, MCPSafetyScanner, the first agentic tool to assess the security of an arbitrary MCP server. MCPScanner uses several agents to (a) automatically determine adversarial samples given an MCP server's tools and resources; (b) search for related vulnerabilities and remediations based on those samples; and (c) generate a security report detailing all findings. Our work highlights serious security issues with general-purpose agentic workflows while also providing a proactive tool to audit MCP server safety and address detected vulnerabilities before deployment. The described MCP server auditing tool, MCPSafetyScanner, is freely available at: https://github.com/johnhalloran321/mcpSafetyScanner

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) defines a schema bound execution model for agent-tool interaction, enabling modular computer vision workflows without retraining. To our knowledge, this is the first protocol level, deployment scale audit of MCP in vision systems, identifying systemic weaknesses in schema semantics, interoperability, and runtime coordination. We analyze 91 publicly registered vision centric MCP servers, annotated along nine dimensions of compositional fidelity, and develop an executable benchmark with validators to detect and categorize protocol violations. The audit reveals high prevalence of schema format divergence, missing runtime schema validation, undeclared coordinate conventions, and reliance on untracked bridging scripts. Validator based testing quantifies these failures, with schema format checks flagging misalignments in 78.0 percent of systems, coordinate convention checks detecting spatial reference errors in 24.6 percent, and memory scope checks issuing an average of 33.8 warnings per 100 executions. Security probes show that dynamic and multi agent workflows exhibit elevated risks of privilege escalation and untyped tool connections. The proposed benchmark and validator suite, implemented in a controlled testbed and to be released on GitHub, establishes a reproducible framework for measuring and improving the reliability and security of compositional vision workflows.

In the development of science, accurate and reproducible documentation of the experimental process is crucial. Automatic recognition of the actions in experiments from videos would help experimenters by complementing the recording of experiments. Towards this goal, we propose FineBio, a new fine-grained video dataset of people performing biological experiments. The dataset consists of multi-view videos of 32 participants performing mock biological experiments with a total duration of 14.5 hours. One experiment forms a hierarchical structure, where a protocol consists of several steps, each further decomposed into a set of atomic operations. The uniqueness of biological experiments is that while they require strict adherence to steps described in each protocol, there is freedom in the order of atomic operations. We provide hierarchical annotation on protocols, steps, atomic operations, object locations, and their manipulation states, providing new challenges for structured activity understanding and hand-object interaction recognition. To find out challenges on activity understanding in biological experiments, we introduce baseline models and results on four different tasks, including (i) step segmentation, (ii) atomic operation detection (iii) object detection, and (iv) manipulated/affected object detection. Dataset and code are available from https://github.com/aistairc/FineBio.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a de facto standard for integrating Large Language Models with external tools, yet no formal security analysis of the protocol specification exists. We present the first rigorous security analysis of MCP's architectural design, identifying three fundamental protocol-level vulnerabilities: (1) absence of capability attestation allowing servers to claim arbitrary permissions, (2) bidirectional sampling without origin authentication enabling server-side prompt injection, and (3) implicit trust propagation in multi-server configurations. We implement MCPBench, a novel framework bridging existing agent security benchmarks to MCP-compliant infrastructure, enabling direct measurement of protocol-specific attack surfaces. Through controlled experiments on 847 attack scenarios across five MCP server implementations, we demonstrate that MCP's architectural choices amplify attack success rates by 23--41\% compared to equivalent non-MCP integrations. We propose MCPSec, a backward-compatible protocol extension adding capability attestation and message authentication, reducing attack success rates from 52.8\% to 12.4\% with median latency overhead of 8.3ms per message. Our findings establish that MCP's security weaknesses are architectural rather than implementation-specific, requiring protocol-level remediation.

As multi-agent AI systems grow in complexity, the protocols connecting them constrain their capabilities. Current protocols such as A2A and MCP do not expose model-level properties as first-class primitives, ignoring properties fundamental to effective delegation: model identity, reasoning profile, quality calibration, and cost characteristics. We present the LLM Delegate Protocol (LDP), an AI-native communication protocol introducing five mechanisms: (1) rich delegate identity cards with quality hints and reasoning profiles; (2) progressive payload modes with negotiation and fallback; (3) governed sessions with persistent context; (4) structured provenance tracking confidence and verification status; (5) trust domains enforcing security boundaries at the protocol level. We implement LDP as a plugin for the JamJet agent runtime and evaluate against A2A and random baselines using local Ollama models and LLM-as-judge evaluation. Identity-aware routing achieves ~12x lower latency on easy tasks through delegate specialization, though it does not improve aggregate quality in our small delegate pool; semantic frame payloads reduce token count by 37% (p=0.031) with no observed quality loss; governed sessions eliminate 39% token overhead at 10 rounds; and noisy provenance degrades synthesis quality below the no-provenance baseline, arguing that confidence metadata is harmful without verification. Simulated analyses show architectural advantages in attack detection (96% vs. 6%) and failure recovery (100% vs. 35% completion). This paper contributes a protocol design, reference implementation, and initial evidence that AI-native protocol primitives enable more efficient and governable delegation.

Recent text-to-video (T2V) technology advancements, as demonstrated by models such as Gen2, Pika, and Sora, have significantly broadened its applicability and popularity. Despite these strides, evaluating these models poses substantial challenges. Primarily, due to the limitations inherent in automatic metrics, manual evaluation is often considered a superior method for assessing T2V generation. However, existing manual evaluation protocols face reproducibility, reliability, and practicality issues. To address these challenges, this paper introduces the Text-to-Video Human Evaluation (T2VHE) protocol, a comprehensive and standardized protocol for T2V models. The T2VHE protocol includes well-defined metrics, thorough annotator training, and an effective dynamic evaluation module. Experimental results demonstrate that this protocol not only ensures high-quality annotations but can also reduce evaluation costs by nearly 50%. We will open-source the entire setup of the T2VHE protocol, including the complete protocol workflow, the dynamic evaluation component details, and the annotation interface code. This will help communities establish more sophisticated human assessment protocols.

Agent communication protocols are becoming critical infrastructure for large language model (LLM) systems that must use tools, coordinate with other agents, and operate across heterogeneous environments. This work presents a human-inspired perspective on this emerging landscape by organizing agent communication into three layers: communication, syntactic, and semantic. Under this framework, we systematically analyze 18 representative protocols and compare how they support reliable transport, structured interaction, and meaning-level coordination. Our analysis shows a clear imbalance in current protocol design. Most protocols provide increasingly mature support for transport, streaming, schema definition, and lifecycle management, but offer limited protocol-level mechanisms for clarification, context alignment, and verification. As a result, semantic responsibilities are often pushed into prompts, wrappers, or application-specific orchestration logic, creating hidden interoperability and maintenance costs. To make this gap actionable, we further identify major forms of technical debt in today's protocol ecosystem and distill practical guidance for selecting protocols under different deployment settings. We conclude by outlining a research agenda for interoperable, secure, and semantically robust agent ecosystems that move beyond message passing toward shared understanding.

Agent-interoperability protocols such as A2A and MCP standardize what agents say to one another but assume address-based transport. Whether over HTTP(S) or a content-protecting binding such as MLS-based SLIM, these transports protect message content yet leave the communication graph exposed: which agent contacts which, when, and how often. In agent systems this graph is more consequential than a privacy framing suggests. Endpoints are capability-labeled, workflows are structured and chained, and interactions are coupled to real actions, so an observer recovers more than past relationships: it can infer the pending workflow and, at machine speed, act on that inference before the workflow completes. The threat is therefore one of workflow integrity, not privacy alone. We formalize a threat model for the communication graph and locate what makes its metadata distinctively consequential: not stronger fingerprinting, which we measure to be comparable to other machine traffic, but exposure across independent trust domains, coupled to autonomous action. We define transport- and bootstrap-layer privacy properties, evaluate candidate transports, and give an A2A case study where a metadata-protecting binding surfaces the protocol's implicit identity assumptions. On a generative model anchored to a real capture and over a live A2A binding, a label-blind classifier recovers a task's class from passive metadata well above chance, and from only its opening; a defense-aware adversary does not overturn this, and only the full set of properties drives recovery toward chance. The leverage of acting on the leak is distinct from recoverability: under a fixed budget an adversary realizes most of a clairvoyant attacker's advantage from a workflow's opening, governed by precision over the top-ranked workflows rather than overall accuracy, so a defense suppresses it even while recovery stays above chance.

As large language models (LLMs) become more powerful and are deployed more autonomously, it will be increasingly important to prevent them from causing harmful outcomes. Researchers have investigated a variety of safety techniques for this purpose, e.g. using models to review the outputs of other models, or red-teaming techniques to surface subtle failure modes. However, researchers have not evaluated whether such techniques still ensure safety if the model is itself intentionally trying to subvert them. In this paper, we develop and evaluate pipelines of safety techniques ("protocols") that are robust to intentional subversion. We investigate a scenario in which we want to solve a sequence of programming problems, using access to a powerful but untrusted model (in our case, GPT-4), access to a less powerful trusted model (in our case, GPT-3.5), and limited access to high-quality trusted labor. We investigate protocols that aim to never submit solutions containing backdoors, which we operationalize here as logical errors that are not caught by test cases. We investigate a range of protocols and test each against strategies that the untrusted model could use to subvert them. One protocol is what we call trusted editing. This protocol first asks GPT-4 to write code, and then asks GPT-3.5 to rate the suspiciousness of that code. If the code is below some suspiciousness threshold, it is submitted. Otherwise, GPT-3.5 edits the solution to remove parts that seem suspicious and then submits the edited code. Another protocol is untrusted monitoring. This protocol asks GPT-4 to write code, and then asks another instance of GPT-4 whether the code is backdoored, using various techniques to prevent the GPT-4 instances from colluding. These protocols improve substantially on simple baselines.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) standardizes how AI agents discover and invoke external tools, with over 10,000 active servers and 97 million monthly SDK downloads as of early 2026. Yet MCP does not yet standardize how agents safely operate those tools at production scale. Three protocol-level primitives remain missing: identity propagation, adaptive tool budgeting, and structured error semantics. This paper identifies these gaps through field lessons from an enterprise deployment of an AI agent platform integrated with a major cloud provider's MCP servers (client name redacted). We propose three mechanisms to fill them: (1) the Context-Aware Broker Protocol (CABP), which extends JSON-RPC with identity-scoped request routing via a six-stage broker pipeline; (2) Adaptive Timeout Budget Allocation (ATBA), which frames sequential tool invocation as a budget allocation problem over heterogeneous latency distributions; and (3) the Structured Error Recovery Framework (SERF), which provides machine-readable failure semantics that enable deterministic agent self-correction. We organize production failure modes into five design dimensions (server contracts, user context, timeouts, errors, and observability), document concrete failure vignettes, and present a production readiness checklist. All three algorithms are formalized as testable hypotheses with reproducible experimental methodology. Field observations demonstrate that while MCP provides a solid protocol foundation, reliable agent tool integration requires infrastructure-level mechanisms that the specification does not yet address.

Distributed protocols should be robust to both benign malfunction (e.g. packet loss or delay) and attacks (e.g. message replay) from internal or external adversaries. In this paper we take a formal approach to the automated synthesis of attackers, i.e. adversarial processes that can cause the protocol to malfunction. Specifically, given a formal threat model capturing the distributed protocol model and network topology, as well as the placement, goals, and interface (inputs and outputs) of potential attackers, we automatically synthesize an attacker. We formalize four attacker synthesis problems - across attackers that always succeed versus those that sometimes fail, and attackers that attack forever versus those that do not - and we propose algorithmic solutions to two of them. We report on a prototype implementation called KORG and its application to TCP as a case-study. Our experiments show that KORG can automatically generate well-known attacks for TCP within seconds or minutes.

AI agents increasingly call tools via the Model Context Protocol (MCP) and delegate to other agents via Agent-to-Agent (A2A), yet neither protocol verifies agent identity. A scan of approximately 2,000 MCP servers found all lacked authentication. In our survey, we did not identify a prior implemented protocol that jointly combines public-key verifiable delegation, holder-side attenuation, expressive chained policy, transport bindings across MCP/A2A/HTTP, and provenance-oriented completion records. We introduce Invocation-Bound Capability Tokens (IBCTs), a primitive that fuses identity, attenuated authorization, and provenance binding into a single append-only token chain. IBCTs operate in two wire formats: compact mode (a signed JWT for single-hop cases) and chained mode (a Biscuit token with Datalog policies for multi-hop delegation). We provide reference implementations in Python and Rust with full cross-language interoperability. Compact mode verification takes 0.049ms (Rust) and 0.189ms (Python), with 0.22ms overhead over no-auth in real MCP-over-HTTP deployment. In a real multi-agent deployment with Gemini 2.5 Flash, AIP adds 2.35ms of overhead (0.086% of total end-to-end latency). Adversarial evaluation across 600 attack attempts shows 100% rejection rate, with two attack categories (delegation depth violation and audit evasion through empty context) uniquely caught by AIP's chained delegation model that neither unsigned nor plain JWT deployments detect.

The rapid development of the AI agent communication protocols, including the Model Context Protocol (MCP), Agent2Agent (A2A), Agora, and Agent Network Protocol (ANP), is reshaping how AI agents communicate with tools, services, and each other. While these protocols support scalable multi-agent interaction and cross-organizational interoperability, their security principles remain understudied, and standardized threat modeling is limited; no protocol-centric risk assessment framework has been established yet. This paper presents a systematic security analysis of four emerging AI agent communication protocols. First, we develop a structured threat modeling analysis that examines protocol architectures, trust assumptions, interaction patterns, and lifecycle behaviors to identify protocol-specific and cross-protocol risk surfaces. Second, we introduce a qualitative risk assessment framework that identifies twelve protocol-level risks and evaluates security posture across the creation, operation, and update phases through systematic assessment of likelihood, impact, and overall protocol risk, with implications for secure deployment and future standardization. Third, we provide a measurement-driven case study on MCP that formalizes the risk of missing mandatory validation/attestation for executable components as a falsifiable security claim by quantifying wrong-provider tool execution under multi-server composition across representative resolver policies. Collectively, our results highlight key design-induced risk surfaces and provide actionable guidance for secure deployment and future standardization of agent communication ecosystems.

Although action recognition for procedural tasks has received notable attention, it has a fundamental flaw in that no measure of success for actions is provided. This limits the applicability of such systems especially within the industrial ___domain, since the outcome of procedural actions is often significantly more important than the mere execution. To address this limitation, we define the novel task of procedure step recognition (PSR), focusing on recognizing the correct completion and order of procedural steps. Alongside the new task, we also present the multi-modal IndustReal dataset. Unlike currently available datasets, IndustReal contains procedural errors (such as omissions) as well as execution errors. A significant part of these errors are exclusively present in the validation and test sets, making IndustReal suitable to evaluate robustness of algorithms to new, unseen mistakes. Additionally, to encourage reproducibility and allow for scalable approaches trained on synthetic data, the 3D models of all parts are publicly available. Annotations and benchmark performance are provided for action recognition and assembly state detection, as well as the new PSR task. IndustReal, along with the code and model weights, is available at: https://github.com/TimSchoonbeek/IndustReal .

The foundation of reproducible science lies in protocols that are precise, logically ordered, and executable. The autonomous generation of these protocols through natural language queries could greatly improve the efficiency of the reproduction process. However, current leading large language models (LLMs) often generate incomplete or inconsistent protocols, limiting their utility. To address this limitation, we first introduce SciRecipe, a large-scale dataset of over 12K structured protocols spanning 27 biological subfields and encompassing both comprehension and problem-solving tasks. To further improve protocol generation, we propose the "Sketch-and-Fill" paradigm, which separates analysis, structuring, and expression to ensure each step is explicit and verifiable. Complementing this, the structured component-based reward mechanism evaluates step granularity, action order, and semantic fidelity, aligning model optimization with experimental reliability. Building on these components, we develop Thoth, trained through a staged Knowledge-to-Action process that progresses from knowledge acquisition to operational reasoning and ultimately to robust, executable protocol generation. Across multiple benchmarks, Thoth consistently surpasses both proprietary and open-source LLMs, achieving significant improvements in step alignment, logical sequencing, and semantic accuracy. Our approach paves the way for reliable scientific assistants that bridge knowledge with experimental execution. All data, code, and models will be released publicly.

In this study, we introduce FEET, a standardized protocol designed to guide the development and benchmarking of foundation models. While numerous benchmark datasets exist for evaluating these models, we propose a structured evaluation protocol across three distinct scenarios to gain a comprehensive understanding of their practical performance. We define three primary use cases: frozen embeddings, few-shot embeddings, and fully fine-tuned embeddings. Each scenario is detailed and illustrated through two case studies: one in sentiment analysis and another in the medical ___domain, demonstrating how these evaluations provide a thorough assessment of foundation models' effectiveness in research applications. We recommend this protocol as a standard for future research aimed at advancing representation learning models.

Traditional protocol fuzzing techniques, such as those employed by AFL-based systems, often lack effectiveness due to a limited semantic understanding of complex protocol grammars and rigid seed mutation strategies. Recent works, such as ChatAFL, have integrated Large Language Models (LLMs) to guide protocol fuzzing and address these limitations, pushing protocol fuzzers to wider exploration of the protocol state space. But ChatAFL still faces issues like unreliable output, LLM hallucinations, and assumptions of LLM knowledge about protocol specifications. This paper introduces MultiFuzz, a novel dense retrieval-based multi-agent system designed to overcome these limitations by integrating semantic-aware context retrieval, specialized agents, and structured tool-assisted reasoning. MultiFuzz utilizes agentic chunks of protocol documentation (RFC Documents) to build embeddings in a vector database for a retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) pipeline, enabling agents to generate more reliable and structured outputs, enhancing the fuzzer in mutating protocol messages with enhanced state coverage and adherence to syntactic constraints. The framework decomposes the fuzzing process into modular groups of agents that collaborate through chain-of-thought reasoning to dynamically adapt fuzzing strategies based on the retrieved contextual knowledge. Experimental evaluations on the Real-Time Streaming Protocol (RTSP) demonstrate that MultiFuzz significantly improves branch coverage and explores deeper protocol states and transitions over state-of-the-art (SOTA) fuzzers such as NSFuzz, AFLNet, and ChatAFL. By combining dense retrieval, agentic coordination, and language model reasoning, MultiFuzz establishes a new paradigm in autonomous protocol fuzzing, offering a scalable and extensible foundation for future research in intelligent agentic-based fuzzing systems.

The rapid development of large language models (LLMs) has led to the widespread deployment of LLM agents across diverse industries, including customer service, content generation, data analysis, and even healthcare. However, as more LLM agents are deployed, a major issue has emerged: there is no standard way for these agents to communicate with external tools or data sources. This lack of standardized protocols makes it difficult for agents to work together or scale effectively, and it limits their ability to tackle complex, real-world tasks. A unified communication protocol for LLM agents could change this. It would allow agents and tools to interact more smoothly, encourage collaboration, and triggering the formation of collective intelligence. In this paper, we provide the first comprehensive analysis of existing agent protocols, proposing a systematic two-dimensional classification that differentiates context-oriented versus inter-agent protocols and general-purpose versus ___domain-specific protocols. Additionally, we conduct a comparative performance analysis of these protocols across key dimensions such as security, scalability, and latency. Finally, we explore the future landscape of agent protocols by identifying critical research directions and characteristics necessary for next-generation protocols. These characteristics include adaptability, privacy preservation, and group-based interaction, as well as trends toward layered architectures and collective intelligence infrastructures. We expect this work to serve as a practical reference for both researchers and engineers seeking to design, evaluate, or integrate robust communication infrastructures for intelligent agents.

The automatic evaluation of instruction following typically involves using large language models (LLMs) to assess response quality. However, there is a lack of comprehensive evaluation of these LLM-based evaluators across two dimensions: the base LLMs and the evaluation protocols. Therefore, we present a thorough meta-evaluation of instruction following, including 25 base LLMs and 15 recently proposed evaluation protocols, on 4 human-annotated datasets, assessing the evaluation accuracy of the LLM-evaluators. Our evaluation allows us to identify the best-performing base LLMs and evaluation protocols with a high degree of robustness. Moreover, our large-scale evaluation reveals: (1) Base LLM performance ranking remains largely consistent across evaluation protocols, with less capable LLMs showing greater improvement from protocol enhancements; (2) Robust evaluation of evaluation protocols requires many base LLMs with varying capability levels, as protocol effectiveness can depend on the base LLM used; (3) Evaluation results on different datasets are not always consistent, so a rigorous evaluation requires multiple datasets with distinctive features. We release our meta-evaluation suite ReIFE, which provides the codebase and evaluation result collection for more than 500 LLM-evaluator configurations, to support future research in instruction-following evaluation.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly capable, it is prudent to assess whether safety measures remain effective even if LLMs intentionally try to bypass them. Previous work introduced control evaluations, an adversarial framework for testing deployment strategies of untrusted models (i.e., models which might be trying to bypass safety measures). While prior work treats a single failure as unacceptable, we perform control evaluations in a "distributed threat setting" -- a setting where no single action is catastrophic and no single action provides overwhelming evidence of misalignment. We approach this problem with a two-level deployment framework that uses an adaptive macro-protocol to choose between micro-protocols. Micro-protocols operate on a single task, using a less capable, but extensively tested (trusted) model to harness and monitor the untrusted model. Meanwhile, the macro-protocol maintains an adaptive credence on the untrusted model's alignment based on its past actions, using it to pick between safer and riskier micro-protocols. We evaluate our method in a code generation testbed where a red team attempts to generate subtly backdoored code with an LLM whose deployment is safeguarded by a blue team. We plot Pareto frontiers of safety (# of non-backdoored solutions) and usefulness (# of correct solutions). At a given level of usefulness, our adaptive deployment strategy reduces the number of backdoors by 80% compared to non-adaptive baselines.

Agentic AI systems built around large language models (LLMs) are moving away from closed, single-model frameworks and toward open ecosystems that connect a variety of agents, external tools, and resources. The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a standard to unify tool access, allowing agents to discover, invoke, and coordinate with tools more flexibly. However, as MCP becomes more widely adopted, it also brings a new set of security and privacy challenges. These include risks such as unauthorized access, tool poisoning, prompt injection, privilege escalation, and supply chain attacks, any of which can impact different parts of the protocol workflow. While recent research has examined possible attack surfaces and suggested targeted countermeasures, there is still a lack of systematic, protocol-level security improvements for MCP. To address this, we introduce the Secure Model Context Protocol (SMCP), which builds on MCP by adding unified identity management, robust mutual authentication, ongoing security context propagation, fine-grained policy enforcement, and comprehensive audit logging. In this paper, we present the main components of SMCP, explain how it helps reduce security risks, and illustrate its application with practical examples. We hope that this work will contribute to the development of agentic systems that are not only powerful and adaptable, but also secure and dependable.

The computation necessary for training Transformer-based language models has skyrocketed in recent years. This trend has motivated research on efficient training algorithms designed to improve training, validation, and downstream performance faster than standard training. In this work, we revisit three categories of such algorithms: dynamic architectures (layer stacking, layer dropping), batch selection (selective backprop, RHO loss), and efficient optimizers (Lion, Sophia). When pre-training BERT and T5 with a fixed computation budget using such methods, we find that their training, validation, and downstream gains vanish compared to a baseline with a fully-decayed learning rate. We define an evaluation protocol that enables computation to be done on arbitrary machines by mapping all computation time to a reference machine which we call reference system time. We discuss the limitations of our proposed protocol and release our code to encourage rigorous research in efficient training procedures: https://github.com/JeanKaddour/NoTrainNoGain.

Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs) represent sophisticated attack patterns in the cybersecurity ___domain, described encyclopedically in textual knowledge bases. Identifying TTPs in cybersecurity writing, often called TTP mapping, is an important and challenging task. Conventional learning approaches often target the problem in the classical multi-class or multilabel classification setting. This setting hinders the learning ability of the model due to a large number of classes (i.e., TTPs), the inevitable skewness of the label distribution and the complex hierarchical structure of the label space. We formulate the problem in a different learning paradigm, where the assignment of a text to a TTP label is decided by the direct semantic similarity between the two, thus reducing the complexity of competing solely over the large labeling space. To that end, we propose a neural matching architecture with an effective sampling-based learn-to-compare mechanism, facilitating the learning process of the matching model despite constrained resources.

We present ACAR (Adaptive Complexity and Attribution Routing), a measurement framework for studying multi-model orchestration under auditable conditions. ACAR uses self-consistency variance (sigma) computed from N=3 probe samples to route tasks across single-model, two-model, and three-model execution modes. The system is implemented on top of TEAMLLM, a deterministic execution substrate with immutable artifacts and complete decision traces. We evaluate ACAR on 1,510 tasks spanning four benchmarks: MathArena, Reasoning Gym, LiveCodeBench, and SuperGPQA, using Claude Sonnet 4, GPT-4o, and Gemini 2.0 Flash, producing more than 7,550 auditable runs. Results show that sigma-based routing achieves 55.6 percent accuracy, exceeding the two-model baseline of 54.4 percent while avoiding full ensembling on 54.2 percent of tasks. The routing mechanism is model-agnostic and requires no learned components. We also document negative results. First, retrieval augmentation reduced accuracy by 3.4 percentage points, as median retrieval similarity was only 0.167, demonstrating that experience injection without semantic alignment introduces noise rather than grounding. Second, when models agree on incorrect answers (sigma equals zero), no downstream ensemble can recover; this agreement-but-wrong failure mode is intrinsic to self-consistency and bounds achievable accuracy at approximately eight percentage points below full ensembling. Third, attribution estimates based on proxy signals such as response similarity and entropy showed weak correlation with ground-truth leave-one-out values, indicating that practical attribution requires explicit counterfactual computation. This work documents which assumptions fail in practice and provides falsifiable baselines for future research on routing, retrieval, and multi-model attribution.

We introduce AnyTool, a large language model agent designed to revolutionize the utilization of a vast array of tools in addressing user queries. We utilize over 16,000 APIs from Rapid API, operating under the assumption that a subset of these APIs could potentially resolve the queries. AnyTool primarily incorporates three elements: an API retriever with a hierarchical structure, a solver aimed at resolving user queries using a selected set of API candidates, and a self-reflection mechanism, which re-activates AnyTool if the initial solution proves impracticable. AnyTool is powered by the function calling feature of GPT-4, eliminating the need for training external modules. We also revisit the evaluation protocol introduced by previous works and identify a limitation in this protocol that leads to an artificially high pass rate. By revising the evaluation protocol to better reflect practical application scenarios, we introduce an additional benchmark, termed AnyToolBench. Experiments across various datasets demonstrate the superiority of our AnyTool over strong baselines such as ToolLLM and a GPT-4 variant tailored for tool utilization. For instance, AnyTool outperforms ToolLLM by +35.4% in terms of average pass rate on ToolBench. Code will be available at https://github.com/dyabel/AnyTool.

Cross-modal optical-SAR (Synthetic Aperture Radar) registration is a bottleneck for disaster-response via remote sensing, yet modern image matchers are developed and benchmarked almost exclusively on natural-image domains. We evaluate twenty-four pretrained matcher families--in a zero-shot setting with no fine-tuning or ___domain adaptation on satellite or SAR data--on SpaceNet9 and two additional cross-modal benchmarks under a deterministic protocol with tiled large-image inference, robust geometric filtering, and tie-point-grounded metrics. Our results reveal asymmetric transfer--matchers with explicit cross-modal training do not uniformly outperform those without it. While XoFTR (trained for visible-thermal matching) and RoMa achieve the lowest reported mean error at 3.0 px on the labeled SpaceNet9 training scenes, RoMa achieves this without any cross-modal training, and MatchAnything-ELoFTR (3.4 px)--trained on synthetic cross-modal pairs--matches closely, suggesting (as a working hypothesis) that foundation-model features (DINOv2) may contribute to modality invariance that partially substitutes for explicit cross-modal supervision. 3D-reconstruction matchers (MASt3R, DUSt3R), which are not designed for traditional 2D image matching, are highly protocol-sensitive and remain fragile under default settings. Deployment protocol choices (geometry model, tile size, inlier gating) shift accuracy by up to 33times for a single matcher, sometimes exceeding the effect of swapping matchers entirely within the evaluated sweep--affine geometry alone reduces mean error from 12.34 to 9.74 px. These findings inform both practical deployment of existing matchers and future matcher design for cross-modal satellite registration.

This position paper argues that computer science conferences should require tamper-evident, nonrepudiable attestations of experimental results. We name the underlying problem experiment nonrepudiation: a compliant protocol must bind the numbers in a paper to an actual executed computation in a way the author cannot later alter or deny. The current system relies on self-reported checklists, optional code sharing, and author-controlled logging. None of these mechanisms answer the question a reviewer cannot check: did the code the paper describes produce the numbers the paper reports? We define the problem formally, state the security properties any compliant protocol must satisfy, and describe a threat model that includes attacks current approaches do not prevent. To show that the problem is solvable, we built K-Veritas, a reference implementation in Go that produces signed reports without accessing training data. K-Veritas is a testbed, not a finished answer. We call on conferences and the community to treat nonrepudiation as a first-class requirement and to help build an open, independent standard for it.

As Model Context Protocol (MCP) introduces an easy-to-use ecosystem for users and developers, it also brings underexplored safety risks. Its decentralized architecture, which separates clients and servers, poses unique challenges for systematic safety analysis. This paper proposes a novel framework to enhance MCP safety. Guided by the MAESTRO framework, we first analyze the missing safety mechanisms in MCP, and based on this analysis, we propose the Model Contextual Integrity Protocol (MCIP), a refined version of MCP that addresses these gaps. Next, we develop a fine-grained taxonomy that captures a diverse range of unsafe behaviors observed in MCP scenarios. Building on this taxonomy, we develop benchmark and training data that support the evaluation and improvement of LLMs' capabilities in identifying safety risks within MCP interactions. Leveraging the proposed benchmark and training data, we conduct extensive experiments on state-of-the-art LLMs. The results highlight LLMs' vulnerabilities in MCP interactions and demonstrate that our approach substantially improves their safety performance.

Foundation models are moving from response generation into operational roles. They plan across steps, call tools, request human input, coordinate with other agents, and increasingly carry responsibility for work that affects customers, claims, code, contracts, and clinical decisions. Production deployments are no longer one human supervising one model. They are multi-human, multi-agent collaborations that cross teams, time zones, and trust boundaries. The technical surface for this collaboration remains weakly specified. When an agent drafts a response and a human edits it before it ships, the moment of human judgement is the most valuable signal in the system. In current practice it is recorded, if at all, in application code, chat threads, ticket comments, and tribal memory. Two protocol standards address adjacent concerns: MCP standardises agent access to tools and data, and A2A standardises agent-to-agent interoperability. Neither defines the shared workspace in which humans and agents perform accountable work together. This paper presents CHAP, the Collaborative Human-Agent Protocol. Under CHAP, the override that used to vanish into a chat thread becomes a structured event carrying a diff, a rationale, and a content hash. The handoff between shifts becomes a portable envelope rather than a pinned message. The human approval of an agent's draft becomes a non-repudiable signed decision that can be replayed years later. The protocol achieves this through a small Core (workspaces, participants, tasks, artefacts, and an append-only evidence log) together with composable profiles that add review, modes, routing, deliberation, handoff, identity, signatures, and transparency-backed audit as deployments require them. Specification, reference implementation, conformance suite, and worked examples are available at: https://github.com/BrightbeamAI/chap

The potential for agents, whether embodied or software, to learn by observing other agents performing procedures involving objects and actions is rich. Current research on automatic procedure learning heavily relies on action labels or video subtitles, even during the evaluation phase, which makes them infeasible in real-world scenarios. This leads to our question: can the human-consensus structure of a procedure be learned from a large set of long, unconstrained videos (e.g., instructional videos from YouTube) with only visual evidence? To answer this question, we introduce the problem of procedure segmentation--to segment a video procedure into category-independent procedure segments. Given that no large-scale dataset is available for this problem, we collect a large-scale procedure segmentation dataset with procedure segments temporally localized and described; we use cooking videos and name the dataset YouCook2. We propose a segment-level recurrent network for generating procedure segments by modeling the dependencies across segments. The generated segments can be used as pre-processing for other tasks, such as dense video captioning and event parsing. We show in our experiments that the proposed model outperforms competitive baselines in procedure segmentation.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) standardizes how large language model (LLM) agents discover, describe, and call external tools. While MCP unlocks broad interoperability, it also enlarges the attack surface by making tools first-class, composable objects with natural-language metadata, and standardized I/O. We present MSB (MCP Security Benchmark), the first end-to-end evaluation suite that systematically measures how well LLM agents resist MCP-specific attacks throughout the full tool-use pipeline: task planning, tool invocation, and response handling. MSB contributes: (1) a taxonomy of 12 attacks including name-collision, preference manipulation, prompt injections embedded in tool descriptions, out-of-scope parameter requests, user-impersonating responses, false-error escalation, tool-transfer, retrieval injection, and mixed attacks; (2) an evaluation harness that executes attacks by running real tools (both benign and malicious) via MCP rather than simulation; and (3) a robustness metric that quantifies the trade-off between security and performance: Net Resilient Performance (NRP). We evaluate nine popular LLM agents across 10 domains and 405 tools, producing 2,000 attack instances. Results reveal the effectiveness of attacks against each stage of MCP. Models with stronger performance are more vulnerable to attacks due to their outstanding tool calling and instruction following capabilities. MSB provides a practical baseline for researchers and practitioners to study, compare, and harden MCP agents. Code: https://github.com/dongsenzhang/MSB

Encrypted traffic classification (TC) methods must adapt to new protocols and extensions as well as to advancements in other machine learning fields. In this paper, we follow a transfer learning setup best known from computer vision. We first pretrain an embedding model on a complex task with a large number of classes and then transfer it to five well-known TC datasets. The pretraining task is recognition of SNI domains in encrypted QUIC traffic, which in itself is a problem for network monitoring due to the growing adoption of TLS Encrypted Client Hello. Our training pipeline -- featuring a disjoint class setup, ArcFace loss function, and a modern deep learning architecture -- aims to produce universal embeddings applicable across tasks. The proposed solution, based on nearest neighbors search in the embedding space, surpasses SOTA performance on four of the five TC datasets. A comparison with a baseline method utilizing raw packet sequences revealed unexpected findings with potential implications for the broader TC field. We published the model architecture, trained weights, and transfer learning experiments.

Our interest is in the design of software systems involving a human-expert interacting -- using natural language -- with a large language model (LLM) on data analysis tasks. For complex problems, it is possible that LLMs can harness human expertise and creativity to find solutions that were otherwise elusive. On one level, this interaction takes place through multiple turns of prompts from the human and responses from the LLM. Here we investigate a more structured approach based on an abstract protocol described in [3] for interaction between agents. The protocol is motivated by a notion of "two-way intelligibility" and is modelled by a pair of communicating finite-state machines. We provide an implementation of the protocol, and provide empirical evidence of using the implementation to mediate interactions between an LLM and a human-agent in two areas of scientific interest (radiology and drug design). We conduct controlled experiments with a human proxy (a database), and uncontrolled experiments with human subjects. The results provide evidence in support of the protocol's capability of capturing one- and two-way intelligibility in human-LLM interaction; and for the utility of two-way intelligibility in the design of human-machine systems. Our code is available at https://github.com/karannb/interact.

Safety alignment is critical for the responsible deployment of large language models (LLMs). As Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architectures are increasingly adopted to scale model capacity, understanding their safety robustness becomes essential. Existing adversarial attacks, however, have notable limitations. Prompt-based jailbreaks rely on heuristic search and transfer poorly, model intervention methods require privileged access to internal representations, and optimization-based input attacks remain output-centric and are fundamentally limited to MoE models due to the non-differentiable routing mechanism. In this paper, we present RouteHijack, a routing-aware jailbreak for MoE LLMs. Our key insight is that safety behavior is concentrated in a small subset of experts, creating an opportunity to steer model behavior by influencing routing decisions through input optimization. Building on this observation, RouteHijack first performs response-driven expert localization to identify safety-critical and harmful experts by contrasting activations under safe refusals and harmful completions. It then constructs adversarial suffixes with a routing-aware objective that suppresses safety experts, promotes harmful experts, and prevents early-stage refusal during generation. At inference time, the optimized suffix is appended to a malicious prompt, requiring only input access. Across seven MoE LLMs, RouteHijack achieves a 69.3\% average attack success rate (ASR), outperforming prior optimization-based attack by 3.2times. RouteHijack also transfers zero-shot across five sibling MoE variants, raising average ASR from 27.7\% to 61.2\%, and further generalizes to three MoE-based VLMs, increasing average ASR from 2.47\% to 38.7\%. These findings expose a fundamental vulnerability in sparse expert architectures and highlight the need for defenses beyond output-level alignment.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a standardized interface enabling seamless integration between Large Language Models (LLMs) and external data sources and tools. While MCP significantly reduces development complexity and enhances agent capabilities, its openness and extensibility introduce critical security vulnerabilities that threaten system trustworthiness and user data protection. This paper systematically analyzes the security landscape of MCP-based systems, identifying three principal threat categories: (1) agent hijacking attacks stemming from protocol design deficiencies; (2) traditional web vulnerabilities in MCP servers; and (3) supply chain security. To address these challenges, we comprehensively survey existing defense strategies, examining both proactive server-side scanning approaches, ranging from layered detection pipelines and agentic auditing frameworks to zero-trust registry systems, and runtime interaction monitoring solutions that provide continuous oversight and policy enforcement. Our analysis reveals that MCP security fundamentally represents a paradigm shift where the attack surface extends from traditional code execution to semantic interpretation of natural language metadata, necessitating novel defense mechanisms tailored to this unique threat model.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has rapidly emerged as a universal standard for connecting AI assistants to external tools and data sources. While MCP simplifies integration between AI applications and various services, it introduces significant security vulnerabilities, particularly on the client side. In this work we conduct threat modelings of MCP implementations using STRIDE (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, Elevation of Privilege) and DREAD (Damage, Reproducibility, Exploitability, Affected Users, Discoverability) frameworks across five key components: (1) MCP Host and Client, (2) LLM, (3) MCP Server, (4) External Data Stores, and (5) Authorization Server. This comprehensive analysis reveals tool poisoning-where malicious instructions are embedded in tool metadata-as the most prevalent and impactful client-side vulnerability. We therefore focus our empirical evaluation on this critical attack vector, providing a systematic comparison of how seven major MCP clients validate and defend against tool poisoning attacks. Our analysis reveals significant security issues with most tested clients due to insufficient static validation and parameter visibility. We propose a multi-layered defense strategy encompassing static metadata analysis, model decision path tracking, behavioral anomaly detection, and user transparency mechanisms. This research addresses a critical gap in MCP security, which has primarily focused on server-side vulnerabilities, and provides actionable recommendations and mitigation strategies for securing AI agent ecosystems.

Current AI agent frameworks commit early to a single interaction protocol, a fixed tool integration strategy, and static user models, limiting their deployment across diverse interaction paradigms. To address these constraints, we introduce STEM Agent (Self-adapting, Tool-enabled, Extensible, Multi-agent), a modular architecture inspired by biological pluripotency in which an undifferentiated agent core differentiates into specialized protocol handlers, tool bindings, and memory subsystems that compose into a fully functioning AI system. The framework unifies five interoperability protocols (A2A, AG-UI, A2UI, UCP, and AP2) behind a single gateway, introduces a Caller Profiler that continuously learns user preferences across more than twenty behavioral dimensions, externalizes all ___domain capabilities through the Model Context Protocol (MCP), and implements a biologically inspired skills acquisition system in which recurring interaction patterns crystallize into reusable agent skills through a maturation lifecycle analogous to cell differentiation. Complementing these capabilities, the memory system incorporates consolidation mechanisms, including episodic pruning, semantic deduplication, and pattern extraction, designed for sub-linear growth under sustained interaction. A comprehensive 413-test suite validates protocol handler behavior and component integration across all five architectural layers, completing in under three seconds.

We introduce MacroBench, a code-first benchmark that evaluates whether LLMs can synthesize reusable browser-automation programs (macros) from natural-language goals by reading HTML/DOM and emitting Selenium. MacroBench instantiates seven self-hosted sites covering 681 tasks across interaction complexity and targeting difficulty. Our end-to-end protocol validates generated code via static checks, sandboxed execution, and outcome verification (DOM assertions, database snapshots), and includes a safety suite for scraping, spam/abuse, and credential/privacy prompts. Across 2,636 model-task runs, we observe stratified success: GPT-4o-mini (96.8%), GPT-4o (95.3%), Gemini (89.0%), DeepSeek (83.4%). Models handle simple tasks reliably (91.7%) but fail on complex workflows (0.0%), and none meet production-quality coding practices despite functional completion. We release our complete benchmark pipeline, evaluation framework, and experimental results at https://github.com/hyunjun1121/MacroBench to enable reproducible assessment of macro synthesis for web automation.

Face recognition has evolved as a widely used biometric modality. However, its vulnerability against presentation attacks poses a significant security threat. Though presentation attack detection (PAD) methods try to address this issue, they often fail in generalizing to unseen attacks. In this work, we propose a new framework for PAD using a one-class classifier, where the representation used is learned with a Multi-Channel Convolutional Neural Network (MCCNN). A novel loss function is introduced, which forces the network to learn a compact embedding for bonafide class while being far from the representation of attacks. A one-class Gaussian Mixture Model is used on top of these embeddings for the PAD task. The proposed framework introduces a novel approach to learn a robust PAD system from bonafide and available (known) attack classes. This is particularly important as collecting bonafide data and simpler attacks are much easier than collecting a wide variety of expensive attacks. The proposed system is evaluated on the publicly available WMCA multi-channel face PAD database, which contains a wide variety of 2D and 3D attacks. Further, we have performed experiments with MLFP and SiW-M datasets using RGB channels only. Superior performance in unseen attack protocols shows the effectiveness of the proposed approach. Software, data, and protocols to reproduce the results are made available publicly.

Purpose: Surgical performance depends not only on surgeons' technical skills but also on team communication within and across the different professional groups present during the operation. Therefore, automatically identifying team communication in the OR is crucial for patient safety and advances in the development of computer-assisted surgical workflow analysis and intra-operative support systems. To take the first step, we propose a new task of detecting communication briefings involving all OR team members, i.e. the team Time-out and the StOP?-protocol, by localizing their start and end times in video recordings of surgical operations. Methods: We generate an OR dataset of real surgeries, called Team-OR, with more than one hundred hours of surgical videos captured by the multi-view camera system in the OR. The dataset contains temporal annotations of 33 Time-out and 22 StOP?-protocol activities in total. We then propose a novel group activity detection approach, where we encode both scene context and action features, and use an efficient neural network model to output the results. Results: The experimental results on the Team-OR dataset show that our approach outperforms existing state-of-the-art temporal action detection approaches. It also demonstrates the lack of research on group activities in the OR, proving the significance of our dataset. Conclusion: We investigate the Team Time-Out and the StOP?-protocol in the OR, by presenting the first OR dataset with temporal annotations of group activities protocols, and introducing a novel group activity detection approach that outperforms existing approaches. Code is available at https://github.com/CAMMA-public/Team-OR.

A general-purpose language model that answers a harmful question returns text; a coding model that complies with a malicious request can return a working weapon -- a keylogger, a ransomware stub, an exploit that runs as written. This asymmetry in the severity of a single act of compliance implies coding-specialized models should clear a higher refusal bar than general-purpose chat models, not a lower one, yet the field cannot presently tell whether they do. Refusal benchmarks for malicious code are fragmented: they mix requests for executable software (ready-to-run weapons) with requests for harmful security knowledge (information a human must still operationalise) and report refusal rates over non-comparable corpora, so no single statistic measures the property that actually matters. This paper introduces an expanded consensus-labeled prompt bank that distinguishes between these two request types and provides a construct-stable substrate for cross-corpus coding-model compliance measurement. Eight corpora (ASTRA, CySecBench, AdvBench/harmful_behaviors, JailbreakBench, MalwareBench, RedCode, RMCBench, Scam2Prompt) are consolidated and classified under a five-judge consensus protocol (6,675 prompts x 5 judges = 33,375 calls). The panel reaches Fleiss' kappa = 0.767 [95% CI 0.755, 0.777] ("substantial"); 95.0% of prompts draw at least four agreeing judges, 76.9% are unanimous, and the panel reproduces the earlier four-corpus release at Cohen's kappa = 0.952 on the 3,133 shared prompts. The released bank comprises 4,748 consensus-CODE prompts (executable malicious code requests) and 1,923 consensus-KNOWLEDGE prompts (harmful security knowledge requests). The bank is the validated instrument the field has lacked: a reliability-quantified basis for testing whether coding models meet the stricter refusal standard their executable output demands.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has emerged as a universal standard that enables AI agents to seamlessly connect with external tools, significantly enhancing their functionality. However, while MCP brings notable benefits, it also introduces significant vulnerabilities, such as Tool Poisoning Attacks (TPA), where hidden malicious instructions exploit the sycophancy of large language models (LLMs) to manipulate agent behavior. Despite these risks, current academic research on MCP security remains limited, with most studies focusing on narrow or qualitative analyses that fail to capture the diversity of real-world threats. To address this gap, we present the MCP Attack Library (MCPLIB), which categorizes and implements 31 distinct attack methods under four key classifications: direct tool injection, indirect tool injection, malicious user attacks, and LLM inherent attack. We further conduct a quantitative analysis of the efficacy of each attack. Our experiments reveal key insights into MCP vulnerabilities, including agents' blind reliance on tool descriptions, sensitivity to file-based attacks, chain attacks exploiting shared context, and difficulty distinguishing external data from executable commands. These insights, validated through attack experiments, underscore the urgency for robust defense strategies and informed MCP design. Our contributions include 1) constructing a comprehensive MCP attack taxonomy, 2) introducing a unified attack framework MCPLIB, and 3) conducting empirical vulnerability analysis to enhance MCP security mechanisms. This work provides a foundational framework, supporting the secure evolution of MCP ecosystems.

It is tempting to assume any task solvable by a short program can be taught to a model as its chain-of-thought: write the steps out, fine-tune, and the model follows. This paper shows the assumption fails for an identifiable class of procedures. The testbed is nine reasoning tasks, each from a deterministic generator; public and hidden splits share generators, so held-out data proxies test accuracy. I reverse-engineer the generators into Python solvers, render them as chain-of-thought, and distill into a rank-<= 32 LoRA over a 30B (3.5B-active) Nemotron model. Forward-computable tasks install readily: lookup/arithmetic and an 8-bit boolean task transfer (>= 0.99 and 0.68). Cryptarithm does not: distilling its backtracking search holds at 0.01-0.07 across eleven chain-of-thought designs, RL from verifiable rewards, and self-training, even though a search solver answers 71% of instances. This is not a capability gap. The model does the arithmetic on 97-100% of lines and ranks the correct cipher in its top eight on 71%; it cannot carry the search forward as a left-to-right derivation. Fine-tuning learns the shape of a verifiable elimination step while its verdicts become unconditional templates, correct only 16-57% of the time ("verdict-as-token"). The ceiling holds across backbones from 3B to 671B and across fine-tuning and prompting; a controlled intervention isolates the cause: revealing the cipher key, which turns the derivation forward, lifts the same instances from 0.03 to 0.57. When a procedure's only solution is search over information-free structure, no faithful forward chain-of-thought exists to imitate. The task becomes learnable only by removing the search, precomputing its combinatorial core into a catalog and reducing the trace to recall plus verification; the 1st-place solution reaches Private LB 0.92 this way. What distills is memorization and verification, not search.

Large language models (LLMs) are evolving into agentic systems that reason, plan, and operate external tools. The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is a key enabler of this transition, offering a standardized interface for connecting LLMs with heterogeneous tools and services. Yet MCP's openness and multi-server workflows introduce new safety risks that existing benchmarks fail to capture, as they focus on isolated attacks or lack real-world coverage. We present MCP-SafetyBench, a comprehensive benchmark built on real MCP servers that supports realistic multi-turn evaluation across five domains: browser automation, financial analysis, ___location navigation, repository management, and web search. It incorporates a unified taxonomy of 20 MCP attack types spanning server, host, and user sides, and includes tasks requiring multi-step reasoning and cross-server coordination under uncertainty. Using MCP-SafetyBench, we systematically evaluate leading open- and closed-source LLMs, revealing that all models remain vulnerable to MCP attacks, with a notable safety-utility trade-off. Our results highlight the urgent need for stronger defenses and establish MCP-SafetyBench as a foundation for diagnosing and mitigating safety risks in real-world MCP deployments.

SCTP is a transport protocol offering features such as multi-homing, multi-streaming, and message-oriented delivery. Its two main implementations were subjected to conformance tests using the PacketDrill tool. Conformance testing is not exhaustive and a recent vulnerability (CVE-2021-3772) showed SCTP is not immune to attacks. Changes addressing the vulnerability were implemented, but the question remains whether other flaws might persist in the protocol design. We study the security of the SCTP design, taking a rigorous approach rooted in formal methods. We create a formal Promela model of SCTP, and define 10 properties capturing the essential protocol functionality based on its RFC specification and consultation with the lead RFC author. Then we show using the Spin model checker that our model satisfies these properties. We define 4 attacker models - Off-Path, where the attacker is an outsider that can spoof the port and IP of a peer; Evil-Server, where the attacker is a malicious peer; Replay, where an attacker can capture and replay, but not modify, packets; and On-Path, where the attacker controls the channel between peers. We modify an attack synthesis tool designed for transport protocols, Korg, to support our SCTP model and four attacker models. We synthesize 14 unique attacks using the attacker models - including the CVE vulnerability in the Off-Path attacker model, 4 attacks in the Evil-Server attacker model, an opportunistic ABORT attack in the Replay attacker model, and eight connection manipulation attacks in the On-Path attacker model. We show that the proposed patch eliminates the vulnerability and does not introduce new ones according to our model and protocol properties. Finally, we identify and analyze an ambiguity in the RFC, which we show can be interpreted insecurely. We propose an erratum and show that it eliminates the ambiguity.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is a standardized interface designed to enable seamless interaction between AI models and external tools and resources, breaking down data silos and facilitating interoperability across diverse systems. This paper provides a comprehensive overview of MCP, focusing on its core components, workflow, and the lifecycle of MCP servers, which consists of three key phases: creation, operation, and update. We analyze the security and privacy risks associated with each phase and propose strategies to mitigate potential threats. The paper also examines the current MCP landscape, including its adoption by industry leaders and various use cases, as well as the tools and platforms supporting its integration. We explore future directions for MCP, highlighting the challenges and opportunities that will influence its adoption and evolution within the broader AI ecosystem. Finally, we offer recommendations for MCP stakeholders to ensure its secure and sustainable development as the AI landscape continues to evolve.

Model Context Protocol (MCP) servers enable AI applications to connect to external systems in a plug-and-play manner, but their rapid proliferation also introduces severe security risks. Unlike mature software ecosystems with rigorous vetting, MCP servers still lack standardized review mechanisms, giving adversaries opportunities to distribute malicious implementations. Despite this pressing risk, the security implications of MCP servers remain underexplored. To address this gap, we present the first systematic study that treats MCP servers as active threat actors and decomposes them into core components to examine how adversarial developers can implant malicious intent. Specifically, we investigate three research questions: (i) what types of attacks malicious MCP servers can launch, (ii) how vulnerable MCP hosts and Large Language Models (LLMs) are to these attacks, and (iii) how feasible it is to carry out MCP server attacks in practice. Our study proposes a component-based taxonomy comprising twelve attack categories. For each category, we develop Proof-of-Concept (PoC) servers and demonstrate their effectiveness across diverse real-world host-LLM settings. We further show that attackers can generate large numbers of malicious servers at virtually no cost. We then test state-of-the-art scanners on the generated servers and found that existing detection approaches are insufficient. These findings highlight that malicious MCP servers are easy to implement, difficult to detect with current tools, and capable of causing concrete damage to AI agent systems. Addressing this threat requires coordinated efforts among protocol designers, host developers, LLM providers, and end users to build a more secure and resilient MCP ecosystem.

We present SlowFast networks for video recognition. Our model involves (i) a Slow pathway, operating at low frame rate, to capture spatial semantics, and (ii) a Fast pathway, operating at high frame rate, to capture motion at fine temporal resolution. The Fast pathway can be made very lightweight by reducing its channel capacity, yet can learn useful temporal information for video recognition. Our models achieve strong performance for both action classification and detection in video, and large improvements are pin-pointed as contributions by our SlowFast concept. We report state-of-the-art accuracy on major video recognition benchmarks, Kinetics, Charades and AVA. Code has been made available at: https://github.com/facebookresearch/SlowFast

Various algorithms for continual learning (CL) have been designed with the goal of effectively alleviating the trade-off between stability and plasticity during the CL process. To achieve this goal, tuning appropriate hyperparameters for each algorithm is essential. As an evaluation protocol, it has been common practice to train a CL algorithm using diverse hyperparameter values on a CL scenario constructed with a benchmark dataset. Subsequently, the best performance attained with the optimal hyperparameter value serves as the criterion for evaluating the CL algorithm. In this paper, we contend that this evaluation protocol is not only impractical but also incapable of effectively assessing the CL capability of a CL algorithm. Returning to the fundamental principles of model evaluation in machine learning, we propose an evaluation protocol that involves Hyperparameter Tuning and Evaluation phases. Those phases consist of different datasets but share the same CL scenario. In the Hyperparameter Tuning phase, each algorithm is iteratively trained with different hyperparameter values to find the optimal hyperparameter values. Subsequently, in the Evaluation phase, the optimal hyperparameter values is directly applied for training each algorithm, and their performance in the Evaluation phase serves as the criterion for evaluating them. Through experiments on CIFAR-100 and ImageNet-100 based on the proposed protocol in class-incremental learning, we not only observed that the existing evaluation method fail to properly assess the CL capability of each algorithm but also observe that some recently proposed state-of-the-art algorithms, which reported superior performance, actually exhibit inferior performance compared to the previous algorithm.

Procedures are inherently hierarchical. To "make videos", one may need to "purchase a camera", which in turn may require one to "set a budget". While such hierarchical knowledge is critical for reasoning about complex procedures, most existing work has treated procedures as shallow structures without modeling the parent-child relation. In this work, we attempt to construct an open-___domain hierarchical knowledge-base (KB) of procedures based on wikiHow, a website containing more than 110k instructional articles, each documenting the steps to carry out a complex procedure. To this end, we develop a simple and efficient method that links steps (e.g., "purchase a camera") in an article to other articles with similar goals (e.g., "how to choose a camera"), recursively constructing the KB. Our method significantly outperforms several strong baselines according to automatic evaluation, human judgment, and application to downstream tasks such as instructional video retrieval. A demo with partial data can be found at https://wikihow-hierarchy.github.io. The code and the data are at https://github.com/shuyanzhou/wikihow_hierarchy.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) replaces static, developer-controlled API integrations with more dynamic, user-driven agent systems, which also introduces new security risks. As MCP adoption grows across community servers and major platforms, organizations encounter threats that existing AI governance frameworks (such as NIST AI RMF and ISO/IEC 42001) do not yet cover in detail. We focus on three types of adversaries that take advantage of MCP s flexibility: content-injection attackers that embed malicious instructions into otherwise legitimate data; supply-chain attackers who distribute compromised servers; and agents who become unintentional adversaries by over-stepping their role. Based on early incidents and proof-of-concept attacks, we describe how MCP can increase the attack surface through data-driven exfiltration, tool poisoning, and cross-system privilege escalation. In response, we propose a set of practical controls, including per-user authentication with scoped authorization, provenance tracking across agent workflows, containerized sandboxing with input/output checks, inline policy enforcement with DLP and anomaly detection, and centralized governance using private registries or gateway layers. The aim is to help organizations ensure that unvetted code does not run outside a sandbox, tools are not used beyond their intended scope, data exfiltration attempts are detectable, and actions can be audited end-to-end. We close by outlining open research questions around verifiable registries, formal methods for these dynamic systems, and privacy-preserving agent operations.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) enables large language models to invoke external tools through natural-language descriptions, forming the foundation of many AI agent applications. However, MCP does not enforce consistency between documented tool behavior and actual code execution, even though MCP Servers often run with broad system privileges. This gap introduces a largely unexplored security risk. We study how mismatches between externally presented tool descriptions and underlying implementations systematically shape the mental models and decision-making behavior of intelligent agents. Specifically, we present the first large-scale study of description-code inconsistency in the MCP ecosystem. We design an automated static analysis framework and apply it to 10,240 real-world MCP Servers across 36 categories. Our results show that while most servers are highly consistent, approximately 13% exhibit substantial mismatches that can enable undocumented privileged operations, hidden state mutations, or unauthorized financial actions. We further observe systematic differences across application categories, popularity levels, and MCP marketplaces. Our findings demonstrate that description-code inconsistency is a concrete and prevalent attack surface in MCP-based AI agents, and motivate the need for systematic auditing and stronger transparency guarantees in future agent ecosystems.

Deploying large language models (LLMs) in real-world applications requires robust safety guard models to detect and block harmful user prompts. While large safety guard models achieve strong performance, their computational cost is substantial. To mitigate this, smaller distilled models are used, but they often underperform on "hard" examples where the larger model provides accurate predictions. We observe that many inputs can be reliably handled by the smaller model, while only a small fraction require the larger model's capacity. Motivated by this, we propose SafeRoute, a binary router that distinguishes hard examples from easy ones. Our method selectively applies the larger safety guard model to the data that the router considers hard, improving efficiency while maintaining accuracy compared to solely using the larger safety guard model. Experimental results on multiple benchmark datasets demonstrate that our adaptive model selection significantly enhances the trade-off between computational cost and safety performance, outperforming relevant baselines.

This paper addresses a critical challenge in cybersecurity: the gap between vulnerability information represented by Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs) and the resulting cyberattack actions. CVEs provide insights into vulnerabilities, but often lack details on potential threat actions (tactics, techniques, and procedures, or TTPs) within the ATT&CK framework. This gap hinders accurate CVE categorization and proactive countermeasure initiation. The paper introduces the TTPpredictor tool, which uses innovative techniques to analyze CVE descriptions and infer plausible TTP attacks resulting from CVE exploitation. TTPpredictor overcomes challenges posed by limited labeled data and semantic disparities between CVE and TTP descriptions. It initially extracts threat actions from unstructured cyber threat reports using Semantic Role Labeling (SRL) techniques. These actions, along with their contextual attributes, are correlated with MITRE's attack functionality classes. This automated correlation facilitates the creation of labeled data, essential for categorizing novel threat actions into threat functionality classes and TTPs. The paper presents an empirical assessment, demonstrating TTPpredictor's effectiveness with accuracy rates of approximately 98% and F1-scores ranging from 95% to 98% in precise CVE classification to ATT&CK techniques. TTPpredictor outperforms state-of-the-art language model tools like ChatGPT. Overall, this paper offers a robust solution for linking CVEs to potential attack techniques, enhancing cybersecurity practitioners' ability to proactively identify and mitigate threats.

AI-agent guardrails are memoryless: each message is judged in isolation, so an adversary who spreads a single attack across dozens of sessions slips past every session-bound detector because only the aggregate carries the payload. We make three contributions to cross-session threat detection. (1) Dataset. CSTM-Bench is 26 executable attack taxonomies classified by kill-chain stage and cross-session operation (accumulate, compose, launder, inject_on_reader), each bound to one of seven identity anchors that ground-truth "violation" as a policy predicate, plus matched Benign-pristine and Benign-hard confounders. Released on Hugging Face as intrinsec-ai/cstm-bench with two 54-scenario splits: dilution (compositional) and cross_session (12 isolation-invisible scenarios produced by a closed-loop rewriter that softens surface phrasing while preserving cross-session artefacts). (2) Measurement. Framing cross-session detection as an information bottleneck to a downstream correlator LLM, we find that a session-bound judge and a Full-Log Correlator concatenating every prompt into one long-context call both lose roughly half their attack recall moving from dilution to cross_session, well inside any frontier context window. Scope: 54 scenarios per shard, one correlator family (Anthropic Claude), no prompt optimisation; we release it to motivate larger, multi-provider datasets. (3) Algorithm and metric. A bounded-memory Coreset Memory Reader retaining highest-signal fragments at K=50 is the only reader whose recall survives both shards. Because ranker reshuffles break KV-cache prefix reuse, we promote CSR_prefix (ordered prefix stability, LLM-free) to a first-class metric and fuse it with detection into CSTM = 0.7 F_1(CSDA@action, precision) + 0.3 CSR_prefix, benchmarking rankers on a single Pareto of recall versus serving stability.

Autonomous AI agents powered by large language models (LLMs) with structured function-calling interfaces have dramatically expanded capabilities for real-time data retrieval, complex computation, and multi-step orchestration. Yet, the explosive proliferation of plugins, connectors, and inter-agent protocols has outpaced discovery mechanisms and security practices, resulting in brittle integrations vulnerable to diverse threats. In this survey, we introduce the first unified, end-to-end threat model for LLM-agent ecosystems, spanning host-to-tool and agent-to-agent communications, formalize adversary capabilities and attacker objectives, and catalog over thirty attack techniques. Specifically, we organized the threat model into four domains: Input Manipulation (e.g., prompt injections, long-context hijacks, multimodal adversarial inputs), Model Compromise (e.g., prompt- and parameter-level backdoors, composite and encrypted multi-backdoors, poisoning strategies), System and Privacy Attacks (e.g., speculative side-channels, membership inference, retrieval poisoning, social-engineering simulations), and Protocol Vulnerabilities (e.g., exploits in Model Context Protocol (MCP), Agent Communication Protocol (ACP), Agent Network Protocol (ANP), and Agent-to-Agent (A2A) protocol). For each category, we review representative scenarios, assess real-world feasibility, and evaluate existing defenses. Building on our threat taxonomy, we identify key open challenges and future research directions, such as securing MCP deployments through dynamic trust management and cryptographic provenance tracking; designing and hardening Agentic Web Interfaces; and achieving resilience in multi-agent and federated environments. Our work provides a comprehensive reference to guide the design of robust defense mechanisms and establish best practices for resilient LLM-agent workflows.

Large language models trained for safety and harmlessness remain susceptible to adversarial misuse, as evidenced by the prevalence of "jailbreak" attacks on early releases of ChatGPT that elicit undesired behavior. Going beyond recognition of the issue, we investigate why such attacks succeed and how they can be created. We hypothesize two failure modes of safety training: competing objectives and mismatched generalization. Competing objectives arise when a model's capabilities and safety goals conflict, while mismatched generalization occurs when safety training fails to generalize to a ___domain for which capabilities exist. We use these failure modes to guide jailbreak design and then evaluate state-of-the-art models, including OpenAI's GPT-4 and Anthropic's Claude v1.3, against both existing and newly designed attacks. We find that vulnerabilities persist despite the extensive red-teaming and safety-training efforts behind these models. Notably, new attacks utilizing our failure modes succeed on every prompt in a collection of unsafe requests from the models' red-teaming evaluation sets and outperform existing ad hoc jailbreaks. Our analysis emphasizes the need for safety-capability parity -- that safety mechanisms should be as sophisticated as the underlying model -- and argues against the idea that scaling alone can resolve these safety failure modes.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) represents a significant advancement in AI-tool integration, enabling seamless communication between AI agents and external services. However, this connectivity introduces novel attack vectors that remain largely unexplored. This paper demonstrates how unsophisticated threat actors, requiring only basic programming skills and free web tools, can exploit MCP's trust model to exfiltrate sensitive financial data. We present a proof-of-concept attack where a malicious weather MCP server, disguised as benign functionality, discovers and exploits legitimate banking tools to steal user account balances. The attack chain requires no advanced technical knowledge, server infrastructure, or monetary investment. The findings reveal a critical security gap in the emerging MCP ecosystem: while individual servers may appear trustworthy, their combination creates unexpected cross-server attack surfaces. Unlike traditional cybersecurity threats that assume sophisticated adversaries, our research shows that the barrier to entry for MCP-based attacks is alarmingly low. A threat actor with undergraduate-level Python knowledge can craft convincing social engineering attacks that exploit the implicit trust relationships MCP establishes between AI agents and tool providers. This work contributes to the nascent field of MCP security by demonstrating that current MCP implementations allow trivial cross-server attacks and proposing both immediate mitigations and protocol improvements to secure this emerging ecosystem.

As the performance of large language models (LLMs) continues to advance, their adoption is expanding across a wide range of domains, including the medical field. The integration of LLMs into medical applications raises critical safety concerns, particularly due to their use by users with diverse roles, e.g. patients and clinicians, and the potential for model's outputs to directly affect human health. Despite the ___domain-specific capabilities of medical LLMs, prior safety evaluations have largely focused only on general safety benchmarks. In this paper, we introduce a safety evaluation protocol tailored to the medical ___domain in both patient user and clinician user perspectives, alongside general safety assessments and quantitatively analyze the safety of medical LLMs. We bridge a gap in the literature by building the PatientSafetyBench containing 466 samples over 5 critical categories to measure safety from the perspective of the patient. We apply our red-teaming protocols on the MediPhi model collection as a case study. To our knowledge, this is the first work to define safety evaluation criteria for medical LLMs through targeted red-teaming taking three different points of view - patient, clinician, and general user - establishing a foundation for safer deployment in medical domains.

Laboratory workflows in pharmaceutical and biomedical research encode substantial tacit knowledge -- expert judgment about failure conditions, decision branching logic, and contextual dependencies -- that remains inaccessible to protocol documents, sensor streams, and existing biomedical ontologies. We present a repeatable structured expert elicitation methodology and federated Semantic Knowledge Graph (SKG) architecture for capturing and querying this knowledge, demonstrated through deployment at the Biochemical and Cellular Pharmacology Department of Genentech. Knowledge is elicited via the Protocol Intelligence Co-pilot, a purpose-built AI interview agent that applies structured elicitation lenses to surface tacit procedural knowledge with expert-assigned confidence scores, producing graph representations across three tiers: program-level decision milestones, assay protocol knowledge, and physical execution infrastructure. Separately constructed subgraphs, exemplified by immunoassay (ELISA), quantitative mass spectrometry (LC-MS/PRM), and laboratory automation, are aligned through a shared upper ontology and queried as a single federated graph. Evaluation demonstrates seven query types structurally unavailable from any individual data source, including a cross-subgraph traversal that identifies automation-masked silent failures -- conditions where execution logs report success while scientific validity is compromised. Critically, the MASKED_BY graph relationship encodes a class of laboratory risk invisible to current informatics platforms -- the structural gap that prevents existing systems from reasoning about scientific validity. This architecture provides the semantic world model that AI laboratory agents currently lack: a queryable representation of where workflows fail silently, where human judgment is irreplaceable, and which execution assets mask rather than detect failure.

Large language model (LLM) routers improve the efficiency of multi-model systems by directing each query to the most appropriate model while leveraging the diverse strengths of heterogeneous LLMs. Most existing approaches frame routing as a classification problem based solely on the input query. While this reduces overhead by avoiding inference across all models, it overlooks valuable information that could be gleaned from potential outputs and fails to capture implicit intent or contextual nuances that often emerge only during response generation. These limitations can result in suboptimal routing decisions, particularly for complex or ambiguous queries that require deeper semantic understanding. To address this challenge, we propose Lookahead, a routing framework that "foresees" potential model outputs by predicting their latent representations and uses these predictions to guide model selection, thus enabling more informed routing without full inference. Within this framework, we implement two approaches based on causal and masked language models. Empirical evaluations across seven public benchmarks - spanning instruction following, mathematical reasoning, and code generation - show that Lookahead consistently outperforms existing routing baselines, achieving an average performance gain of 7.7% over the state-of-the-art. Our code is available at https://github.com/huangcb01/lookahead-routing.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) is rapidly becoming the standard interface for Large Language Models (LLMs) to discover and invoke external tools. However, existing evaluations often fail to capture the complexity of real-world scenarios, relying on restricted toolsets, simplistic workflows, or subjective LLM-as-a-judge metrics. We introduce MCP-Atlas, a large-scale benchmark for evaluating tool-use competency, comprising 36 real MCP servers and 220 tools. It includes 1,000 tasks designed to assess tool-use competency in realistic, multi-step workflows. Tasks use natural language prompts that avoid naming specific tools or servers, requiring agents to identify and orchestrate 3-6 tool calls across multiple servers. We score tasks using a claims-based rubric that awards partial credit based on the factual claims satisfied in the model's final answer, complemented by internal diagnostics on tool discovery, parameterization, syntax, error recovery, and efficiency. Evaluation results on frontier models reveal that top models achieve pass rates exceeding 50%, with primary failures arising from inadequate tool usage and task understanding. We release the task schema, containerized harness, and a 500-task public subset of the benchmark dataset to facilitate reproducible comparisons and advance the development of robust, tool-augmented agents.

The Model Context Protocol (MCP) has recently emerged as a standardized interface for connecting language models with external tools and data. As the ecosystem rapidly expands, the lack of a structured, comprehensive view of existing MCP artifacts presents challenges for research. To bridge this gap, we introduce MCPCorpus, a large-scale dataset containing around 14K MCP servers and 300 MCP clients. Each artifact is annotated with 20+ normalized attributes capturing its identity, interface configuration, GitHub activity, and metadata. MCPCorpus provides a reproducible snapshot of the real-world MCP ecosystem, enabling studies of adoption trends, ecosystem health, and implementation diversity. To keep pace with the rapid evolution of the MCP ecosystem, we provide utility tools for automated data synchronization, normalization, and inspection. Furthermore, to support efficient exploration and exploitation, we release a lightweight web-based search interface. MCPCorpus is publicly available at: https://github.com/Snakinya/MCPCorpus.

AI control protocols serve as a defense mechanism to stop untrusted LLM agents from causing harm in autonomous settings. Prior work treats this as a security problem, stress testing with exploits that use the deployment context to subtly complete harmful side tasks, such as backdoor insertion. In practice, most AI control protocols are fundamentally based on LLM monitors, which can become a central point of failure. We study adaptive attacks by an untrusted model that knows the protocol and the monitor model, which is plausible if the untrusted model was trained with a later knowledge cutoff or can search for this information autonomously. We instantiate a simple adaptive attack vector by which the attacker embeds publicly known or zero-shot prompt injections in the model outputs. Using this tactic, frontier models consistently evade diverse monitors and complete malicious tasks on two main AI control benchmarks. The attack works universally against current protocols that rely on a monitor. Furthermore, the recent Defer-to-Resample protocol even backfires, as its resampling amplifies the prompt injection and effectively reframes it as a best-of-n attack. In general, adaptive attacks on monitor models represent a major blind spot in current control protocols and should become a standard component of evaluations for future AI control mechanisms.

RAG (Retrieval-Augmented Generation) systems and web agents are increasingly evaluated on multi-hop deep search tasks, yet current practice suffers from two major limitations. First, most benchmarks leak the reasoning path in the question text, allowing models to follow surface cues rather than discover reasoning chains autonomously. Second, evaluation is typically reduced to a single pass rate, which collapses diverse behaviours into one score and obscures whether failures stem from inadequate search, poor knowledge use, or inappropriate refusal. To address these issues, we present WebDetective, a benchmark of hint-free multi-hop questions paired with a controlled Wikipedia sandbox that ensures full traceability of model actions, and a holistic evaluation framework that separates search sufficiency, knowledge utilisation, and refusal behaviour. Our evaluation of 25 state-of-the-art models reveals systematic weaknesses across all architectures: models struggle with knowledge utilisation despite having sufficient evidence and demonstrate near-absent appropriate refusal when evidence is lacking. These patterns expose a fundamental gap: today's systems excel at executing given reasoning paths but fail when required to discover them. We develop an agentic workflow, EvidenceLoop, that explicitly targets the challenges our benchmark identifies, incorporating verification loops and systematic evidence tracking that improve both search and synthesis capabilities. This baseline demonstrates that WebDetective's diagnostic framework can guide concrete architectural improvements, establishing our benchmark as a critical tool for developing genuinely autonomous reasoning systems rather than pattern-following agents.

Large language models routinely hallucinate APIs and mislocalize edits, while language servers compute verified, IDE-grade facts about real code. We present Lanser-CLI, a CLI-first orchestration layer that pins and mediates a Language Server Protocol (LSP) server for coding agents and CI, exposing deterministic, replayable workflows. Our position is that language servers provide not only structural information (definitions, references, types, diagnostics) but also an actionable process reward: machine-checked, step-wise signals that align an agent's planning loop with program reality. In this work, Lanser-CLI contributes: (i) a robust addressing scheme beyond brittle "file:line:col" via a Selector DSL (symbolic, AST-path, and content-anchored selectors) with a principled relocation algorithm; (ii) deterministic Analysis Bundles that normalize Language Server responses and capture environment/capability metadata with stable content hashes; (iii) a safety envelope for mutating operations (rename, code actions) with preview, workspace jails, and Git-aware, transactional apply; and (iv) a process-reward functional derived from Language Server facts (diagnostic deltas, disambiguation confidence, and safe-apply checks) that is computable online and replayable offline. We formalize determinism under frozen snapshots and establish a monotonicity property for the process reward, making it suitable for process supervision and counterfactual analysis. Project Page: https://github.com/yifanzhang-pro/lanser-cli

The emergence of agent-to-agent communication protocols mirrors the early internet: powerful connectivity with minimal security infrastructure. When AI agents communicate on behalf of users, every message crosses a trust boundary where the user's personal data and the external agent's unconstrained language each present distinct risks. We address both through a dual-firewall architecture grounded in a unifying principle: each task defines a context, and both sides of the communication carry information far exceeding what that context requires. Our firewalls act as projections onto the task context, allowing only contextually appropriate content to cross each boundary. The Language Converter Firewall projects incoming messages onto a closed, ___domain-specific, structured protocol; an external agent's message is converted to validated fields while persuasive framing, urgency tactics, and embedded instructions are structurally eliminated through deterministic verification. This replaces the asymmetric challenge of resisting every possible manipulation with the structural guarantee that manipulation has no channel through which to arrive. The Data Abstraction Firewall projects outgoing information onto the granularity appropriate for the task, rather than applying binary disclose-or-redact filtering, as previous airgapping solutions did. Both firewalls operate in a trusted environment isolated from external input, applying ___domain-specific rules learned automatically from demonstrations. Across 864 attacks spanning three domains on the ConVerse benchmark, our architecture reduces privacy attack success rates (e.g., from 84% to 10% for GPT-5) and security attacks (from 60% to 3%), while maintaining or even improving task completion quality.

Following step-by-step procedures is an essential component of various activities carried out by individuals in their daily lives. These procedures serve as a guiding framework that helps to achieve goals efficiently, whether it is assembling furniture or preparing a recipe. However, the complexity and duration of procedural activities inherently increase the likelihood of making errors. Understanding such procedural activities from a sequence of frames is a challenging task that demands an accurate interpretation of visual information and the ability to reason about the structure of the activity. To this end, we collect a new egocentric 4D dataset, CaptainCook4D, comprising 384 recordings (94.5 hours) of people performing recipes in real kitchen environments. This dataset consists of two distinct types of activity: one in which participants adhere to the provided recipe instructions and another in which they deviate and induce errors. We provide 5.3K step annotations and 10K fine-grained action annotations and benchmark the dataset for the following tasks: supervised error recognition, multistep localization, and procedure learning

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into real-world applications via the Model Context Protocol (MCP), a universal, open standard for connecting AI agents with data sources and external tools. While MCP enhances the capabilities of LLM-based agents, it also introduces new security risks and expands their attack surfaces. In this paper, we present the first systematic taxonomy of MCP security, identifying 17 attack types across 4 primary attack surfaces. We introduce MCPSecBench, a comprehensive security benchmark and playground that integrates prompt datasets, MCP servers, MCP clients, attack scripts, and protection mechanisms to evaluate these attacks across three major MCP providers. Our benchmark is modular and extensible, allowing researchers to incorporate custom implementations of clients, servers, and transport protocols for systematic security assessment. Experimental results show that over 85% of the identified attacks successfully compromise at least one platform, with core vulnerabilities universally affecting Claude, OpenAI, and Cursor, while prompt-based and tool-centric attacks exhibit considerable variability across different hosts and models. In addition, current protection mechanisms have little effect against these attacks. Overall, MCPSecBench standardizes the evaluation of MCP security and enables rigorous testing across all MCP layers.

Multi-model routing has evolved from an engineering technique into essential infrastructure, yet existing work lacks a systematic, reproducible benchmark for evaluating vision-language models (VLMs). We present VL-RouterBench to assess the overall capability of VLM routing systems systematically. The benchmark is grounded in raw inference and scoring logs from VLMs and constructs quality and cost matrices over sample-model pairs. In scale, VL-RouterBench covers 14 datasets across 3 task groups, totaling 30,540 samples, and includes 15 open-source models and 2 API models, yielding 519,180 sample-model pairs and a total input-output token volume of 34,494,977. The evaluation protocol jointly measures average accuracy, average cost, and throughput, and builds a ranking score from the harmonic mean of normalized cost and accuracy to enable comparison across router configurations and cost budgets. On this benchmark, we evaluate 10 routing methods and baselines and observe a significant routability gain, while the best current routers still show a clear gap to the ideal Oracle, indicating considerable room for improvement in router architecture through finer visual cues and modeling of textual structure. We will open-source the complete data construction and evaluation toolchain to promote comparability, reproducibility, and practical deployment in multimodal routing research.

This chapter discusses the need of security and privacy protection mechanisms in aggregation protocols used in wireless sensor networks (WSN). It presents a comprehensive state of the art discussion on the various privacy protection mechanisms used in WSNs and particularly focuses on the CPDA protocols proposed by He et al. (INFOCOM 2007). It identifies a security vulnerability in the CPDA protocol and proposes a mechanism to plug that vulnerability. To demonstrate the need of security in aggregation process, the chapter further presents various threats in WSN aggregation mechanisms. A large number of existing protocols for secure aggregation in WSN are discussed briefly and a protocol is proposed for secure aggregation which can detect false data injected by malicious nodes in a WSN. The performance of the protocol is also presented. The chapter concludes while highlighting some future directions of research in secure data aggregation in WSNs.

Autonomous AI agents now transact at production scale -- 69,000 bots executing 165 million transactions across 50 million USDC in cumulative volume on a single marketplace -- without any shared trust layer between participants. Regulatory frameworks (Singapore IMDA, NIST CAISI, EU AI Act) and major AI laboratories (Anthropic, Google) have independently converged on the same structural requirement: an open, portable, cryptographically verifiable trust infrastructure for autonomous agents that no single vendor can deliver alone. This paper presents MolTrust, a production-deployed implementation of such an infrastructure built on W3C Verifiable Credentials 2.0 and Decentralized Identifiers v1.0, with on-chain anchoring on Base Layer 2. The system architecture is organized around four primitives (identity, authorization, behavioral record, portability), a five-party accountability chain, and the Agent Authorization Envelope (AAE) -- a machine-evaluable authorization structure enforced at three layers: cryptographic signatures, API-level credential lifecycle management, and kernel-level syscall monitoring via Falco eBPF integration. The paper documents three distinguishing capabilities: kernel-layer AAE enforcement below the agent process boundary; cross-protocol interoperability through five reproducible test vectors verified against independent implementations; and layered Sybil resistance combining dual-signature interaction proofs, cross-vertical endorsement diversity gating, and principal-DID-linked violation persistence. The reference implementation has been operational since March 2026 across eight credential verticals. Empirical validation at adversarial scale is pending. The contribution is deployment-first evidence that the trust infrastructure regulators and industry have converged on is implementable today using W3C-standardized primitives.

The emergence of Large Language Models (LLMs) has ushered in a transformative paradigm in artificial intelligence, Agentic AI, where intelligent agents exhibit goal-directed autonomy, contextual reasoning, and dynamic multi-agent coordination. This paper provides a systematic review and comparative analysis of leading Agentic AI frameworks, including CrewAI, LangGraph, AutoGen, Semantic Kernel, Agno, Google ADK, and MetaGPT, evaluating their architectural principles, communication mechanisms, memory management, safety guardrails, and alignment with service-oriented computing paradigms. Furthermore, we identify key limitations, emerging trends, and open challenges in the field. To address the issue of agent communication, we conduct an in-depth analysis of protocols such as the Contract Net Protocol (CNP), Agent-to-Agent (A2A), Agent Network Protocol (ANP), and Agora. Our findings not only establish a foundational taxonomy for Agentic AI systems but also propose future research directions to enhance scalability, robustness, and interoperability. This work serves as a comprehensive reference for researchers and practitioners working to advance the next generation of autonomous AI systems.

With the rise of LLMs, a large number of Model Context Protocol (MCP) services have emerged since the end of 2024. However, the effectiveness and efficiency of MCP servers have not been well studied. To study these questions, we propose an evaluation framework, called MCPBench. We selected several widely used MCP server and conducted an experimental evaluation on their accuracy, time, and token usage. Our experiments showed that the most effective MCP, Bing Web Search, achieved an accuracy of 64%. Importantly, we found that the accuracy of MCP servers can be substantially enhanced by involving declarative interface. This research paves the way for further investigations into optimized MCP implementations, ultimately leading to better AI-driven applications and data retrieval solutions.

This paper provides a systematic analysis of the opportunities, challenges, and potential solutions of harnessing Large Language Models (LLMs) such as GPT-4 to dig out vulnerabilities within smart contracts based on our ongoing research. For the task of smart contract vulnerability detection, achieving practical usability hinges on identifying as many true vulnerabilities as possible while minimizing the number of false positives. Nonetheless, our empirical study reveals contradictory yet interesting findings: generating more answers with higher randomness largely boosts the likelihood of producing a correct answer but inevitably leads to a higher number of false positives. To mitigate this tension, we propose an adversarial framework dubbed GPTLens that breaks the conventional one-stage detection into two synergistic stages - generation and discrimination, for progressive detection and refinement, wherein the LLM plays dual roles, i.e., auditor and critic, respectively. The goal of auditor is to yield a broad spectrum of vulnerabilities with the hope of encompassing the correct answer, whereas the goal of critic that evaluates the validity of identified vulnerabilities is to minimize the number of false positives. Experimental results and illustrative examples demonstrate that auditor and critic work together harmoniously to yield pronounced improvements over the conventional one-stage detection. GPTLens is intuitive, strategic, and entirely LLM-driven without relying on specialist expertise in smart contracts, showcasing its methodical generality and potential to detect a broad spectrum of vulnerabilities. Our code is available at: https://github.com/git-disl/GPTLens.

The recent success and proliferation of machine learning and deep learning have provided powerful tools, which are also utilized for encrypted traffic analysis, classification, and threat detection in computer networks. These methods, neural networks in particular, are often complex and require a huge corpus of training data. Therefore, this paper focuses on collecting a large up-to-date dataset with almost 200 fine-grained service labels and 140 million network flows extended with packet-level metadata. The number of flows is three orders of magnitude higher than in other existing public labeled datasets of encrypted traffic. The number of service labels, which is important to make the problem hard and realistic, is four times higher than in the public dataset with the most class labels. The published dataset is intended as a benchmark for identifying services in encrypted traffic. Service identification can be further extended with the task of "rejecting" unknown services, i.e., the traffic not seen during the training phase. Neural networks offer superior performance for tackling this more challenging problem. To showcase the dataset's usefulness, we implemented a neural network with a multi-modal architecture, which is the state-of-the-art approach, and achieved 97.04% classification accuracy and detected 91.94% of unknown services with 5% false positive rate.

By providing a standardized interface for LLM agents to interact with external tools, the Model Context Protocol (MCP) is quickly becoming a cornerstone of the modern autonomous agent ecosystem. However, it creates novel attack surfaces due to untrusted external tools. While prior work has focused on attacks injected through external tool outputs, we investigate a more fundamental vulnerability: Tool Poisoning, where malicious instructions are embedded within a tool's metadata without execution. To date, this threat has been primarily demonstrated through isolated cases, lacking a systematic, large-scale evaluation. We introduce MCPTox, the first benchmark to systematically evaluate agent robustness against Tool Poisoning in realistic MCP settings. MCPTox is constructed upon 45 live, real-world MCP servers and 353 authentic tools. To achieve this, we design three distinct attack templates to generate a comprehensive suite of 1312 malicious test cases by few-shot learning, covering 10 categories of potential risks. Our evaluation on 20 prominent LLM agents setting reveals a widespread vulnerability to Tool Poisoning, with o1-mini, achieving an attack success rate of 72.8\%. We find that more capable models are often more susceptible, as the attack exploits their superior instruction-following abilities. Finally, the failure case analysis reveals that agents rarely refuse these attacks, with the highest refused rate (Claude-3.7-Sonnet) less than 3\%, demonstrating that existing safety alignment is ineffective against malicious actions that use legitimate tools for unauthorized operation. Our findings create a crucial empirical baseline for understanding and mitigating this widespread threat, and we release MCPTox for the development of verifiably safer AI agents. Our dataset is available at an anonymized repository: https://anonymous.4open.science/r/AAAI26-7C02.

Information seeking is a fundamental requirement for humans. However, existing LLM agents rely heavily on open-web search, which exposes two fundamental weaknesses: online content is noisy and unreliable, and many real-world tasks require precise, ___domain-specific knowledge unavailable from the web. The emergence of the Model Context Protocol (MCP) now allows agents to interface with thousands of specialized tools, seemingly resolving this limitation. Yet it remains unclear whether agents can effectively leverage such tools -- and more importantly, whether they can integrate them with general-purpose search to solve complex tasks. Therefore, we introduce InfoMosaic-Bench, the first benchmark dedicated to multi-source information seeking in tool-augmented agents. Covering six representative domains (medicine, finance, maps, video, web, and multi-___domain integration), InfoMosaic-Bench requires agents to combine general-purpose search with ___domain-specific tools. Tasks are synthesized with InfoMosaic-Flow, a scalable pipeline that grounds task conditions in verified tool outputs, enforces cross-source dependencies, and filters out shortcut cases solvable by trivial lookup. This design guarantees both reliability and non-triviality. Experiments with 14 state-of-the-art LLM agents reveal three findings: (i) web information alone is insufficient, with GPT-5 achieving only 38.2% accuracy and 67.5% pass rate; (ii) ___domain tools provide selective but inconsistent benefits, improving some domains while degrading others; and (iii) 22.4% of failures arise from incorrect tool usage or selection, highlighting that current LLMs still struggle with even basic tool handling.

Evaluating instruction following capabilities for multimodal, multi-turn dialogue is challenging. With potentially multiple instructions in the input model context, the task is time-consuming for human raters and we show LLM based judges are biased towards answers from the same model. We propose MMMT-IF, an image based multi-turn Q&A evaluation set with added global instructions between questions, constraining the answer format. This challenges models to retrieve instructions dispersed across long dialogues and reason under instruction constraints. All instructions are objectively verifiable through code execution. We introduce the Programmatic Instruction Following (PIF) metric to measure the fraction of the instructions that are correctly followed while performing a reasoning task. The PIF-N-K set of metrics further evaluates robustness by measuring the fraction of samples in a corpus where, for each sample, at least K out of N generated model responses achieve a PIF score of one. The PIF metric aligns with human instruction following ratings, showing 60 percent correlation. Experiments show Gemini 1.5 Pro, GPT-4o, and Claude 3.5 Sonnet, have a PIF metric that drops from 0.81 on average at turn 1 across the models, to 0.64 at turn 20. Across all turns, when each response is repeated 4 times (PIF-4-4), GPT-4o and Gemini successfully follow all instructions only 11% of the time. When all the instructions are also appended to the end of the model input context, the PIF metric improves by 22.3 points on average, showing that the challenge with the task lies not only in following the instructions, but also in retrieving the instructions spread out in the model context. We plan to open source the MMMT-IF dataset and metric computation code.